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INTRODUCTION
The legal field is at a critical moment of renewal and rein-
vention for the twenty-first century. In an analytical tour de
force, contemporary legal thought is promoting a shift from the
traditional New Deal regulatory era to a "Renew Deal" govern-
ance paradigm. Different schools of thought within legal aca-
demia are breaking from conventional models of regulation,
administration, and adjudication, and introducing a new re-
gime for a new century. Pointing to the false dilemma between
centralized regulation and deregulatory devolution, there is a
growing consensus in legal scholarship that innovative ap-
proaches to law, lawmaking, and lawyering are possible and
necessary. At the same time, a myriad of policy initiatives in
different fields are employing new regulatory approaches in le-
gal practice that reflect this theoretical vision. Administrative
agencies at the federal and state levels are increasingly pro-
moting outreach programs and issuing nonbinding guidelines
in lieu of their traditional top-down rule promulgation, imple-
mentation, and enforcement activities. New legislation in areas
such as eco-management and information technology provides
opportunities for private parties to opt out of the conventional
legal regime and manage their environment through collabora-
tive and dynamic planning. Courts and administrators increas-
ingly rely on voluntary compliance as a defense against liability
in employment discrimination cases. In all of these contexts,
government harnesses the power of new technologies, market
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innovation, and civic engagement to enable different stake-
holders to contribute to the project of governance.
This Article introduces the emerging vision as a paradigm
shift from a regulatory to a governance model, signifying a col-
lective intellectual and programmatic project for a new legal
regime. The new governance model connotes a decentering of
legal scholarship, challenging the traditional focus on formal
regulation as the dominant locus of change. The model enables
practices that dislocate traditional state-produced regulation
from its privileged place, while at the same time maintaining
the cohesion and large-scale goals of an integrated legal sys-
tem. It thereby provokes a long-awaited synthesis of thought
within legal academia, addressing the pervasiveness of both
regulatory and market failures. Ingeniously integrating in-
sights from law and economics and critical legal scholarship, it
further promises a renewed dialogue between those who cham-
pion centralized top-down regulation and those who advocate
devolution, deregulation, and privatization. The Article main-
tains that a key strength of the new governance model is its
explicit suggestion that economic efficiency and democratic le-
gitimacy can be mutually reinforcing.
Over a half-century ago, the New Deal signified a para-
digm shift in the American polity. Under the mandate of relief,
recovery, and reform, the modern regulatory administrative
state was created. In the context of world war and economic
depression, law was conceptualized as national, top-down, and
sanctioned. The New Deal regulatory model sought to consoli-
date formerly dispersed powers into the newly founded expert
regulatory agencies and to direct economic and social activities
at the national level. At the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury, against the backdrop of global competition, changing pat-
terns in market organization, and a declining commitment to
direct government intervention, contemporary legal thought
and practice are pointing to the emergence of a new para-
digm-governance-that ties together recent developments in
the political economy with advances in legal and democratic
theory. Governance signifies the range of activities, functions,
and exercise of control by both public and private actors in the
promotion of social, political, and economic ends. The new gov-
ernance model supports the replacement of the New Deal's hi-
erarchy and control with a more participatory and collaborative
model, in which government, industry, and society share re-
sponsibility for achieving policy goals. The adoption of govern-
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ance-based policies redefines state-society interactions and en-
courages multiple stakeholders to share traditional roles of
governance. Highlighting the increasing significance of norm-
generating nongovernmental actors, the model promotes a
movement downward and outward, transferring responsibili-
ties to states, localities, and the private sector-including pri-
vate businesses and nonprofit organizations. Lawmaking shifts
from a top-down, command-and-control framework to a reflex-
ive approach, which is process oriented and tailored to local cir-
cumstances. At the same time, by linking together geographi-
cally and materially dispersed law reform efforts, the model
provides innovative ways to coordinate local efforts and to pre-
vent the isolation of problems. Scaling up, facilitating innova-
tion, standardizing good practices, and encouraging the replica-
tion of success stories from local or private levels become
central goals of government. Legal orchestration is achieved
through interpenetration of policy boundaries, new pub-
lic/private partnerships, and next-generation policy strategies
such as negotiated rulemaking, audited self-regulation, per-
formance-based rules, decentralized and dynamic problem solv-
ing, disclosure regimes, and coordinated information collection.
This Article integrates the insights of recent legal ap-
proaches into a single framework called the Renew Deal school.
The Article both asserts the emergence of a new model and
critically explores the interaction among its various elements.
It unpacks the widespread claims of newness in legal theory, as
well as in practice, asking why legal projects are seeking to be
innovative and to what they are responding. At the same time,
it offers a comprehensive map for understanding the uncharted
terrain of renewal projects collectively, addressing contingen-
cies and internal tensions among the possible meanings and in-
terpretations of the emerging model. Prominent scholarly
works at the microlevel of doctrinal areas, the macrolevel of
constitutional and administrative law, and the metalevel of ju-
risprudence all advocate the necessity and the possibility of re-
newal through a new governance model. The new paradigm is
instigating change in a wide spectrum of policy issues and
fields, ranging from employment and environmental protection;
to welfare, family, health, and education laws; to policing and
criminal justice administration; to state takings, torts and con-
sumer protection; to transportation, information technology,
privacy, and corporate shareholder protections. This Article
demonstrates how the governance model emerges from a myr-
20041 345
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iad of recent scholarly theories including the following: "reflex-
ive law,"' "soft law," 2 "collaborative governance," 3 "democratic
experimentalism,"' 4 "responsive regulation,"5 "outsourcing regu-
lation,"6 "reconstitutive law,"7 "post-regulatory law,"8 "revitaliz-
ing regulation,"9 "regulatory pluralism,"' 0 "decentering regula-
tion,"'"i "meta-regulation,"'12  "contractarian law,"13
1. ALBERTO FEBBRAJO & GUNTHER TEUBNER, STATE, LAW AND ECONOMY
AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS: REGULATION AND AUTONOMY IN A NEW
PERSPECTIVE (1992); REFLEXIVE LABOUR LAW: STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT REGULATION (Ralf Rogowski & Ton Wilthagen
eds., 1994) [hereinafter REFLEXIVE LABOUR LAW].
2. See, e.g., David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in
the Construction of Social Europe: The Role of the Open Method of Coordina-
tion, EUR. L.J. (forthcoming 2004); KERSTIN JACOBSSON, INNOVATIONS IN EU
GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF EMPLOYMENT POLICY CO-ORDINATION (Stockholm
Center for Organizational Research, Working Paper No. 2001:12, 2001), at
http://www.score.su.se/pdfs/2001- l12.pdf.
3. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997).
4. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE
PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE (1998); Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and
Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875 (2003); Michael C. Dorf & Charles
F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
267 (1998) [hereinafter A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism]; Mi-
chael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Experimentalist
Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000) [hereinafter Drug Treatment Courts
and Experimentalist Government].
5. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION (2002).
6. DARA O'ROURKE, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Non-
Governmental Systems of Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL'Y STUD. J.
1 (2003).
7. Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86 (1986).
8. Gunther Teubner, After Legal Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of
Post-Regulatory Law, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 299 (Gun-
ther Teubner ed., 1986); David Trubek & Louise Trubek, Post-Regulatory Law
& Lawyering (Wisconsin Law School Course 940-015) (unpublished syllabus
and bibliography, on file with author).
9. Daniel A. Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1278,
1280 (1993).
10. Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Regulatory Pluralism: Designing
Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection, 21 LAW & POLY 49 (1999).
11. Julia Black, Decentering Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regu-
lation and Self-Regulation in a 'Post-Regulatory' World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 103 (2001).
12. Bronwen Morgan, Regulating the Regulators: Meta-Regulation as a
Strategy for Reinventing Government in Australia, 1 PUB. MGMT. 50 (1999).
13. David A. Dana, The New "Contractarian" Paradigm in Environmental
Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35.
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"communicative governance," 14 "negotiated governance,"'15 "de-
stabilization rights,"16 "cooperative implementation,"'17 "interac-
tive compliance,"' 8 "public laboratories," 19 "deepened democracy
and empowered participatory governance,"20  "pragmatic
lawyering,"21 "nonrival partnership,"' 22 and "a daring legal sys-
tem."23 It argues that these subsets of ideas should be under-
stood together as generating a powerful vision within legal
thought about the need for renewal through a shift to the gov-
ernance paradigm. The theoretically-integrated, Renew Deal
model serves to better inform policymakers in prescribe and
normatively evaluate policies, legal function, and democratic
ideals.
The Article begins by introducing the myriad of claims for
renewal within legal thought and practice. Part I discusses the
emergence of the twenty-first-century Renew Deal vision
against the backdrop of the twentieth-century New Deal.
Rather than merely a transition from one set of rules to the
next, it describes the connection between renewal and perma-
nent innovation as the key to understanding the new govern-
ance model. While the concept of regulation carries with it the
baggage of boundaries and predetermined solutions, the con-
14. Jan Kooiman, Findings, Speculations and Recommendations, in
MODERN GOVERNANCE: NEW GOVERNMENT-SOCIETY INTERACTIONS 249 (Jan
Kooiman ed., 1993).
15. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negoti-
ated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003).
16. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
17. Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regula-
tions, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 535 (1996).
18. CORPORATE LAWBREAKING AND INTERACTIVE COMPLIANCE:
RESOLVING THE REGULATION-DEREGULATION DICHOTOMY (Jay A. Sigler & Jo-
seph E. Murphy eds., 1991); JAY A. SIGLER & JOSEPH E. MURPHY,
INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO REGULATORY
COMPULSION (1988).
19. James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey
Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Re-
form, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 183 (2003).
20. DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN
EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright
eds., 2003).
21. William H. Simon, Solving Problems v. Claiming Rights: The Pragma-
tist Challenge to Legal Liberalism (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thor).
22. MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD (2002).
23. Id.
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temporary concept of governance is open, dynamic, and diverse
with a built-in temporal dimension. Part II traces the various
rationales and motivations that drive the theoretical and prac-
tical efforts for a Renew Deal. It argues that the contemporary
moment of renewal is simultaneously motivated by both exter-
nal push factors of the new political economy and internal de-
velopments within legal thought concerning the inherent limi-
tations of traditional regulatory theory. The analysis reveals
the coexistence of parallel modes of reasoning, internal and ex-
ternal to legal thought, including the following: crisis and op-
portunity; action and reaction; regression, progression, and cy-
clic; transition and permanence; replacement and
complementarity; and authentic law and outside-of-the-law
constructs. Drawing on these internal and external dynamics
for reform, Part II further demonstrates how the governance
model is linked to sectoral isomorphism among the public sec-
tor, the market, and the nonprofit, or "civil society," third sec-
tor. It argues that the market and civil society are at once the
platform and the analogy for triggering isomorphic changes in
the organization of public governance.
Part III provides a comprehensive roadmap of the dimen-
sions and organizing principles of the governance model. These
features consist of increased participation of nonstate actors,
stakeholder collaboration, diversity and competition, decen-
tralization and subsidiarity, integration of policy domains,
flexibility and noncoerciveness, adaptability and dynamic
learning, and legal orchestration among proliferated norm-
generating entities. The challenge is to understand these di-
mensions of the new legal model as operating together, along
with the contingencies and internal debates over meaning and
bricolage that inevitably arise in an emerging school of
thought. The new policy tools and mechanisms that are inte-
gral to the governance principles are evaluated and considered
within the efforts to improve democratic practices. Part IV
critically documents the practical application of governance
principles in the following three areas: employment law, envi-
ronmental law, and digital technology law. First, new work-
place policies-including occupational safety and health ad-
ministration, employment discrimination, and vocational
training programs-provide important insights into the ways
the legal regime is confronting the new political economy and
constructing innovative policies to produce socially responsible
market practices. The recent enactment of the Workforce In-
348 [89:342
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vestment Act (WIA), as well as newly adopted programs of the
federal Occupational Health and Safety Agency (OSHA) and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), pro-
vide practical testing grounds to examine large-scale shifts
from regulation to governance. In environmental law, a second
leading area of governance, scholars and activists are develop-
ing the concept of civic environmentalism, which confronts the
failures of traditional regulatory schemes and promotes par-
ticipatory and decentralized arrangements to better conserve
the ecosystem and natural resources. In particular, Part IV.B
examines the 2000 revised federal guidelines for Habitat Con-
servation Planning (HCP) under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA). The new policy encourages private stakeholders to en-
gage in participatory governance as an alternative to top-down
regulation. Finally, in a third principal governance domain, in-
formation technology law, the ever-expanding domain of the
Internet provides a momentous illustration of the implementa-
tion of governance principles in a new technological infrastruc-
ture. Regulatory agencies have begun harnessing the power of
digital technologies to meet the informational and organiza-
tional demands of rulemaking and to expand civic involvement
in policymaking, for example, through the enactment and im-
plementation of the 2002 E-Government Act. At the same time,
private industry and nongovernmental organizations are using
information technology to expand their public activities and
agendas, fostering new forms of norm-generating institutions.
The concept of cyberdemocracy and its regulatory challenges
are considered in relation to current legal debates about digital
regulation and design.
While the struggle among regulatory, market, and govern-
ance approaches persists, the new governance paradigm en-
ables a synthesis of thought within legal academia. Part V ar-
gues that the governance model is purposely and ingeniously
designed as a model of theoretical and practical hybridization,
drawing together elements from rival schools of thought. In
practice, it addresses the pervasiveness of both regulatory and
market failures. In legal theory, hybridization involves the in-
tegration of insights from both law and economics and critical
legal scholarship, and the rejection of the oppositional stance
that these schools have previously taken. In turn, the integra-
tive project enables the realignment of commitments between
advocates of centralized regulation and advocates of deregula-
tory privatization. Most importantly, the Renew Deal illumi-
2004]
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nates the ways in which, under certain conditions, economic ef-
ficiency and democratic legitimacy can be mutually reinforcing.
This Article concludes with a discussion of the central
normative canons that are evoked by the nascent governance
regime. Building on both the theoretical and programmatic
analyses of the emerging paradigm, Part VI introduces several
sets of critical challenges to the new conceptual framework.
First, it considers situations of compatibility-as opposed to in-
terchangeability-between the traditional regulatory model
and the new governance model. Second, it describes tensions
that arise between the emphasis on direct engagement, as well
as the notion of pluralized authority, championed by the new
model and the ongoing need for an expert representative gov-
ernment in the new polity. Third, the issue of power in a col-
laborative participatory legal regime is explicitly explored. A
central strength of the governance model is its appeal to both
progressive social reform agendas that support bottom-up de-
mocratic empowerment and exponents of projects of privatiza-
tion and devolution. It is precisely for this reason, however,
that the Renew Deal must confront difficult choices and further
develop its underlying values, enhancing the particular circum-
stances in which governance succeeds. In the concluding sec-
tion, the Article relates principles of the governance model to
our complex understanding of democracy, arguing for ongoing
substantive normative evaluation, even as we advance to the
more pluralized and process-oriented governance model.
I. THE SPIRIT OF RENEWAL IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL
THOUGHT
In describing the emergence of a new legal regime, the
claim to novelty is inexorably ambitious and problematic. Un-
doubtedly, there are politics of innovation in academia, as in
other communities of knowledge. A claim of newness often car-
ries with it several exciting promises, including progress, origi-
nality, optimism, and the introduction of cutting-edge ideas.
Newness as politics can also serve as a strategy for forgetting
differences and moving beyond past disagreements; it is a way
to conceal preassigned identities and enter into an ongoing dis-
course that previously seemed gridlocked by the ideas of famil-
iar, but mutually exclusive, incumbents. This Article is moti-
vated by the need for an articulation and evaluation of
contemporary legal thought, which ubiquitously declares itself
at a stage of renewal.
350 [89:342
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In his remarkable book, The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions, Thomas Kuhn describes a paradigm as a "set of recurrent
and quasi-standard illustrations of various theories in their
conceptual, observational, and instrumental applications."24 A
paradigm draws a picture of the world, including the constella-
tion of beliefs, values, and techniques shared by the members of
a community. 25 A new paradigm emerges through a revolution,
a noncumulative developmental episode in which an older
paradigm is understood to be replaced in whole or part by one
that is new and incompatible. 26 A revolution takes place when
the existing paradigm ceases to function adequately in the ex-
ploration of an aspect of nature and thought. While new para-
digms may replace older ones, continuous links to earlier mod-
els invariably exist.27
Over six decades ago, the New Deal brought a paradigm
shift to American society. The establishment of the New Deal
by President Franklin Roosevelt is widely understood as one of
the most significant events in American politics of the twenti-
eth century. As Bruce Ackerman has described, "[a] half-
century ago, our legal system was reeling under one of the
greatest shocks in its history. Although America had experi-
enced many depressions before, it had never confided political
power to a leadership so evidently willing to respond by ques-
tioning the legitimacy of laissez faire itself."28 Responding to
the burdens and risks of the Depression and two world wars,
the New Deal instigated the creation of the modern regulatory
and administrative state. The New Deal paradigm invoked
three Rs-relief, recovery, and reform, but it was the legal de-
velopments that united all three under the umbrella of the big
"R" of regulation. In a short period of time, a sweeping set of
24. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43
(1962).
25. See JOHN A. VASQUEZ, THE POWER OF POWER POLITICS: FROM
CLASSICAL REALISM TO NEOTRADITIONALISM 22-23 (1998) (defining paradigm
as the fundamental assumptions scholars make about the world they are
studying).
26. KUHN, supra note 24, at 110.
27. Labeling is of the essence, as it shapes and informs the imaginative
spectrum. New governance approaches have received a variety of names. Some
contribute more than others to the very elements the model seeks to promote.
Terms such as "post-regulatory" or "soft law" can, in my view, be problematic,
as they begin with a position of either/or and accept an inferior position of law
vis-i-vis the regulatory model.
28. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 6 (1984).
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new regulations, regulatory agencies, and federal and state
programs were created. 29
As we enter the twenty-first century, commentators from
across the political spectrum are signaling a second revolution-
ary paradigm shift-the Renew Deal. As with the New Deal,
the Renew Deal vision of governance aims to tie developments
in technology, globalization, communications, economic organi-
zation, and privatization, as well as the collapse of states and
ideologies, the unification of regimes like the European Union
(EU), and the rise of nonstate and stateless actors in both peace
and war together with developments in legal and democratic
theory, including the decline of unified theories and the dissat-
isfaction with oppositional and fragmented schools. At this
moment, a window has opened that engages the attention and
energy of diverse thinkers in the legal world.3 0
In the emerging Renew Deal, the claims of a new legal re-
gime are self-descriptive. Commentators from a wide range of
29. See generally WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
AND THE NEW DEAL: 1932-1940 (1963) (describing the social and political
events of Franklin D. Roosevelt's first two terms).
30. See infra Part II. Whether the shift to the Renew Deal is directly cor-
related with actual developments in the world or internally integrated by a
myriad of legal scholars who are using similar terms and concepts and are in-
spiring and being inspired by others, is secondary to the actual emergence of a
vision. Before the New Deal, pragmatism was understood to be the knot that
pulled different strands of intellectual thought together-the emergence of
cultural pluralism, the fascination with pure science and the logic of scientific
inquiry, the development of probability theory as a means for coping with ran-
domness and uncertainty and the spread of historicist approaches to study
culture, the rapid assimilation of Darwinian theory of evolution, and the sus-
picion of institutional authority. See, e.g., MICHAL ALBERSTEIN, PRAGMATISM
AND THE LAW: FROM PHILOSOPHY TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 13-14 (2002) (sug-
gesting that pragmatism should be understood as a rupture and a founda-
tional moment in American thought); CLASSICAL AMERICAN PRAGMATISM: ITS
CONTEMPORARY VITALITY (Sandra B. Rosenthal et al. eds., 1999) (showcasing
the intellectual contributions of prominent contemporary pragmatist scholars);
THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND
CULTURE (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998) (profiling the major currents in modern
American pragmatic thought); CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF
PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM (1989) (chronicling the history of
American pragmatism from Ralph Waldo Emerson to Richard Rorey and the
challenge of postmodernity). See generally Louis Menand, Introduction to
Pragmatism, in PRAGMATISM: A READER, at xxvi (Louis Menand ed., 1997). In
the succeeding decades after the New Deal, the "space race" of the 1960s and
1970s further fostered expectation about the capacities of top-down reform and
optimism about technology as an all-encompassing response to social need. See
WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY
05' Ti-iF PA CF An v (1 QRM
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legal fields agree that there is a contemporary "broad consen-
sus in favor of the need for some kind of change in the current
regulatory system."31 As one author describes, "[n]ot since the
New Deal has the direction of the administrative state been
subject to such contestation. The language of regulatory rein-
vention is ubiquitous."
3 2
Proclaiming a new post-New Deal paradigm has also been
ubiquitous in the political arena. During his presidency, Presi-
dent Clinton stated that the New Deal "helped to restore our
31. Daniel J. Fiorino, Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives
on Law and Governance, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441 (1999).
32. Freeman, supra note 3, at 3; see also BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS,
TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE
PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION (1995) (discussing the shifts and developments in
regulatory analysis and the federal bureaucracy during the Reagan years);
THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991); Nicholas W.
Allard, Reinventing Rate Regulation, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 63 (1993) (analyzing
the efficacy of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992); Symposium, Getting Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the Regula-
tory State, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 267, 279 (2002) (inquiring into the idea "that
public choice theory need not involve either the strong motivational assump-
tion of self-interest or the reductionary premise of perfect information and ra-
tionality"); Steven J. Groseclose, Reinventing the Regulatory Agenda: Conclu-
sions from an Empirical Study of EPA's Clean Air Act Rulemaking Progress
Projections, 53 MD. L. REV. 521 (1994) (recounting the shortcomings of the
EPA's Regulatory Agenda and offering suggestions for improvement); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Ne-
glect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 405 (1996) (scruti-
nizing efforts by the executive and legislative branches to reform the adminis-
trative state); Symposium, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Public Power to
Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002) (exploring the needs of the con-
temporary administrative state); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Rein-
venting the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1995) (evaluating Executive
Order 12,866 and its place in the Clinton administration's plan to reinvent
government); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public
Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611 (2001) (examining the
trend towards an "elaborate system of third-party government in which crucial
elements of public authority are shared with a host of non-governmental or
other governmental actors"); Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap:
Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1
(2002) (investigating attempts to overhaul the administrative state in the
European Union); Louise G. Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Gov-
ernance: Advocating for Healthcare, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 575 (arguing that public
interest lawyers must change their tactics to remain relevant in a world where
the center of government is shifting back to the states); Peter F. Drucker,
Really Reinventing Government, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1995, at 49 (argu-
ing that the need for reform is so severe that slashing bureaucracies is inade-
quate, and suggesting that reforms in the private sector be adopted in the pub-
lic sector).
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Nation to prosperity and defined the relationship between our
people and their Government for half a century.... That ap-
proach worked in its time. But we today, we face a very differ-
ent time and very different conditions." 33 Like his Republican
counterparts, President Clinton repeatedly asserted that "[t]he
era of big [g]overnment is over." 34 At a bill-signing ceremony,
he declared that it was time for power to shift from the federal
to the state and local levels:
We are recognizing that the pendulum has swung too far, and that we
have to rely on the initiative, the creativity, the determination and
the decision making of people at the State and local level to carry
much of the load for America as we move into the 21st century. 35
Yet, the Renew Deal shift is not simply a swing back from
a point to which "the pendulum has swung too far." A remark-
able aspect of the contemporary calls for a new paradigm is the
way the concept of change and renewal continues to inform the
new vision even as it replaces elements of the older model. The
connection between renewal and permanent innovation is
therefore key to understanding the Renew Deal governance
model. The promise is not merely a shift from one regime to an-
other, from one set of legal doctrines to another, or from one
method of regulation to another; but rather an entirely new re-
gime that will have the built-in ability to innovate and con-
stantly renew itself. Newness itself becomes the essential sub-
stance of the emerging paradigm. The idea of dynamic
innovation is intrinsic to the theory. The organizing principles
of the governance model are designed to allow the new para-
digm to evolve organically. Its leading features, such as dy-
namic learning, process orientation, iteration, innovation, and
adaptability, all constitute a time dimension within the model.
The goal of this newness in legal thought is to imagine the ar-
33. President William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 24, 1995), in 31 WKLY. COMPILATION
OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 97, 97 (1995).
34. President William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 23, 1996), in 32 WKLY. COMPILATION
OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 90, 90 (1996); see also Steven G. Calabresi,
"The Era of Big Government Is Over," 50 STAN. L. REV. 1015 (1998) (reviewing
ALAN BRINKLEY ET AL., NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS: ESSAYS IN DEFENSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1997)).
35. President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Unfunded
Mandate Reform Act of 1995 (Mar. 22, 1995), in 31 WKLY. COMPILATION OF
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 453, 455 (1995), quoted in Laurens Walker, The
End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV.
1269, 1278 (1997).
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chitecture of a legal system that is most likely to support con-
stant improvement: The overriding task in the design of ar-
rangements conducive to practical progress is therefore always
to imagine and establish the arrangements for cooperation, in
the small and in the large, that are least likely to prevent per-
manent innovation.
36
II. THE PUSH AND PULL FOR RENEWAL
A. THE COMPETING LOGICS OF THE RENEW DEAL: CLOSING THE
GAP OR LEADING THE WAY
What motivates the drive for a new governance model?
Several sets of competing logics run through the vision of re-
newal. The primary set of logics juxtaposes external and inter-
nal reaction. While the dominant narrative of reaction relies on
external triggers created by new realities of the political econ-
omy, a competing account emphasizes the internal push for
new approaches to sociolegal theory. Externally, law reacts to
change in the circumstances of the outside world. These cir-
cumstances might include globalization, privatization, technol-
ogy, increased market competition, economic recession, and al-
ternating modes of production. At the same time, it is
internally motivated by the inadequacies of existing theories,
stagnation in the current state of legal discourse, and the need
to progress beyond conceptual binaries-including left/right,
critical/constructive, expressive/scientific, formal/informal, pub-
lic/private, and regulated/unregulated-that have misinformed
previous schools of thought.
3 7
A related set of logics provokes the images of both progres-
sion and regression in the shift from a regulatory to a govern-
ance model. While many descriptions invoke the rhetoric of
36. UNGER, supra note 4, at 184.
37. The duality of political economy developments and theoretical concep-
tualization comes through explicitly in introductory notes on reflexive law:
Reflexive labour law is both a theoretical concept and a description of
a certain development of modern labour law systems. As a theoretical
concept it applies a particular version of general legal theory, i.e.,
autopoietics to labour law. As a descriptive concept it interprets and
reconstructs trends in labour law ....
REFLEXIVE LABOUR LAW, supra note 1, at 7-8. This tension is similarly visible
in A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4. The first sub-
title of Dorf and Sabel's article is "The Crisis." Id. at 270. Thereafter, the au-
thors shift to the description of progress and advancements internal to legal
thought. Id. at 270-88.
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progress and growth by describing the transformation in evolu-
tionary terms, a competing rhetoric highlights crisis and de-
cline in existing capabilities and public commitment. While one
path of reasoning reflects political disillusionment with the
postwar model of the bureaucratic welfare state, the second
signifies a relegitimation of the legal process by shifting to a
more advanced form of public, deliberative participation. These
coexisting rationales emphasize an additional tension concern-
ing the temporal duration of the transformation-whether the
shift to governance is understood as part of a transitional pe-
riod toward an unknown future or a permanent new framework
that replaces the traditional regulatory paradigm. Moreover,
while the Renew Deal literature often depicts the new ap-
proaches of the governance model as alternatives to conven-
tional regulatory approaches, it simultaneously assumes their
complementarity.
A final set of competing ideas that run throughout the lit-
erature involves the allocation of the new governance model
within or without law's empire. While one underlying line of
reasoning emphasizes the legal externality of the new model as
being in sharp opposition to regulation, a competing narrative
uses the rhetoric of authenticity and resurgence to suggest that
the Renew Deal governance model represents a newer and
truer, form of law, lawmaking, and public administration.38
Rather than deciding between competing motivators, our
focus should be on the conditions, both internal and external to
legal thought, that make the new vision possible. Indeed, in-
stead of asking what is truly motivating and authentically new
in the model, the key questions concern the range of develop-
ments and changes that have made the principles of the new
governance model salient and feasible at the beginning of the
twenty-first century.
B. EXTERNAL PUSH FACTORS: LAW FOLLOWS THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY
The first set of rationales for the Renew Deal is reactive.
The premise is that, as the world changes, patterns of law and
governance must change with it. As we move into the twenty-
38. See generally Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extra-Legal Activism: Criti-
cal Legal Conciousness and Transformative Politics (2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (describing the tension between depictions of
new reform strategies as legal and extra-legal).
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first century, the economic, social, and political landscapes are
constantly in motion. Consequently, legal thought and practice
must transform themselves to adjust to new realities: "The
world will not stand still and let us enjoy our freedoms. It will
continually make itself anew, and as it does, we must consider
the ever-changing predicament of liberty, and the ever new
methods by which it may be augmented or curtailed."
39
A remarkable number of recent legal articles therefore be-
gin with a description of a change in the circumstances in the
outside world, including increased global competition and fiscal
crises; new modes of production and patterns of employment;
changing ecology; and advancements in communication, sci-
ence, and technology. 40 In reaction, law needs to continually
close the gap and adapt to these circumstances: "A rapidly
changing world that is moving toward a new phase of moder-
nity requires innovative legal and policy strategies."4 1 If the po-
litical economy has changed, legal theorists and practitioners
need to rethink the traditional roles of law.
The first step therefore is to diagnose the discontinuities
between the demands of the twenty-first century and the ca-
pacities of the regulatory state:
Where society demands flexibility and dynamism, the state offers bu-
reaucracy and rules. Where society requires legal instruments that
are almost self-implementing, the state builds an elaborate oversight
apparatus. While societies need a legal system that induces self-
reflection toward "sustainable" behavior, the state maintains a legal
strategy of forcing desired behavior from outside the firm, through
threats of exposure and punishment.
42
This analysis reflects the idea that life has reached a new
degree of complexity which renders a central control-and-
command structure impossible: "[I]n a complex and rapidly
changing world it is manifestly impossible to write rules that
39. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 58
(2004).
40. See, e.g., MODERN GOVERNANCE: NEW GOVERNMENT-SOCIETY
INTERACTIONS (Jan Kooiman ed., 1993) (containing a collection of essays on
the new realities in Europe that demand a different conception of state/society
relations); Jan Kooiman, Governance and Governability: Using Complexity,
Dynamics and Diversity, in MODERN GOVERNANCE: NEW GOVERNMENT-
SOCIETY INTERACTIONS, supra at 35; William F. Pedersen, Contracting with
the Regulated for Better Regulations, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1067 (2001).
41. Fiorino, supra note 31, at 464-67 (stating "the world is changing, so
law and patterns of governance must change with it").
42. Id. at 464.
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cover the particulars of current circumstances in any sphere of
activity."43 Moreover, the conditions of the new market are
those of uncertainty, unpredictability, and volatility. "[P]olicy
has to be flexible and revisable to cope with an increasingly
complex and volatile world.. . ."44 Law should recognize the
new reality of "radical indeterminacy"45 and the "pervasiveness
of unintended consequences." 46 These twenty-first century re-
alities no longer allow for the traditional statist project, but
rather require the proliferation of newly diverse sources of
norms and strategies. 4 7
New governance approaches are also needed to address the
increased speed of change in the new economy.48 Flexibility and
adaptability are key in remaining competitive in the globalized
market. Scientific innovation, as well as unpredictable strains
of heightened competition, require techniques which incorpo-
rate constant change and improvement.
In addition to the new levels of complexity, unpredictabil-
ity, and dynamic change in society, law must also react to in-
creasing heterogeneity. The New Deal model was created upon
the assumptions of a former era, in which uniformity and sta-
bility were considerably more widespread. As described in Part
IV, the typical New Deal economic enterprise was a large and
relatively stable industrial company, while today the workplace
43. Drug Treatment Courts and Experimentalist Government, supra note
4, at 837. For a discussion relating to new understandings about the complex-
ity of ecosystems, see Annecoos Wiersema, Extinction and Uncertainty: Recon-
ciling Ecology and Law in International Legal Regimes for Protection of Spe-
cies and Ecosystems 3 (unpublished SJD colloquium Dec. 2003, on file with
author): 'While, over the past few decades, ecologists have increasingly recog-
nized the complexity and the lack of stability in nature, lawyers seeking pro-
tection of these ecological systems have been slow to catch up." Id.; see also
Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1231(1995) ("Conventional regulation is continually outpaced by the increasing
complexity of environmental problems.")
44. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 2, at 17.
45. Oliver Gerstenberg & Charles F. Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyar-
chy: An Institutional Ideal for Europe?, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE'S
INTEGRATED MARKET 289, 292 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse eds.,
2002).
46. A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4, at 285.
47. Roderick A. Macdonald, Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Re-
gimes and Legal Pluralism, 15 ARiZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 69, 71-72 (1998); see
also A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4, at 270("[O]ur national affairs are too complex, diverse, and volatile to be governed by
lapidary expressions of the public will-laws of Congress, administrative
rules, judicial judgments-that indicate precisely how to dispose of most of the
cases to which they will eventually be applied.").
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is vastly heterogeneous, networked, and constantly changing.
48
Similarly, the accumulation of new scientific knowledge about
the diverse and changing nature of different ecological systems
requires the response of environmental policy. A significant
impediment for legal reform today is the diversity of the mar-
ket and the wide range of social issues and problems, which re-
quire the adoption of a wide range of organizational forms and
policies. Contemporary legal scholarship recognizes that, today,
no single model of social organization exists and thus a unitary
conception of the regulation of diverse social fields and contexts
is impossible. 49 There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the chal-
lenges facing the regulatory state. No standard regulations can
effectively govern the multiplicity of settings in which social ac-
tion operates. The nature of the new economy requires legal in-
stitutions themselves to be multiple and diverse.
50
Technological advances and changes in market infrastruc-
ture have been conducive to these new demands for openness
and "radicali[z]ed modernity." 51 They have also added a new
layer of settings to which legal thought must react. Namely, the
physicality of the regulated unit has itself changed. Advances
in technology and communication are increasingly facilitating
self-regulation within the private market by enabling more in-
48. See infra notes 241-49 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4;
Fiorino, supra note 31.
50. In more abstract terms, these changes can be theorized as the changes
in our perceptions of modernity. While the New Deal was founded on the
premises of modernism, including certainty, order, rationality, universality,
and objectivity, the Renew Deal is motivated by the assumptions of the "radi-
calization of modernity" (in some versions, postmodernism), including inde-
terminacy, disequilibrium, particularism, diversity, experientialism, subjectiv-
ity, and the possibility that chaos is openness. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE
CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 50-52 (1990); see also BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA
SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION AND
EMANCIPATION 21-22 (2002) (explaining the tension between regulation and
emancipation in a postmodern understanding of the law).
51. Giddens characterizes radicalized modernity, or accelerated high
modernity, as the unprecedented rapidity of change, the encompassing scope
of change, and the increased commodification of social action. GIDDENS, supra
note 50, at 149-50. Through time/space distinctions, social disembedding, ac-
cepted systems of knowledge, and self-monitoring, radical modernity promotes
global integration and increased local and global coordination. Id. This is in
fact opposed to the conditions described by postmodern theorists of fragmenta-
tion and disorganization. See id.; cf. DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF
POSTMODERNITY (1990) (describing the historical construction of the intellec-
tual project of postmodernity but ultimately finding a renewal of Enlighten-
ment ideals).
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formation sharing and lowering the barriers of entry. For ex-
ample, advances in air travel have increased competition
among airlines; thereby reducing some of the need for antitrust
regulation.52 Similarly, the natural monopoly of microwave
transmission has decreased in telecommunications.53 As de-
scribed in Part IV, the explosion of Internet technologies and
cable broadcasting has eliminated some of the rationales for
regulation of information, while creating other types of risks. 54
A central example is the way new cybercommunications tech-
nology has lowered the threshold for groups to act collectively,
triggering the emergence of new kinds of norm-generating in-
stitutions.55 Furthermore, the digital revolution has made it
easy to copy, transmit, and distribute materials, as well as to
connect with others through communication networks at dras-
tically lower costs. 56 These physical and architectural innova-
tions require corresponding developments in legal theory.57
Finally, recent developments in the political economy have
revealed new gaps between democratic practices and prevailing
constitutional theory.58 Globalization, primarily the unification
of nations in Europe, has brought into question the adequacy of
the concept of a demos. Within legal theory, globalization has
raised concerns about a democratic deficit. 59 The need for a bet-
52. Cf. Bruce B. Wilson, Railroads, Airlines, and the Antitrust Laws in the
Post-Regulatory World: Common Concerns and Shared Lessons, 60 ANTITRUST
L.J. 711, 717-18 (1991) (asserting that railroads can learn from the airlines'
adoption of electronic ratemaking and electronic reservation system and the
subsequent antitrust litigation).
53. PETER H. SCHUCK, The Politics of Regulation, in THE LIMITS OF LAW:
ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 117, 123-24 (2000).
54. See infra Part IV.C.
55. HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON
THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 38-64 (1993).
56. Balkin, supra note 39, at 6-7.
57. In response to these new digital realities, Jack Balkin argues,
[A]s the world changes around us, as the possibilities and problems of
new technologies are revealed, our conception of the free speech prin-
ciple begins to change with them. Our sense of what freedom of
speech is, why we value it, and how best to preserve that which we
value, reframes itself in the changing milieu.
Id. at 55.
58. See, e.g., A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4,
at 272 (describing the crisis of constitutional theory premised on a choice be-
tween the Constitution or institutional democracy as "deliberately alarmist").
59. See, e.g., Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European
Community Rulemaking: A Call for Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40
HARV. INT'L L.J. 451 (1999); Dan Hunter, ICANN and the Concept of Democ-
ratic Deficit, 36 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1149 (2003); Joseph S. Nye Jr., Globaliza-
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ter theory for the new polity bridges most directly the external
and the internal drives for renewal. In the face of new realities
and changing needs, these concerns have created a platform to
which legal thought must react in addressing the inadequacies
of existing models of regulation and lawmaking.
C. THE INTERNAL PULL: THE DIRECTIVE OF LEGAL THOUGHT
The second set of motivations for the Renew Deal is active
in nature, rather than reactive. It represents an internal pull
for renewal from within legal thought. These rationales have as
their starting point the inadequacy of existing approaches
within the world of law. The focus is on the inherent limitations
of conventional regulatory instruments, as well as the inade-
quacies of a legal regime based solely on market incentives.
Under the traditional regulatory model, law itself has become
so complex and dense that it is inevitably self-defying. The Re-
new Deal regulatory model, relying on substantive command-
and-control legislation, has itself created the "crisis of the in-
terventionist state."60 A more advanced and sustainable theory
of law-in-society must be developed to replace the deficiencies
of the existing model.
The active internal line of reasoning is evolutionary in tone
and Darwinian in spirit. It includes a discourse of progression
and evolution, and explores common stages through which the
legal regimes of most nations progress. The future of the law in
the twenty-first century lies in the mutant forms and experi-
ments which prove to be fittest and survive the demands of to-
morrow. The evolutionist pull factors are manifested most
clearly in the writings on reflexive law and autopoietic systems.
In his Introduction to Autopoietic Law, Gunther Teubner asks,
Is the practice of legal reasoning bound to end in "strange loops",
"tangled hierarchies", and "reflexivity dilemmas"? Is the legal process
nothing but a closed cycle of recurrent legal operations: "computation
of computation of computation... "? And are the social dynamics of
the legal system based upon the "paradoxes of self-reference"? 61
Exemplifying the internal demand for renewal, Teubner
begins by describing the crisis in legal theory-the crisis of a
tion's Democratic Deficit: How To Make International Institutions More Ac-
countable, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2001).
60. Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern
Law, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 239, 267 (1983).
61. Gunther Teubner, Introduction to Autopoietic Law, in AUTOPOIETIC: A
NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY 1, 1 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988) (cita-
tions omitted).
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split between legal theory and legal sociology. Teubner ad-
vances autopoiesis as a new approach to legal thought that can
both recognize and transcend the crisis. 62 Teubner describes
autopoiesis, a "new and promising research strategy... to
identify circular relationships within the legal system." 63 Draw-
ing on Niklas Luhmann's systems theory, Teubner argues that
the complexity of modern life and society requires a new, next-
stage approach to regulation, that of reflexive law, in which law
facilitates the internal discourse and coordination of other sys-
tems. Reflexive law reforms social practices by influencing the
self-referential capacities of other social institutions. 64 Teubner
outlines an attractive paradox that surfaces in the new model.
The more the legal system, as an autopoietic system, is closed
(operative closeness), the more it can be radically open (cogni-
tive openness). 65 The more it is autonomous, the more it can
both reference and investigate social facts, political demands,
social science research, and human needs. 66
Renew Deal scholars, operating under broader approaches
than the European reflexive law school of thought, subscribe to
the evolution of modern law through three legal paradigms.
Generally, there is a linear progression from: (1) a system that
merely facilitates private ordering to (2) a regulatory model and
then (3) from the regulatory state to a governance approach.
The first stage in the evolution of modern legal systems, the
background ordering and maintenance of private entitlements,
consists of formal law, a minimalist set of rules within the
bounds of which private actors are free to carry out their own
transactions. Economies have traditionally relied on formal law
as a thin regulatory framework for freedom of contract and
property security. Because formal law does not correct the in-
adequacies and inequities of the market, however, modern legal
systems universally move to a second evolutionary stage, in
which they develop bodies of substantive law. In the substan-
tive law stage, the thick regulatory state is formed.67 In the
62. Id.
63. Id. Reflexive law and autopoiesis break the taboo of circularity in legal
thinking. Id. It is a moment of "transferring circularity from the world of ideas
to that of hard facts." Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2.
66. Id.
67. While there are significant variances in the constitution of various
substantive social regulatory regimes across developed countries, there has
been a general move to regulate some form of welfare state. See generally
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United States, Roosevelt's New Deal crystallized this second
stage. It reflected the judgment that social subsystems are in-
capable of self-adjustment and need to be ordered by a central-
ized authority.68 The regulatory stage requires the formation of
a bureaucratic omnipresent government that intervenes pur-
posively, through goal-oriented policies in such diverse areas as
consumer protection, welfare, health and safety, education, and
nondiscrimination.
Despite its merits, substantive law inevitably and uni-
formly reaches a crisis. The self-reproducing nature of all other
social fields produces a regulatory trilemma. The regulatory
model is fated to be either undereffective, overeffective, or dis-
torted vis-A-vis other social fields. First, the use of substantive
law is likely in most circumstances to be underinclusive and in-
effective in producing meaningful changes in behavior without
risking the destruction of other subsystems (under-
effectiveness). 69 Second, substantive law may indeed turn out
to be too effective and consequently destroy the internal fabric
of subsystems (overlegalization or juridification of society by
law). 70 Finally, regulation itself risks becoming colonized by the
regulated subsystems. That is, it becomes too politicized, or
"economized," by the centers of power of the system with which
it is interacting (capture). Law needs new techniques to cir-
GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM
(1990); WELFARE STATES IN TRANSITION: NATIONAL ADAPTATIONS IN GLOBAL
ECONOMIES (Gosta Esping-Andersen ed., 1996).
68. Stewart, supra note 7, at 93. In the American context, Richard Stew-
art describes the three stages as a shift from constitutive law, which legally
recognizes and supports private ordering, defines constituents' power and en-
titlements, and establishes procedures for resolving disputes, to prescriptive
law. Id. Prescriptive rules specify and dictate what conduct is required from
individuals. Id. at 89-90.
69. Teubner, supra note 8, at 310-12; see also Arthur J. Jacobson, Auto-
poietic Law: The New Science of Niklas Luhmann, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1647,
1650 (1989); Helmut Wilke, Three Types of Legal Structure: The Conditional,
the Purposive, and the Relational Program, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE
WELFARE STATE, supra note 8, at 280, 282-87.
70. Gunther Teubner, Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions,
in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE
AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW 3, 9
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1987); see also DE SOUSA SANTOS, supra note 32, at 55
(referring to modern law's loss of its original function as a mediator between
social regulation and social emancipation); Stewart, supra note 7, at 90 (de-
scribing prescriptive law as an inevitable, preempting choice within subsys-
tems).
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cumvent this trilemma and to engage society in a better and
more productive way.
The need for a third transformation in the legal paradigm
is consequently a necessary stage that every society reaches in
its search for justice and order. This is achieved by implement-
ing reflexive or reconstitutive legal strategies that restructure
subsystems rather than simply prescribe substantive orders. 71
And indeed, through comparative observations, scholars find
empirically that these are the actual progressive stages of most
legal systems. For example, studying thirteen countries, Martin
Janicke and Helmut Weidner conclude that most nations pro-
gress from a strategy of dispersion of pollution (formal market-
based law) to direct regulatory control (substantive regulatory
law), and then progress to a more complex policy approach,
which includes building cooperative relationships with the pri-
vate market (reflexive, governance law).72
Straddling the internal and external motivations for a new
legal paradigm are changes in the goals of legal action. Not
only have the techniques of law become outmoded and the need
to design second generation legal strategies become apparent,
the aspirations of law and policy have themselves undergone
transformation. Peter Schuck describes the old regulatory
model of the New Deal as "economic or cartel regulation." He
further suggests that, since the beginning of the 1970s (and
still within the regulatory model), substantive law has experi-
enced a shift from economic to social regulation, aimed at en-
hancing health, safety, environmental quality, equal opportu-
nity, and quality of life. 73 Social regulation, unlike economic
regulation, confers on an administrative agency cross-industry
jurisdiction. 74 Such regulation is a more complex task, requir-
ing different types of knowledge, information,, and political
support. While social legislation under the regulatory model
still entails compliance requirements of uniform rules, the
changing fabric of legal goals moves us closer to an internal
71. Stewart, supra note 7, at 90; Teubner, supra note 8, at 299.
72. Martin Janicke & Helmut Weidner, Summary: Global Environmental
Policy Learning, in NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF CAPACITY-BUILDING 299, 310-12 (Martin Janicke & Helmut
Weidner eds., 1997).
73. SCHUCK, supra note 53, at 123. Schuck compares the rate of return on
natural gas to the safety of the air to exemplify the difference in economic and
social regulation. Id.
74. See infra notes 295-317 and accompanying text (discussing OSHA's
wide jurisdiction as innovative at the time of its establishment).
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evolution in legal approaches. Demonstrative of such changes
in policy goals has been the move in Western countries in the
past decade to adopt new social policies, as nations shift from a
passive bureaucratic welfare state to active approaches. 75 As
will be further explored in the next sections, both in the United
States and in Europe, social policy has changed from the main-
tenance of a permanent social safety net to strategies geared
toward an adaptable and dynamic workforce. 76 Again, the po-
litical economy, along with social and legal theory, have moti-
vated these changes in policy aspirations and the techniques
for their realization.
The governance model is a natural successor to the regula-
tory model. It addresses the changes in both the goals and ca-
pabilities of legal regulation, and avoids the central deficiencies
of substantive law. The governance stage fundamentally trans-
forms legal control into a dynamic, reflexive, and flexible re-
gime. Its principles promote the internal self-regulatory capaci-
ties of other social fields (or subsystems) with which it
interacts. Unlike the regulatory model, it is not self-destructive,
but self-sustaining.
The coexistence of external and internal logics in the mo-
ment of transformation is exemplified in this context by the in-
fluence of the new economy on legal theory. The Renew Deal
governance model imports features from the organization of the
market into the public sphere.77 At the same time, albeit to a
lesser degree, it orchestrates the importation of public values
into the new private-sector economy. 78 A recurring theme of the
new model is that state and government agencies should learn
75. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & Johnathan Zeitlin, Active Welfare, Ex-
perimental Governance, and Pragmatic Constitutionalism: The New Trans-
formation of Europe (unpublished draft prepared for the International Confer-
ence of the Hellenic Presidency of the European Union (May 21-22, 2003), on
file with author) (discussing recent changes in social welfare policy in the EU).
76. See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, Questions About Social Europe by an Ameri-
can Observer, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 437 (2000); Sabel & Zeitlin, supra note 75;
Trubek & Trubek, supra note 2.
77. MINOW, supra note 22, at 6-49 (explaining that nonprofits increas-
ingly use the techniques of private industries to enhance their effectiveness);
see also infra Parts III.C, III.G (discussing the influence of market organiza-
tion on Renew Deal scholarship).
78. There have been recent calls for expanding this aspect within the
growing body of Renew Deal literature. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public
Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1295 (2003); Mar-
tha Minow, Public and Private Partnership: Accounting for the New Religion,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1243 (2003).
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from the practices of private organizational models and mar-
ket-based management theories. The use of private firms as an
analogy to other social spheres reflects the growing opinion
that broad developments in the market economy trigger direct
changes in law. In many contexts, the interconnections between
the object of regulation (the economy) and the strategy by
which it is regulated (law) motivate the push for renewal
through the adoption of market practices in the public sphere.
It is often more plausible, however, that legal thought is adopt-
ing a practice patterned after and correlated with the changing
American market as an analogous sphere of good practices to
be replicated in other spheres of life. Both possibilities link con-
temporary problems in the organization of the economy to in-
novative legal theory on regulation and governance. Thus, as
scholars and reformers increasingly observe private-sector de-
velopments, regulatory agencies and public officials are facing
heightened pressures to imitate the efficiencies of the private
sector. For example, government is urged to become lean and
flexible through the reduction of size and costs. One central
way to reduce the size of the public sector is through acceler-
ated privatization projects, reducing the size of bureaucracy
primarily by contracting out public functions to private par-
ties. 79
Other institutional economic approaches are similarly in-
fluencing the principles of public management. For example, in
Reinventing Government, David Osborne and Ted Gaebler sug-
gest bringing Japanese business models of entrepreneurial,
team-oriented management to bear on American governmental
institutions.8 0 An entrepreneurial government is one that be-
gins with identifying its customers, determining their needs,
and moving forward to identify the best practices that would
meet these needs.8 1 Under this subset of rationales, the basic
assumptions of a market economy-profit motivation under
competitive supply and demand conditions-are often projected
onto public management ideals. As we shall further see in Part
III, these developments correspond with the organizing princi-
79. Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some
Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance (Mar. 1, 2004) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
80. DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 232-34
(1992).
81. Id.
[89:342
THE RENEW DEAL
ples of the governance model including flexibility, competition,
adaptability, and learning.
8 2
D. CYCLES OF RENEWAL
A final dimension of the motivation for change is cyclical in
nature. The dynamics of intellectual renewal, particularly in
the field of law, which is strongly characterized by being based
both in practice and in aspiration can be understood over time
as rhythmic. The image evoked in President Clinton's speech, a
"pendulum that has moved too far,"8 3 expresses the idea of re-
curring waves. In legal practice and institutional design, as
well as legal thought, there is a natural cycle of renewal, fol-
lowed by ossification and entrenchment, followed in turn by
another wave of renewal.
In legal practice, scholars point to recurring barriers to in-
novation as part of the institutional fabric of the profession.
These barriers include the difficulties of modifying written
texts, the formal and informal impact of precedent, the doctrine
of stare decisis, and the professional adherence to status quo.
8 4
As new doctrines are developed, they increasingly become part
of the system and entrenched in particular meanings and prac-
tices. Innovative processes gradually become formalized, and,
eventually, there is renewed need to think outside of the regu-
latory tool box, and to develop newer approaches. Often this
means the invention of previously informal practices. These
new practices will eventually become more formalized. This cy-
cle creates a rhythm, very much like seasonal regeneration, of
calls for far-reaching innovations by every generation of legal
academics. Todd Rakoff, describing shifts between formal and
informal modes of administrative law, suggests such a recur-
ring pattern:
What we see in the American experience is a cyclical phenomenon in
which less formal modes of regulation are invented; over time, they
become increasingly formalized; and then newer, less formal modes
are developed.8 5
82. See infra Part III.
83. Clinton, supra note 35, at 455.
84. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1527 (2002) (arguing that the ineffectiveness of
American labor law is due to its "insulation from democratic renewal and local
innovation").
85. Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of
Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 170 (2000).
2004]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In the context of the decline of American labor law, Cyn-
thia Estlund similarly argues that the shrinking scope of collec-
tive bargaining is traceable to the law's longstanding insulation
from renewal and innovation. 86 The collective bargaining re-
gime created by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was
the New Deal's answer to labor market discontents.8 7 Not long
after its enactment, however, the new statutory regime came to
be viewed as deeply problematic by labor law scholars. They
argued that during the decades succeeding the enactment of
the NLRA, the courts, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), and other administrative bodies interpreted and im-
plemented the statutory regime in ways that "deradicalized"
the Act; thereby creating a rigid legal regime that naturalized a
particular, limited vision of collective bargaining that was sys-
tematically hostile to labor militancy.8 8 And indeed, from the
1960s to the 1980s, as unionism declined, individual employ-
ment law expanded and specific, substantive federal regula-
tions on workplace issues increased from about forty-four to
over two hundred.8 9 During the 1990s, the government with-
drew from some of its roles as an active player in the regulation
of employment.90 Today, commitment to employment regulation
and its enforcement has eroded. This retreat has created some
renewed interest in the foundations of collective labor laws. As
Estlund points out, although labor laws now appear rigid and
inefficient, the essence of collective bargaining responds to pre-
cisely the same demands for renewal, flexibility, and change
86. Estlund, supra note 84, at 1527.
87. See National Labor Reform Act, § 7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-69 (2000); Orly
Lobel, Agency and Coercion in Labor and Employment Relations: Four Dimen-
sions of Power in Shifting Patterns of Work, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 121
(2001).
88. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 251 (1997);
Karl Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 281-93 (1977);
Lobel, supra note 87, at 184-87.
89. PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE
NEW LABOR MARKET 47 (2001) (citing John Dunlop, The Limits of Legal Com-
pulsion, 27 LAB. L.J. 67, 67-74 (1976)).
90. Orly Lobel, Orchestrated Experimentalism in the Regulation of Work,
101 MICH. L. REV. 2146, 2161 (2003) (reviewing OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note
89).
368 [89:342
2004] THE RENEW DEAL 369
that are pervasive in contemporary legal thought. 91 There is an
historical logic to the pattern:
[The "ossified" labor law regime] is at least potentially decentralized,
tailored to local circumstances, flexible, and democratic. Indeed, col-
lective bargaining would seem to represent a promising "third way"
between the harsh regimen of individual contract and the much-
maligned paradigm of centralized "command and control" regulation.
That is no accident. The New Deal's institutionalization of collective
bargaining was designed to rectify the failings of individual "liberty of
contract" at a time when mandated minimum terms were still consti-
tutionally and politically suspect, and the increasing role of minimum
standards legislation since then is often described as a response to the
decline of collective bargaining and the regulatory vacuum it has left
behind. There would thus be a certain historical logic to the revival of
collective bargaining at a time when the centralized imposition of uni-
form regulations is increasingly questioned.
92
Like many other scholars who have called for renewal, Est-
lund identifies possibilities for change paved by the process of
ossification itself. This paradox of ossification leading to re-
newal is a recurring theme in legal scholarship.
93
As in doctrinal fields like administrative, labor, and em-
ployment law, the more abstract field of legal theory calls for
regeneration during every new generation of legal scholars. Re-
petitive similarities exist in modes of mediating contradiction
in different structures of successive legal schools. 94 The solution
also repeats-destabilization through the reinvention of a new
paradigm and new conceptual frameworks for change. Para-
phrasing Michel Foucault, Stepan Woods asks how it is that le-
91. Estlund, supra note 84, at 1528; see also Stewart, supra note 7, at 94
(describing early federal regulatory programs, particularly labor law and secu-
rities law as reconstitutive or reflexive strategies that promote "self-regulatory
practices rather than ... comprehensive central prescription of conduct").
92. Estlund, supra note 84, at 1528-29.
93. But see Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1047, 1080 (2002). Schlag argues that the opposite is also true-too much
renewal energy risks ossification by exhaustion: "The energy aesthetic is
threatened by its own explosive, uncontrollable force. Ironically, it is also
threatened with exhaustion: the expenditure of energy leads to its depletion."
Id.
94. Orly Lobel, Retrieving the Projects Beyond Deconstruction: Channel-
ing the Social in Private Law Theory (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (describing a pendulum of private law theory, embodying "recur-
ring patterns: the existence of both individual and social is identified, at-
tempts are made to distinguish, justify and confine the social to distinct
boundaries"); see also Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42
SYRACUSE L. REV. 75, 96-97 (1991) (describing legal argumentation as "a
product of the actual history of a particular legal discourse" that is incomplete
and changing).
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gal scholars repeatedly attempt to sever the "king's head," yet
the next generation always seems to find the head back on the
sovereign's shoulders: 95
Exploding, fragmenting or contextualizing the state, law, sovereignty,
public, private and so on, have been regular features of criticism and
innovation in the social sciences and law throughout the last century,
so that proclaiming the "death of the state" (or law or sovereignty) has
become part of the ritual of renewal in discipline after discipline.96
David Kennedy makes a radical expression of the possibil-
ity that, in fact, there is nothing new under the sun in the in-
ternational law field of legal scholarship. Describing repetitive
reform agendas in the field of international law, Kennedy
states: "The discipline of international law today is cheek byjowl with people calling for new thinking and renewal, even as
they offer up the most shopworn ideas and initiatives .... For
international lawyers, the performances of renewal, criticism,
and reform are central to professional identity and compe-
tence."9
7
While we should take seriously the occurrences of cyclical
renewal, this pattern does not undermine the contemporary
moment of a high peak of the cycle that is driving the Renew
Deal paradigm shift. Moreover, despite the value in the reflex-
ive exploration of recurring patterns of renewal, these claims
should not be overstated. Even as history repeats, we never
truly face the same challenges twice. We can and must learn
from renewal efforts (successes as well as failures) of former
eras, yet the particular constellation of multiple factors at the
beginning of the twenty-first century makes the current experi-
ence of renewal unique. The internal and external factors trig-
gering the emergence of a new vision interact powerfully to
challenge, revive, and reaffirm our fundamental principles as a
society:
95. Stepan Wood, Environmental Management Systems and Public Au-
thority in Canada: Rethinking Environmental Governance, 10 BUFF. ENVTL.
L.J. 129, 189 (2003).
96. Id.
97. David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 335, 335-37 (2000). According to Kennedy:
The occasion invites thought about the role of novelty and innovation
in the field-what is it, how does it happen, how should it be val-
ued? ... [Flor more than a century, these lawyers have shared an ar-gumentative terrain which can be analyzed using the tools of struc-
tural or semiotic analysis that have now been applied to the doctrinal
terminology of various other legal fields.
[89:342
THE RENEW DEAL
For only through constant rethinking, in the face of changed circum-
stances, can we recall and rediscover what our deepest commitments
truly are. What appears to be change is actually continuity; what ap-
pears to be revision is actually the deepest form of remembrance.
98
Most importantly, in the contemporary vision for renewal,
the strength of the governance paradigm is its integral com-
mitment to innovation as an ongoing, collective, intellectual,
and programmatic project. The construct of openness sheds
conceptually, epistemologically, and institutionally the baggage
of predetermined solutions and widens our imaginative spec-
trum. What is particularly promising about the Renew Deal
governance model is its self-conscious promise to continue the
process of energized renewal from within the new paradigm.
III. THE ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES OF THE RENEW
DEAL GOVERNANCE MODEL
A. PARTICIPATION AND PARTNERSHIP
During the New Deal era, a key feature of the organization
of law and order was the commitment to centralized, institu-
tional decision-making authorities relying on professional, offi-
cial expertise: "The New Deal believed in experts. Those who
rationalized its regulatory initiatives regarded expertise and
specialization as the particular strengths of the administrative
process."99
The central proposition of the New Deal regulatory model
was that a few well-educated, specially trained, and publicly
appointed professionals could make the best decisions about
national policies. 10 0 The belief in experts and the need for regu-
lation were mutually reinforcing. The project of centralized so-
cial engineering required focused factfinding and professional
skills. Felix Frankfurter described how, with the rise of regula-
tion, "we are singularly in need in this country of the deliber-
98. Balkin, supra note 39, at 56.
99. JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 44 (1978); see also JAMES M. LANDIS,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23-24 (1938) (describing how the rise of regu-
lation increased the need for expertise).
100. Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1272 (1997).
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Table 1: Coexisting Rationales for a Paradigm Shift
External [-Cyclical-] Internal
Noncumulative [Seasonal An Evolution
Developmental Episode Regeneration]
Triggered by Political [Legal From WithinEconomy Systemic Ossification Socio-legaland Entrenchment] Theory
Active
Reactive Linear progres-
Real world increased [Formal- sion from formal
complexity, speed, diver- Informal/Formal- minimalist to
sity, technological and Informal] regulatory sub-
sci tec hn calnd stantive interven-
scientific advancements tionist to active
governance
Crisis [Professional Identity Progress;
and Competence] Opportunity
Decline [Energy Aesthetic] Growth
Alternative [Historical ComplimentaryRegulatory Vacuums]
Transitional [Recurrent Permanent
Insulation]
Innovation [Repetitive ResurgenceSimilarities]
Outside the Law [Communities of Authentic (true)Knowledge] Law
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ateness and truthfulness of really scientific expertness."'10 1 Ad-
ministrative law was developed under the idea that the regula-
tory policymaking powers of administrative agencies are based
on their superior knowledge, information, and expertise.
10 2 The
commitment to agency expertise influenced the development of
legal doctrines involving delegation and deference to agency
expertise, and permitting certain divergence from the scope of
delegation to the implementation stage.10 3 External participa-
tion was thought of as a threat to the expertise and legitimacy
of the administrative state, since expert agencies would be in-
fluenced by self-interest and thus more prone to capture by pri-
vate industry pressures.
10 4
The new governance model challenges these conventional
assumptions. It broadens the decision-making playing field by
involving more actors in the various stages of the legal process.
It also diversifies the types of expertise and experience that
these new actors bring to the table. Renew Deal governance is a
regime based on engaging multiple actors and shifting citizens
from passive to active roles. The exercise of normative author-
ity is pluralized.
Increased participation permeates the many levels and
stages of legal process-legislation, promulgation of rules, im-
plementation of policies, and enforcement. In the last several
decades, a range of policies has attempted to increase the par-
ticipation of nongovernmental individuals and groups in public
processes. 105 New groups demand more access to policy proc-
101. FREEDMAN, supra note 99, at 45 (quoting Note, The Democratic Faith
of Felix Frankfurter, 25 STAN. L. REV. 430, 433 n.16 (1973)) (emphasis added).
102. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned
Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 83, 91 (1994) ("[A]lthough agencies may set regulatory policy, they do not
make controversial, value-laden choices, but rather use their expertise to solve
technical problems left to them by Congress.").
103. See generally Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Delegation Debate and Com-
peting Ideals of the Administrative Process, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 419, 422 (1987)
(examining the nondelgation doctrine in the context of "reformist liberal ideals
about administration").
104. See generally Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative
Process: A Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1954) (describing ad-
ministrative action as "reflect[ing] predominantly the solution desired by the
industrial group").
105. As early as the 1970s, with environmental programs leading the way,
there were attempts to promote participation of the people whose interests the
policies were intended to serve. Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and How
of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J.
525, 526, 534-35 (1972).
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esses and a role in governing social institutions. Multiparty in-
volvement is understood as a way of creating norms, cultivating
reform, and managing new market realities. As we shall see,
the overall goal of participation is broader than simply ensur-
ing the achievement of policy goals; it enhances the ability of
citizens to participate in political and civic life.
At the stage of implementation, stakeholder participation
has been referred to as "a revolution in the technology of public
action." 10 6 Participation has included the creation of a system of
third-party government, in which the public sector uses exten-
sively third-party agents to carry out public functions, such as
the delivery of social services. 107 Sharing tasks and responsi-
bilities with the private sector creates more interdependence
between government and the market. In turn, increased par-
ticipation leads to fluid and permeable boundaries between pri-
vate and public. 108 This cycle thus explains, for example, how
today's body of federal employees is one-third smaller per-
capita than it was immediately after the New Deal, even
though massive new responsibilities have been undertaken by
government. 109
From this perspective, the Renew Deal model embodies a
spatial dimension-a shift away from the singular focus on the
formal legal arena and formal officials to activism in the second
sphere of the private, for-profit sector, and the third sphere of
civil society. Calls for a spatial shift appear not only at the local
level, but also at the transnational and international levels,
evoking the image of a global civil society."1o Of particular im-
106. See Symposium, The Changing Shape of Government, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1319, 1334 (2001) (remarks by Lester M. Salamon).
107. LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE: GOVERNMENT-
NONPROFIT RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE 104-05 (1995); TheChanging Shape of Government, supra note 106, at 1334 (remarks by Lester
M. Salamon).
108. MINOW, supra note 22, at 142-74.
109. JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS,PRIVATE MEANS 4-5 (1989) (describing systematic efforts to reduce the size of
the federal government despite constant demand for public spending); PAUL C.
LIGHT, THE TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 1 (1999) (noting that the number offull-time federal government employees would increase by nearly eleven mil-lion if employees of private contractors and providers were included); Mashaw,
supra note 79, at 46.
110. In the environmental context, see, for example, RONNIE D. LIPSCHUTZ,
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 49-78(1996); PAUL WAPNER, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM AND WORLD CIVIC POLITICS
3-5 (1996).
374 [89:342
2004] THE RENEW DEAL 375
portance is the role of private ordering and self-regulation, par-
ticularly new instances of private standard setting, accredita-
tion, and certification plans by independent activists, as well as
monitoring by both nonprofits and for-profit consulting firms.11 1
New governance policies seek to enable individuals and organi-
zations to act as private attorney generals and to block watch
public action."12
Unlike the earlier writings on legal pluralism113 and the
recent writings on law and organizing, 114 the governance model
offers a framework that enables us to view the different sec-
tors-state, market, and civil society-as part of one compre-
hensive, interlocking system. The focus is on government inter-
actions with private actors in public action. The concept of
partnership is more important to the model than the descrip-
tion of spatial shifts.115
New participatory arrangements emerge at all levels of
government and nongovernment action. For example, at the in-
ternational level, the idea of "transgovernmental regulatory
networks" is attracting increasing attention as "a new and at-
tractive form of global governance, enhancing the ability of
States to work together to address common problems without
111. See, e.g., LESTER M. SALAMON ET AL., GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY:
DIMENSIONS OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 14 (1999); Jim Rossi, Bargaining in
the Shadow of Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in Rulemaking
Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1015-16 (2001); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The
Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347,
352-55 (2001) (discussing the rise of transgovernmental regulatory networks);
Business Ethics: Sweatshop Wars, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1999, at 62-63
(discussing audits of "social accountability 8000" certificates by firms such as
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young, and KPMG); COUNCIL ON
ECONOMIC PRIORITIES ACCREDITATION AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF SA 8000
STANDARDS, at http://www.cepaa.org/SA8000/SA8000.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2004).
112. Peter Dobkin Hall, Crisis in Governance: Comments (2003) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author).
113. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Or-
dering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 1 (1981) (noting the
widely held view among legal professionals that justice is a product created
and distributed exclusively by the state).
114. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection
on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001); Lobel, supra note 38.
115. See, e.g., SALAMON, supra note 107, at 104-05 (challenging the argu-
ment that increased partnership between government and nonprofit sectors
would infringe on the latter's independence or autonomy); Freeman, supra
note 3, at 6 (arguing that a model of the administrative process that empha-
sizes problem solving and shared responsibility better serves goals of efficiency
and legitimacy).
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the centralized bureaucracy of formal international institu-
tions. They are fast, flexible, and decentralized-attributes that
allow them to function particularly well in a rapidly changing
information environment."16 Similarly, in the context of the
EU, scholars describe new policy networks of government offi-
cials, civil servants, social partners (labor and industry associa-
tions), and civil society in multilevel, public/private transna-
tional networks.117 At the more local level, American lawyers
describe the emerging context of multidisciplinary networks,
for example in the realms of environmental policy 118 and health
care. 119 Increasingly, local professionals and community groups
are coming together with the aim of figuring out the schema for
responsible and effective delivery of social policy.120
B. COLLABORATION
The commitment to collaboration follows naturally from
the commitment to participation, since an inclusive structure
facilitates multiparty cooperative exchanges. Under the tradi-
tional regulatory model, industry and private individuals are
the object of regulation. Their agency is limited to choosing
whether to comply with the regulations to which they are sub-jected. Information flows selectively to the top while decisions
flow down, following rigid parameters, and leaving decision
116. Slaughter, supra note 111, at 347; see THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN,
COOPERATION AMONG DEMOCRACIES 38 (John Lewis Gaddis et al. eds., 1995)(defining transgovernmental coalitions as "transboundary networks among
subunits of national governments forming in the absence of central and au-
thoritative national decisions"); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global
EconomyTthrough Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 179 (Michael Byers ed., 2000); Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 195 (1997). But cf. SolPicciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States
and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1014, 1035-45
(1996-1997).
117. JACOBSSON, supra note 2, at 5-6; Trubek & Trubek, supra note 2, at
23.
118. For example, the Multi-State Working Group on Environmental Per-
formance (MSWG) was organized in 1996. The MSWG convenes parties in thebusiness, nongovernmental organizations, academic, and government sectors
to discuss the development and use of new tools within the context of public
policy to achieve environmental performance. See Multi-State Working Group
on Environmental Performance Web Site (Nov. 15, 2001), at http://www.
mswg.org.
119. Trubek, supra note 32.
120. Id.
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making to a small, detached group of number-crunching ex-
perts.121 Consequently, the regulatory model promotes adver-
sarial relations, mutual distrust, and conflict. In contrast, un-
der the governance model, individuals are norm-generating
subjects. They are involved in the process of developing the
norms of behavior and changing them. The governance model
thus views traditional patterns of hierarchical top-down regula-
tory control as obsolete. It advocates instead the adoption of co-
operative governance based on continuous interaction and
sharing of responsibility. 122 It signifies a move to partnership,
to horizontal relationships, and to two-way communications.
The goal is to create microsystems of open communication in
which policy is imagined, managed, and maintained.
In a cooperative regime, the role of government changes
from regulator and controller to facilitator, and law becomes a
shared problem-solving process rather than an ordering activ-
ity. 123 Government, industry, and civil society groups all share
responsibility for achieving policy goals. Industry is expected to
participate as part of a search for common goals, not just.rig-
idly asserting its narrow economic or political interests.
Congress has recently endorsed the spirit of collaborative
rulemaking by standardizing regulatory negotiation in the Ne-
gotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, which was permanently reau-
thorized in 1996.124 Negotiated rulemaking is a process through
which stakeholders come together to negotiate and reach con-
sensus as to the substance of regulation. As early as 1982,
Philip Harter published an article entitled Negotiating Regula-
tions: A Cure for Malaise.125 Harter proposed the features of
negotiated rulemaking as a way of giving stakeholders more
voice in the regulatory process. 126 The process enables the shar-
ing of information and the comparison of practices and out-
comes among various participants. 127 The creation of a realm of
regulatory negotiation is also intended to encourage discussion
121. Farber, supra note 9, at 1280.
122. See Fiorino, supra note 31, at 464.
123. Freeman, supra note 3, at 28-30.
124. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (1994 & Supp.
I 1995); Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320,
§ 11(a), 110 Stat. 3870, 3873.
125. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1 (1983).
126. Id. at 65-67.
127. Id. at 30-31.
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and establish a space for collaboratively reaching decisions,
ideally through consensus building.128
The collaborative approach further affects the relations
among social actors. The governance model urges dialogue at
all levels of the economy-local communities, sectors of the
economy, regional, national and transnational levels-and en-
courages more links among social movements. 129 At the non-
governmental level, the model draws on the idea of multiparty
social action that involves parties in relatively undefined rela-
tionships.130 In a collaborative environment, the capacities as
well as the identities of the participants evolve substantially
over time.' 3' Collaboration thus promotes mutual accountabil-
ity, defined as "accountability among autonomous actors com-
mitted to shared values and visions and to relationships of mu-
tual trust and influence that enable renegotiating expectations
and capacities to respond to uncertainty and change."'132 It re-
quires the identification of shared goals, which often requires
abandoning entrenched positions that construct other actors as
the problem, rather than as partners to a solution. 33
The principle of collaboration therefore involves the recog-
nition of interdependencies among social actors. Regulatory ap-
proaches to social policy have often been criticized for being
based on a rights discourse which has a trump quality. Regula-
tion entails a winner-takes-all approach, implying a message of
zero sum distribution. Much of the struggle for rights is framed
competitively:
128. See id. at 28-29.
129. See Lobel, supra note 90, at 2157-62 (examining the collaborative
model's impact on the labor market).
130. L. David Brown, Multiparty Social Action and Mutual Accountability,
in GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND MORAL COMMUNITY (Alnoor Ebrahim & Ed-
ward Weisband eds, forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 15-16, on file with au-
thor).
131. Id.
132. Id. (manuscript at 7) (emphasis omitted).
133. See, e.g., L. David Brown, Building Civil Society Legitimacy and Ac-
countability with Domain Accountability Systems, in PHILANTHROPY AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA (Cynthia Sanborn et al. eds., forthcoming
2004) (discussing civil society organizations' contribution to governance and
social problem solving); L. David Brown & Mark H. Moore, Accountability,
Strategy, and International Nongovernmental Organizations, 30 NONPROFIT &
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 569 (2001) (discussing the importance of accountability
among international nongovernmental development and environmental or-
ganizations).
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Particularly where hard resources are involved, it is alarmingly easy
to see that winner-take-all civil rights contests can take shape. Af-
firmative action programs are rife with such contests, which pit one
recognized civil rights constituency against another. For instance, in
minority business enterprise programs, blacks and Latinos have had
ample opportunity to observe white women speed ahead of them in
contests for finite resources.
1 34
However, in reality, the ends of social policy are multiple
and hard to measure. 13 5 The nature of social life is extremely
complex and interdependent. A collaborative model increases
the need for parties to work together to realize their interests
and goals in a mutually respectful way. A shift from adversar-
ial legalism to collaboration entails a move from an image of
win-lose situations to a win-win environment. All actors come
to realize their interlocking interest in the processes of govern-
ance. As will be discussed in the succeeding sections, such an
environment heightens the need to include procedures that en-
sure that parties' interests and externalities are taken into ac-
count, negotiation processes are adequately structured, and the
bargaining power of stakeholders is addressed.
C. DIVERSITY AND COMPETITION
The command-and-control regulatory model of the New
Deal era sought to control market rates, control entry into in-
dustries, and command the minimum conditions and require-
ments of production and service. 136 The aim was to unify, stan-
dardize, make activities routine, and, frequently, to suppress
divergence. Responding to the increased complexity, diversity,
and volatility of the new market, the Renew Deal aims con-
versely to promote diversification, pluralization of solutions,
and increased competition.
A central critique of the old regulatory model is its one-
size-fits-all approach. 137 The premise of the governance model
134. Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Eth-
ics of Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 115, 131 (David Kairys ed.,
1998).
135. See, e.g., THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD
WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 222-28 (1990)
(describing the "Basic Contradictions Thesis" as the contention that public
programs and policy domains always have multiple purposes, which are often
difficult to achieve simultaneously).
136. SCHUCK, supra note 53, at 121.
137. See, e.g., Philip E. Karmel, Achieving Radical Reductions in Cleanup
Costs, in NEW SOLUTIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN BUSINESS AND
REAL ESTATE DEALS 2003, at 371 (PLI Real Estate Law & Practice Course,
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is that, in order for a legal regime to be sustainable, it must en-
compass a multitude of values and account for conflict and
compromise. It must acknowledge the diversity and changing
interests of many stakeholders. 138 It must recognize the legiti-
macy of private economic interests while appealing to public
values.
A second premise underlying the idea of diversity and plu-
rality is derived from the principles of collaboration and par-
ticipation-that no one institution possesses the ability to regu-
late all aspects of contemporary public life. Institutional design
based on inclusion and the proliferation of normative authori-
ties encourages the adoption of a wide variety of approaches,
methodologies, and practices. This design must be coupled with
the development of comparative measures to assess the relative
success of varying methods in comparable circumstances. The
new model must also create pressures and incentives to gener-
ate the information that would allow for such comparisons. 139
The generation of interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional
competition-through processes of decentralization, privatiza-
tion, and participatory administration, as well as the sharing of
information and incentives for comparison-signifies new pub-
lic management tools of the governance model.
Some scholars, assuming the Renew Deal is transitional,
call for more "experimentation with and evaluation of multiple
approaches before settling on one or a few approaches that
demonstrate superior performance."'' 40 The most sophisticated
articulations of the governance model, however, understand
competition and diversity not as a temporary strategy before
choosing the superior solution in any given scenario, but rather
as a means for continuous change and improvement. 41 In both
Handbook Series No. N-499, 2003) (asserting that there is no one-size-fits-all
solution to the problems of environmental cleanups); Lobel, supra note 90 (re-
marking that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the problems of the new
labor market).
138. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, ECOPRAGMATISM 12-13 (1999) (asserting
that environmental law must remain flexible and pluralistic to take diverse
interests into account).
139. See Minow, supra note 78, at 1242-43 (arguing that public/private
partnerships can regulate schools, social services, prisons, and welfare more
efficiently due to the incentives generated by market style competition).
140. OSTERMAN ETAL., supra note 89, at 165.
141. Lobel, supra note 90; Minow, supra note 78; cf. Trubek & Trubek, su-
pra note 8 (arguing that EU law regulating social policy should adopt a hybrid
approach that transcends the hard/soft law distinctions by emphasizing diver-
sity).
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versions competition is understood as good and effective. How-
ever, the model is open to the possibility that in certain situa-
tions these assumptions may be found illusory, for example,
when efforts to involve more actors in fact lead to the creation
of private monopolies. 142
D. DECENTRALIZATION AND SUBSIDIARITY
During the New Deal era, centralization was thought to be
essential to overcoming the economic crisis that the nation
faced. 143 The Depression revealed the pervasive interdependen-
cies of the economy. The national extent of the crisis made it
difficult for reformers to believe that the individual states could
solve their grave problems without a centralized federal or-
der. 144 The New Deal regulatory model sought therefore to con-
solidate formerly dispersed power, often into the hands of the
newly founded regulatory agencies and programs. 145 In con-
trast, the Renew Deal advocates a movement downward and
outward-a transfer of responsibilities to the states and locali-
ties and to the private sector, including private businesses and
nonprofit organizations. 146
142. See DONAHUE, supra note 109, at 222 (claiming that privatization
would not be a sufficient remedy for the complex public realm); ORLY LOBEL,
REGULATING COEXISTENCE IN THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY: CROSS-SEcToR
COLLABORATION IN A WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (Harvard Univ., John F.
Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Hauser Center for Nonprofit Org., Working Paper, No. 21,
2003), at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hauser/publications/working-papers/work
ingpaperlist.htm. A second tension occurs between an understanding of com-
petition and diversity as instrumental-as a means to produce the best re-
sults-and an embrace of diversity, pluralism, and choice. Whether in the
market or in civil society, pluralism and diversity must be embraced as intrin-
sic goods, promoting respect, tolerance, and valuation of the variety of norms
within society. On the many meanings of diversity and pluralism, instrumen-
tal as well as intrinsic, see PETER SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING
GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE (2003). See also Minow, supra note 78, at
1244-45 (claiming that the public/private collaboration can potentially create
"a vibrant and nontoxic pluralism").
143. Walker, supra note 100, at 1275.
144. See DONALD F. KETTL, THE REGULATION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
27 (1983) ("Roosevelt's programs were based on a novel sense of the national
government's purpose. Serious problems that affected the country, even if they
were economic as opposed to military or diplomatic, were national problems
that deserved a national solution."); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After
the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 425 (1987).
145. Walker, supra note 100, at 1275-76; David Yassky, A Two-Tiered
Theory of Consolidation and Separation of Powers, 99 YALE L.J. 431, 437-38
(1989).
146. Trubek, supra note 32, at 72-76.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Decentralization serves at least four different purposes.
First, it promotes the governance principles we have just ex-
plored-participation, diversity, competition, and experimenta-
tion. A decentralized public design realizes Justice Brandeis'
metaphor of the states as laboratories of experimentation. 147
Each state and locality contributes to the evolution of law by
first creating various programs that enact and test reforms,
and then subsequently accepting or rejecting them. As a result
of increased diversity and competition, decentralization further
promotes choice and responsiveness. 148
Second, decentralization affirms the pragmatic idea of sub-
sidiarity, including the localness and partiality of human
knowledge, and the difficulty of translation between locali-
ties. 149 In 1912, William James wrote about the humility of the
human perspective:
Hands off: neither the whole of truth nor the whole of good is revealed
to any single observer, although each observer gains a partial superi-
ority of insight from the peculiar position in which he stands. Even
prisons and sick-rooms have their special revelations. It is enough to
ask of each of us that he should be faithful to his own opportunities
and make the most of his own blessings, without presuming to regu-
late the rest of the vast field. 50
As a guiding principle of social organization, subsidiarity
maintains that all governmental tasks are best carried out at
the level closest to those affected by them. Central authorities
should leave the widest scope possible for local discretion to fill
in the details of broadly defined policies. Those closest to the
problem possess the best information leading toward a poten-
tial solution. Therefore, the specific elaboration and application
of common standards needs local knowledge to reach the de-
sired objectives. Local entities are consequently understood to
be more properly situated to manage functions by which they
are affected than a dominant central organization.
147. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
148. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA:
THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 173 (1992).
149. See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 465 (1990)
(arguing that pragmatism is a preferable means of approaching problems due
to a "full awareness of the limitations of human reason with a sense of the 'lo-
calness' of human knowledge").
150. William James, On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings, in ON
SOME OF LIFE'S IDEALS 46 (1912).
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A third function of decentralization is the creation of rela-
tional density and synergy.1 51 While the New Deal created a
system of bureaucracies often experienced as faceless and inac-
cessible, 152 one of the goals of the governance model is to "re-
place remote impersonal relations ... with face-to-face rela-
tions," and convert impersonal duties into personal ones. 153 A
relatively small-scale geographic focus gives people a sense of
connectedness. Indeed, there are psychological and anthropo-
logical indications that scale matters for successful engage-
ment-the smaller the scale, the easier it is for people to com-
municate and to reach sustainable solutions. 154
Describing the rise of the Community Economic Develop-
ment Movement in the 1990s, Bill Simon argues that the spa-
tial shift to decentralization provides people with "a sense of
place," preventing them from experiencing public life as "ano-
nymity... divorced from its surroundings." 155 Similarly, Todd
Rakoff, focusing on the temporal dimensions of social interac-
tion, deplores the contemporary decline of engagement of ordi-
nary citizens in the public and civic sphere. Analogous to
Simon's sense of place framework, Rakoff argues for providing
people with a sense of time. Rakoff joins an increasing number
of scholars who worry that we are investing too much of our
time in economically productive activities, and hence neglecting
our civic and expressive activities. 56
151. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY 227 (2002).
152. William H. Clune, Unreasonableness and Alienation in the Continuing
Relationships of Welfare State Bureaucracy: From Regulatory Complexity to
Economic Democracy, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 707, 715-17; Gerald E. Frug, The Ide-
ology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1382 (1984);
Ian R. MacNeil, Bureacracy, Liberalism, and Community-American Style, 79
Nw. U. L. REV. 900, 907 (1984); William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and
Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1232 (1983).
153. SIMON, supra note 151, at 50 (citing Lewis D. Solomon, Microenter-
prise: Human Reconstruction in America's Inner Cities, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 191, 193-202 (1992)).
154. Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and His-
tory, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 157 (2000).
155. SIMON, supra note 151, at 41 (citing OFFICE OF COMTY. PLANNING &
DEV., U.S. DEP'T OF HoUs. & URBAN DEV., A GUIDEBOOK FOR COMMUNITY-
BASED STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR EMPOWERMENT ZONES AND ENTERPRISE
COMMUNITIES 13 (1994)).
156. See Orly Lobel, The Law of Social Time, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 357
(2003) (reviewing TODD RAKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE: LAW AND THE
BALANCE OF LIFE (2002)). In recent years, Robert Putnam has been a leading
voice in the argument that while societies have traditionally benefited from
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A fourth rationale for decentralization follows naturally
from the generation of multiple links among groups and indi-
viduals. The aspiration of the governance model is that in-
creased engagement will contribute to the building of delibera-
tive and collaborative capacities, thus sustaining an
environment for democratic engagement. In the context of
community development, Simon explains the function of multi-
plying the roles, capacities, and contexts in which people inter-
act in a community. Neighbors become able to view one another
in their relationships as sellers-consumers, employers-
employees, property owners-tenants, planners-citizens, and
administrators-service recipients. 15 7 When people encounter
one another repeatedly,
Each encounter is an opportunity to develop collaborative capacities,
and there is a synergy among the relations. People's self-confidence,
their knowledge of their neighbors, and their capacities for negotia-
tion and deliberation spill over from one sector to another and hence
develop cumulatively with collaboration across different areas. 158
Finally, there is some ambiguity in the added value of gen-
erating synergy. By some accounts, generating synergy creates
empathy and mutual trust among people. 159 But other versions
contend that social density has the potential to produce addi-
tional layers of social control and mutual surveillance. 160 In
economic terms, each of these possibilities may be viewed as a
process in which externalities are internalized. Both versions
assume that under certain circumstances individuals will fol-
low norms against their immediate self-interest, even in ab-
sence of the threat of formal regulatory sanction. But while the
civil society associations, today's societies are experiencing a troubling decline
in associational life. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE
AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING
DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIc TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993); Robert D.
Putnam, The Strange Disappearance of Civic America, 24 AM. PROSPECT 34
(1996).
157. SIMON, supra note 151, at 41.
158. Id. at 49.
159. Id.; see also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND
THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 8 (1995); Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman's" Fourth
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Re-
vival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1558 (1988).
160. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of
the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and
Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 301-08(1998); Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J.
1039, 1074-89 (2002).
[89:342
THE RENEW DEAL
first view describes a process of negotiated shared visions and
values, the second in effect projects traditional understandings
of human motivations (e.g., fear of sanction) from the formal
regulatory realm to the governance environment. Recalling
game theory models, it suggests that under the right architec-
ture-increased social density that generates collaboration and
interdependence-people will follow norms and conform with-
out formal regulatory means because of the necessity of repeat
dealings, adverse effects on reputation, relationship-based
credibility, possibility of retribution, and the increased likeli-
hood of reciprocation.
16 1
This final tension further complicates the relationship be-
tween decentralization and diversity. The best interpretation of
the governance model is that divergence is generative and de-
sirable. However, following the alternative interpretation of
synergy as creating pressures to conform, an architectural pan-
optic with "eyes upon the street"162 springs forth, emerging
from the competing analysis that "the experience of being
watched itself inhibits deviance." 163
E. INTEGRATION OF POLICY DOMAINS
The governance model recognizes that doctrinal divides
and boundaries between legal fields are contingent and are of-
ten defined through negotiation and revision. It therefore en-
courages the questioning of these divides through openness and
fluidity of policy domains. The features of participation, col-
laboration, decentralization, and diversity all have the poten-
tial to illuminate how widely dispersed issues are nonetheless
connected at the level of those who are most influenced by
them. Governance scholarship acknowledges that the focus of
our zoom lens determines much of what we see in the complex
world we face.
In a regulatory model, law is fragmented into distinct,
specified subfields. By contrast, the governance model takes a
holistic approach to problem solving, aiming for a synoptic view
161. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104
Harv. L. Rev. 373 (1990); Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico,
Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1281 (2003).
162. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 35
(1961); see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON 201 (1979) (explaining the regulatory effect of a panoptic presence
in society).
163. SIMON, supra note 151, at 50.
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of conditions as they exist simultaneously over a broad discipli-
nary spectrum. The constant question to be asked is what is
left outside of the policy picture. Renew Deal scholarship aims
to show how most social problems involve multiple issues in-
cluding the interconnections between housing, employment,
family, welfare, health, transportation, banking, and entrepre-
neurship.16 4
A large-scale example of the adoption of a governance ap-
proach is the novel policy process recently adopted by the EU,
collectively termed the Open Method of Coordination (OMC).
The process illustrates the significance of policy integration.
The OMC was established in 2000 at the Lisbon European
Council as a process of governance designed to spread best
practices among EU member states.165 The OMC serves mem-
ber states by coordinating their social policies in areas such as
employment, education, and health. The newly-adopted process
allows the development of common goals without the formal re-
quirement of state compliance and is therefore considered to be
a novel form of soft law. The committees established under the
OMC reveal how sectoral divides between legal fields are con-
tingent and are defined through negotiation and struggle. 166
The emphasis of OMC processes is on policy linkage, integrat-
ing different considerations and aspects with the aim to ac-
count for the interconnections among issues such as economic
policy, employment, fiscal and wage policy, social inclusion,
pensions, immigration and the environment.67 By integrating
these issues, policy debates at the EU level aim to uproot struc-
tural impediments to human development, for example, by fo-
cusing on both supply-side and demand-side barriers to em-
ployment.
164. See, e.g., id.
165. EUROPEAN UNION COMM. OF THE REGIONS, CONFERENCE ON THE
OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION (OMC): IMPROVING EUROPEAN
GOVERNANCE? (Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 2002), http://consiglio.regione.emiliaromagna.
it/europaIMonitorEuropa/Monitor_4/conferenza%20sull%20governance.pdf
(last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
166. Created in 2000, the European Employment Strategy (EES) commit-
tee was the first OMC committee established. Id. More recent committees ad-
dress policy questions on social exclusion, education, and pensions. See Caro-
line de la Porte, Is the Open Method of Coordination Appropriate for
Organising Activities at European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?, 8 EUR. L.J.
38 (2002); Joanne Scott & David Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Ap-
proaches to Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1 (2002).
167. GrAinne de Bdrca, The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in
the European Union, 28 EuR. L. REV. 814, 824 (2003).
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In both Europe and the United States, the rethinking of so-
cial policies has been largely motivated by the need to take a
more active, holistic approach to welfare, social safety nets, and
social mobility. 168 As we shall see in the domain of U.S. work-
force development reform, and as has been integral to the de-
sign of the OMC, a governance approach to social provision em-
phasizes integration of related policy issues, such as the
availability of vocational training, placement services, health
care, child care, transportation, and tax credits. In the context
of health care, legal scholars now advocate a broader approach
to chronic disease management, pointing to recent initiatives
that have been undertaken in the field. By forging relation-
ships with the community and schools, diverse professionals-
including lawyers, doctors, social workers, and educators-
collaborate to address such broad issues as housing conditions,
nutrition, environmental policy, consumerism, and preven-
tion. 169 The metaphor of chronic problems persisting because of
their isolation from structurally integrated solutions pervades
Renew Deal governance literature.
170
Finally, it should be noted that the integration of policy
domains in the Renew Deal era is often generated by a change
in the terms of the debate. A new appellation for an ongoing so-
cial problem frees participants from preconceptions of the range
of familiar questions and the stereotypical answers of the past.
For instance, in the context of Social Europe and the transfor-
mation of European welfare regimes, Kenneth Armstrong de-
scribes a shift from a "poverty" to a "social exclusion" dis-
course.1 71 In the American context, commentators suggest that
an opposite shift-from a welfare discourse to a poverty dis-
course-may generate new ideas and responses.172
168. LOBEL, supra note 142.
169. Trubek, supra note 32, at 575.
170. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 16, at 1020 ("Destabilization
rights are claims to unsettle and open up public institutions that have chroni-
cally failed to meet their obligations and that are substantially insulated from
the normal processes of political accountability.").
171. Kenneth A. Armstrong, Tackling Social Exclusion Through OMC: Re-
shaping the Boundaries of EU Governance, in 6 THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION: LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 170, 173 (Tanja A. Borzel & Rachel A.
Cichowski eds., 2003); see also The European Convention, Final Report of
Working Group XI on Social Europe, Conv 516/1/03 Revl, Brussels, Feb. 4,
2003.
172. For a collection of essays discussing the import of social welfare for
American democracy and balancing the delivery of assistance to the poor be-
tween the government and nonprofit organizations, see WHO WILL PROVIDE?
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F. FLEXIBILITY AND NONCOERCIVENESS (OR SOFTNESS-IN-LAW)
The governance model aims to create a flexible and fluid
policy environment that fosters "softer" processes that either
replace or complement the traditional "hard" ordering of the
regulatory model. Scholars suggest a leap outside the regula-
tory box, developing new mechanisms to replace top-down or-
dering, implementation, and enforcement.173 Over the past dec-
ades, commentators across the political spectrum have come to
see aspects of the regulatory model as inherently cumbersome,
ineffective, and heavily executed. Moreover, the gaps between
law-in-the-books and law-in-action, have led many to seek more
integrated approaches to law reform. The rapid rise of secon-
dary, informal markets and underground economies-
characterized by vast noncompliance, and underenforcement,
and lucrative opportunities coexisting with pervasive exploita-
tion-has further challenged the notion that traditional regula-
tion can bring meaningful change in globalizing economies.174
Finally, the broad dissatisfaction with the formalities of bu-
reaucratic procedures in relation to the experience of citizen-
ship has registered with scholars and practitioners. Increas-
ingly, the new vision includes softer processes, which will
create an environment more conducive to participation and dia-
logue.
There is a wide spectrum of what softer processes and in-
creased flexibility might mean for law reform. Some Renew
Deal scholars depict governance processes as informalization,
while others, including myself, prefer to describe degrees and
variations of formality.175 The term "soft law" has been used in
THE CHANGING ROLE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE (Mary Jo
Bane et al. eds., 2000).
173. Trubek, supra note 32.
174. On informal or underground economies, see SASKIA SASSEN,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 153-72 (1998); Richard Epstein, The
Moral and Practical Dilemmas of an Underground Economy, 103 YALE L.J.
2157 (1994); Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Work-force and the Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE
L.J. 2179 (1994); Orly Lobel, Class and Care: The Roles of Private Intermediar-
ies in the In-home Care Industry in the United States and Israel, 24 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (2001); Christian Zlolniski, The Informal Economy in an Ad-
vanced Industrialized Society: Mexican Immigrant Labor in Silicon Valley, 103
YALE L.J. 2305 (1994).
175. On the use of the concept of informality in contemporary legal scholar-
ship, see Annelise Riles, User Friendly: Informality and Expertise, 27 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 613 (2002). See also Lobel, supra note 38. William H. Simon has
referred to certain variations in the degrees of formalities in decision making
[89:342
legal scholarship in a variety of ways. At one extreme, soft law
regimes are comprised of interwoven rules of conduct, estab-
lished and enforced within the private realm in the absence of a
hard-binding regulatory regime. 176 Jerry Mashaw defines soft
law as consisting of "social accountability" regimes that are "in-
finitely negotiable, continuously revisable, often unspoken, os-
cillating between deep respect for individual choices and relent-
less social pressure to conform to group norms."
177 This
approach urges us not to equate law with formal regulation but
rather to decenter the concept of law to include multiple in-
stances of normativity, particularly nonstate generated norms.
By requiring a move away from conventional notions of regula-
tion, it calls for alternative avenues of reform, building on ear-
lier formulations of the legal pluralism school of thought. Re-
cent legal scholarship has looked at the role of soft law regimes
and nonregulatory instruments in diverse contexts, including
international law, labor and employment law, consumer laws,
and environmental regimes. 178 These nonregulatory instru-
ments include social labeling, voluntary corporate codes of con-
duct, private accreditation, and certification by nongovernmen-
tal actors. 179
At its best, however, the governance model assumes a
harder definition of soft law; one that preserves an active role
for the state and the legal regime. First, the type of soft law
norms described above should be understood as interwoven and
existing within an authoritative legal system. Even when ac-
tors who do not have the formal capacity to make law generate
as "personal formality." In the context of the community economic develop-
ment movement, see SIMON, supra note 151.
176. See Steven R. Ratner, International Law: The Trials of Global Norms,
FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1998, at 65; see also David Trubek et al., Transnation-
alism in the Regulation of Labor Relations: International Regimes and Trans-
national Advocacy Networks, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1187, 1194 (2000). On
"soft law" labor regimes, see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To the Yukon and
Beyond: Local Laborers in a Global Labor Market, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 93, 121-23 (1999). On soft law in the context of environmental policy,
see Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environ-
ment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420, 432 (1991). For a discussion of soft law in the
European context, see, for example, NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING
SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH
(1999).
177. Mashaw, supra note 79.
178. Id.
179. A Hard Look at Soft Law, Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law, 82 AM. SOC Y INT'L L. PROC. 371 (1988) [hereinafter Hard
Look at Soft Law].
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norms, the Renew Deal paradigm recognizes how these non-
governmental actors are sustained by the background rules of
the legal system.
Second, governance scholars focus on the range of signals
of authority within formal institutions.180 Any given agency
undertakes different activities that exert different degrees of
authority as to the finality, rigidity, and control of their signals.
Formal signals exist by which the same norm-generating insti-
tution distinguishes between hard law utterances and other
communications, for example by choosing between oral and
written deliberations, by the naming of documents, or by the
procedures taken to make its activities known publicly.lsl For
example, in recent years, several administrative agencies have
issued "good guidance practices" instead of more conventional
regulations.18 2 In the mid-1990s, the Federal Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) decreased the number of its regulations by fifty per-
cent compared with its activities during the 1970s and 1980s.
But over the same time period, the number of guidance docu-
ments it has issued increased by four hundred percent.18 3 The
underlying assumption of these softer expressions of intent is
that they will allow greater flexibility while still considerably
affecting conduct. In industries in which regulated parties are
repeat players, the relationship with the agency often provides
a greater incentive for compliance than the issuance of harder
regulation. 184
A third understanding of regulatory flexibility within the
governance model involves the process by which authoritative
decisions are issued. Hard regulatory processes often include
rigid requirements about the scope of participation, the forms
of exchange between participants, and the ways in which deci-
sions can be reached, such as the notice and comment require-
ments under the Administrative Procedure Act. 8 5 Softer proc-
esses loosen these requirements to allow open communication,
fluid participation, and consensus-based deliberation. One ef-
180. Id. at 373 (remarks by Michael Reisman); Rakoff, supra note 85, at
168.
181. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forward: Nomos
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 43 (1983).
182. Rakoff, supra note 85, at 167.
183. Id. at 168.
184. Id. at 169-70.
185. See generally Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice
and Comment Rulemaking Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317 (1989).
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fect of a more flexible attitude toward reaching decisions is that
it allows more integration between stages of the legal process.
Unlike the regulatory model, the governance model does not in-
sist that legislation, implementation, enforcement, and adjudi-
cation are separate stages; but rather seeks to form dynamic
interactions among these processes.
A final element of softness in the governance model in-
volves the sanctions that are attached to legal directives. Flexi-
bility implies variation in the communications of intention to
control and discipline deviance.' 8 6 Less coercive sanctions can
promote flexibility in implementation and compliance. For ex-
ample, a requirement for reporting is considered softer than
mandatory fines in the case of noncompliance. This aspect of
soft law has been described in the context of the increasing
adoption of reporting requirements rather than the imposition
of penalties as structured but unsanctioned.
8 7
It is important to mention two other possible understand-
ings of softness-in-law that are more conventional and have de-
veloped within the traditional regulatory model. The most
common accounting of degrees of softness and hardness of law
involves the content of the law and the degree of openness in its
articulation.18 8 This analysis has been an integral part of the
regulatory era, invoking the traditional realist concept of the
choice between rules and standards. While this is not a novel
feature of the governance model, this more traditional account-
ing continues to interact with other forms of softening under
the new model. For example, recently adopted performance-
based regulation, designed to allow a range of reasonable inter-
pretations that can meet the legal requirement of comparable
outcomes, promotes flexibility in the means adopted to achieve
186. See, e.g., Hard Look at Soft Law, supra note 179, at 375 (remarks by
Michael Reisman).
187. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 2.
188. This is the early legal realist understanding about rules versus stan-
dards, further elaborated through generations of critical legal thinking. See
generally Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799
(1941); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991
Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
58 (1992) (defining legal directive as a rule when the directive binds a decision
maker to respond a certain way with the decision to the facts and defining a
legal directive as a standard when the directive "tends to collapse decision-
making back into the direct application of the background principle or policy
to a fact situation").
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the specified goals.18 9 Private firms are given incentives to
search for the least costly approach to abide by the performance
requirements. Often, along with the adoption of such mecha-
nisms, firms are required to design plans that outline how cer-
tain goals will be achieved. The governmental agency assists
the development of these plans, as well as approving or certify-
ing them. Subsequently, firms need to show compliance with
their own plans or provide reasons for divergence from them.
They may alter the plans as conditions. or new knowledge ar-
rives.
A second and final understanding of softness that existed
within the regulatory tradition is that actual enforcement of a
law is weak, even as the threat of formal sanctions continues.
Again, this is certainly not an innovative approach of the gov-
ernance model, but it interacts with other variations of formal-
ity and informality in the legal system. Weak enforcement
combines with softness when public commitment changes, such
as in sodomy laws, or when there is a vast apparatus rendered
invisible to public policy, such as in the case of the thriving un-
derground economies of global cities. 19 0 From a regulatory per-
spective, this kind of softness is usually seen as an unintended,
undesirable result. However, from a governance perspective, it
is understood as a potential tool. Hence, Renew Deal commen-
tators have proposed formalizing this feature of incomplete en-
forcement and law-in-action flexibility. While under the regula-
tory model, regulations usually apply to all members of an
industry, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite propose that, in
some situations, "partial-industry regulation" is superior to all-
or-nothing regulatory policies.191 They claim that regulating
only a subset of firms in an industry can engender "a system of
checks and balances in which the regulated and unregulated
portions of the market each curb the excesses of the alternative
form of market governance. Partial-industry regulation can
189. See Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects
and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN.
L. REV. 705, 711 (2003).
190. On informal or underground economies, see supra note 174 and ac-
companying text. Sodomy laws are a highly politicized example of changingpublic norms and values that influence the enforcement of laws that continue
to be on the books, but less dramatic examples are widespread. See Ryan
Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms,
and Social Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643, 644 (2001).
191. Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation: A Mo-
nopsony Standard for Consumer Protection, 80 CAL. L. REV. 13, 14 (1992).
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thus promote efficiency by restraining monopoly power without
giving rise to the evils of either captured or benighted regula-
tion."
1 9 2
Many of the writings within the governance model promote
softness in more than one of these possible dimensions. Return-
ing to the European OMC, the new EU governance approach
has been defined as a soft law process. 193 In fact, the OMC em-
bodies a combination of several flexible elements. It is soft law
because it "has general and open-ended guidelines rather than
rules [recalling the traditional standards vs. rules axis], pro-
vides no formal sanctions for Member States that do not follow
the guidelines [communications of intentions], and is not justi-
ciable [absence of formal enforcement mechanism]."'194
As with other principles of the governance model, different
rationales abound as to why, in certain contexts, soft mecha-
nisms may be preferable to hard regulation. First, the complex-
ity of many modern issues does not allow for obvious solution.
Renew Deal thinking recognizes that it is often better to allow
a range of interpretation, deviance, and trial and error without
the constraints of rigid orders and fear of formal sanctions. A
soft law approach reduces the often perverse incentives im-
posed by liability and sanctions. 195
A second reason to use soft law involves circumstances in
which the gap between the aspired norm and the existing real-
ity is so large that hard regulatory provisions are meaningless.
Many proposals for social and economic rights in developing
countries rest in this rationale. 196 The underlying idea is that it
is better for the normative order to recognize in advance the
impossibility of immediate change and to explicitly acknowl-
edge the space between real and ideal. Softer mechanisms al-
low a regime to establish minimum levels of adherence and to
formalize advancement toward higher, aspirational stan-
dards.197
192. Id.
193. Armstrong, supra note 171, at 193; de Birca, supra note 167, at 823-
26; Trubek & Trubek, supra note 2, at 2.
194. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 2, at 2.
195. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing employment discrimination); see also
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 521-22 (2001).
196. See generally HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 35-46 (2d ed. 2000).
197. See, e.g., John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework
for National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 9-14 (1998); John C.
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A related set of circumstances also points to the desirabil-
ity of a softer governance approach. Often, large differences ex-
ist in the capacity of different entities under the law's authority
to reach the desired regulatory goals. 198 This situation may be
most evident where law operates on differently situated poli-
ties, for example international conventions or European unifi-
cation. In sum, when material resources are greatly limited or
social barriers to implementation are high, it might be prefer-
able to promote certain policies in a flexible, noncoercive way.
A fourth context in which legal scholars advocate the softer
approach of the governance model over the traditional coer-
civeness of the regulatory model is where there is intense dis-
agreement among decision-making authorities. At times, no
consensus can be reached within a single legislative or admin-
istrative body; at other times, in an environment of regulatory
competition, controversy results over the authority of the forum
to legislate. 199 This latter situation is exemplified in the EU,
where competition between member states and the union over
hard legislative competence has led, in some areas, to the coex-
istence of national hard law and supranational semisoft law.
A fifth context occurs in circumstances where there is too
much political weakness to reach hard legislation or too much
ideological resistance to ensure implementation. In such cases,
if there is a de facto lack of competency to legislate, softer ini-
tiatives may often be enough to achieve similar results through
a noncoercive, nonregulatory approach. Such is the case with
international labor standards, in which activists have sought
Dernbach, Targets, Timetables and Effective Implementing Mechanisms: Nec-
essary Building Blocks for Sustainable Development, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POLY REV. 79, 93-94 (2002); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as En-
vironmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a
New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 366-67 (2001); William F. Pedersen, Regu-
lation and Information Disclosure: Parallel Universes and Beyond, 25 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 177-79 (2001) (describing the need for "operationally sig-
nificant goals").
198. This is, for example, a rationale for soft law approaches for the inte-
gration of Europe-where differently situated countries come together under a
new legal regime. See Scott & Trubek, supra note 166, at 4-8; de Bdrca, supra
note 167, at 827-30.
199. See, e.g., Timothy A. Canova et al., Labor and Finance as Inevitably
Transnational: Globalization Demands a Sophisticated and Transnational
Lens, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 109, 109-14 (2004); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime
Shifting. The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellec-
tual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 82 (2004); Kal Raustiala, The
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and
the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 70-72 (2002).
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market-based pressures, coupled with the background support
of official international and national bodies, to turn corporate
codes of conduct into soft law norms. 20 0
Finally, an overarching justification for softer, flexible ap-
proaches to policy is that they increase the overall legitimacy of
the system. Soft law is experienced by the different stake-
holders in a polity as less oppressive than regulatory means
and force. Semivoluntary compliance encourages an environ-
ment of nonfear and increases people's willingness to contrib-
ute freely to the efforts of public policy; thus supporting other
governance principles, including collaboration, diversity, and
learning.
G. FALLIBILITY, ADAPTABILITY, AND DYNAMIC LEARNING
Since a basic premise of the governance model is the inevi-
tability and the fertility of change, the new vision is optimistic
about uncertainty and doubt. In fact, unlike the traditional
regulatory model, governance treats ambiguity as an opportu-
nity rather than a burden to overcome. As we will further ex-
plore in Part V, theoretical and practical hybridization is a key
strength of the model. The coexistence of competing rationales
for the shift to the Renew Deal paradigm, its richness of ele-
ments, and its open and fluid multitiered architecture all con-
tribute to its boundless potential as a new paradigm.
The governance model engages Justice Jackson's famous
declaration that "[wie are not final because we are infallible,
but we are infallible only because we are final."20 1 In social life
and public policy, nothing is ever final, not even adjudication.
All arrangements are inherently fallible. The operative meta-
phor is that of living systems, where organic mutations and de-
viations can prove to be fitter, stronger, and more socially de-
sirable.
The regulatory model has often proved stagnant and slug-
gish, curtailing revision and improvement. "[M]ost of the classic
complaints about public bureaucracies are really criticisms of
200. See, e.g., Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the
Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401, 424-25 (2001); Owen E. Herrnstadt, Voluntary
Corporate Codes of Conduct: What's Missing?, 16 LAB. LAW. 349, 351-63
(2001); Elisa Westfield, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enter-
prise Responsibility: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1075, 1098-99 (2002).
201. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
2004] 395
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
agencies for being too legalistic (too rigid, unimaginative, proc-
ess-oriented, etc.) in their strict adherence to the statute, at
least as they understand it."202
While regulation has been an ordering act, governing is a
learning process. The new model is better positioned to accept
uncertainty and diversity, advancing iteratively toward worka-
ble solutions. The role of law is to promote practices that allow
revision and improvement. Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel de-
scribe their vision for an experimentalist regime as the open
acknowledgment of the incomplete and ambiguous character of
the initial specification of means and ends, and the use of the
lack of specificity as a prod to inquiry and discovery. 203 When
technology is widespread and knowable and standards are easy
to define, command-and-control regimes might be preferable.
Yet, under the realities of fast advancements, heterogeneity,
and complexity, the informational and adaptability advantages
of private firms should be configured into the legal system.
Moreover, lack of clarity about appropriate solutions can bene-
fit complex governance domains, because it enables conflicting
parties to come together in multistakeholder negotiations, mov-
ing away from, at least tentatively, entrenched positions about
each party's particular interests. 204
Martha Minow, recounting the growing involvement of pri-
vate actors in public activities, argues that "[p]rivatization
stimulates new knowledge and infrastructure by drawing new
people into businesses previously handled by government. 20 5
By designing institutions that rely on self-discipline and self-
surveillance to ensure performance, Renew Deal governance
scholarship stresses the importance of capacity building of pri-
vate actors. It borrows private sector techniques such as infor-
mation pooling, learning-by-monitoring, reliable feedback,
knowledge networks, and benchmarks for best practices. 206
Processes must be kept open since learning can be undermined
by too much specificity about goals, tasks, and roles. All of
202. PETER H. SCHUCK, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David
Schoenbrod, in THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE,
supra note 53, at 251, 262.
203. See A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4, at
363-64.
204. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 16, at 1099.
205. Minow, supra note 78, at 1245.
206. OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 80, at 195-219.
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these techniques and processes together form a system that is
iterative and dynamic, generating virtuous cycles of innovation.
Sophisticated analyses within the governance school dis-
tinguish between different levels of learning.20 7 In the context
of environmental law, Pieter Glasbergen differentiates between
four types of learning. 208 Among them, technical learning in-
volves the application of a limited number of policy instru-
ments, conceptual learning includes the redefinition of policy
goals and problems, and social learning has to do with the in-
teractions and communication among actors. 20 9 David Trubek
and James Mosher, discussing the desirability of ongoing learn-
ing in the EU context, characterize the implementation of the
new European governance initiative of OMC as "an iterative
multi-level, multi-actor process." 210 They similarly describe
three types of learning: first, the fine tuning of existing policy
instruments; second, the modification of instruments; and
third, making changes in policy goals themselves. 211 They ar-
gue that policy learning is facilitated by various measures,
many of which are elements of the governance model that have
been explored in the previous parts:
[M]echanisms that destabilize existing understanding; bring together
people with diverse viewpoints in settings that require sustained de-
liberation about problem-solving; facilitate erosion of boundaries be-
tween both policy domains and stakeholders; reconfigure policy net-
works; encourage decentralized experimentation; produce information
on innovation; require sharing of good practice and experimental re-
sults; encourage actors to compare results with those of the best per-
formers in any area; and oblige actors collectively to redefine objec-
tives and policies. 21 2
In addition to addressing the limits of human knowledge,
the principle of permanent learning is equally cognizant of the
unlimited power of human learning that has been perceived as
a threat under the regulatory model. On the one hand, the peo-
207. Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The
Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain, 25 COMP. POL. 275, 288 (1993).
208. Pieter Glasbergen, Learning to Manage the Environment, in
DEMOCRACY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 175, 176
(William M. Lafferty & James Meadowcroft eds., 1996).
209. Id.
210. David M. Trubek & James S. Mosher, New Governance, Employment
Policy, and the European Social Model, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN
A NEW ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS 33, 38-41 (Jona-
than Zeitlin & David M. Trubek eds., 2003).
211. Id. at 46.
212. Id. at 46-47.
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ple who are regulated are the ones with the greatest familiarity
and knowledge relevant to the goals of social policy. On the
other hand, there is the continuous risk that, precisely for the
reason that governmental regulation was required, self-
regulation will fail. One could predict with good reason that,
left to their own devices, private groups will not adhere to the
social goals involved. The Renew Deal governance model ac-
tively engages Weberian insights about the natural learning
process of organizations designed to overcome legal limita-
tions.2 13 Consequently, if there are some activities that are
likely to occur (e.g., because they are efficient) but we as a soci-
ety believe there is reason to control them, then there is a need
to keep law innately dynamic. Max Weber thought it obvious
that,
those who continuously participate in the market intercourse with
their own economic interests have a far greater rational knowledge of
the market and interest [in the] situation than the legislators and en-
forcement officers whose interest is only ideal .... It is those private
interested parties who are in a position to distort the intended mean-
ing of a legal norm to the point of turning it into its very oppo-
site .... 214
Weber recognized the inevitable learning cycle of those in
the market that want to avoid regulation-a cycle through
which regulation, even if innovative when conceived, eventually
becomes outmoded. Private actors quickly learn how to avoid
certain provisions, while the regulatory machinery might take
much longer to realize its dictates have been circumvented. 2 15
In the Renew Deal, the legal system's constant engagement
with evaluation, revision, experimentalism, feedback, and
monitoring addresses both types of learning-the positive im-
provement of policy as well as its avoidance. The new physical
infrastructure of advanced technology helps this practice by al-
lowing better data collection and the comparison of outcomes.
As David Osborne and Ted Gaebler report, "We can generate,
analyze, and communicate a thousand times more information
213. Max Weber, On Law in Economy and Society 38 (Max Rheinstein ed.
& Edward Shils trans., 1954), quoted in Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process 56-
57 (1978).
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 195, at 475-78 (arguing that employers
develop a systematic ability to learn to avoid discrimination liability in a
command-and-control regime).
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than we could just a generation ago, for a fraction of the
cost."
2 16
Hence, the business of government agencies becomes
"regulatory research and development," rather than regulatory
decision making, requiring "an ethic of experimentalism in
which errors are not viewed as failures.' '217 Under the govern-
ance model, several policy tools are considered to be especially
adapted to triggering mechanisms for renewal. One such policy
tool is the use of time-centered rules, which specify a preset
timeline or a rhythmic calendar for revision or change, for ex-
ample sunset rules and temporary decrees. 218 A second central
example of a dynamic policy tool is information-centered laws,
including both private disclosure rules and public sunshine
laws. Increasingly, information or disclosure regimes are policy
tools, ensuring choice and participation. 219 For example, on en-
vironmental issues, many countries now require industries to
release information on their performance to the community and
interested stakeholders. 220 In areas as diverse as securities
regulation, banking and loan management, health care, phar-
maceuticals, and consumer protection, the availability of in-
formation on performance, rates, and quality is increasingly
216. OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 80, at 141.
217. Freeman, supra note 3, at 31.
218. In private law, there are also examples of legislation that use time
rules to ensure the generation of new knowledge, improvements, and industry
advancements-like in the preset timelines for the expiration of intellectual
property entitlements. E.g., 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (2002) (The term of a patent be-
gins at the date of issuance and ends twenty years from the date on which the
application for the patent was filed in the United States.)
219. See, e.g., Pedersen, supra note 197, at 151-52 (arguing information
disclosure programs could effect significant changes in the status and func-
tions of federal regulatory agencies); Albert J. Boro, Jr., Comment, Banking
Disclosure Regimes for Regulating Speculative Behavior, 74 CAL. L. REV. 431,
472-89 (1986) (advancing a disclosure regime as a means of stabilizing banks).
220. The U.S. Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) requires specified categories
of manufacturing facilities to report annually on their use, storage, and re-
lease of about six hundred chemicals into the air, water, land, and under-
ground injection wells. Fiorino, supra note 31, at 448. The Environmental Pro-
tection Agency then compiles the data in annual reports, often receiving
extensive media coverage:
The TRI does not require firms to install technology or otherwise take
steps to reduce emissions; it is purely an information requirement.
Nonetheless, experience and empirical studies document that firms
respond to the negative publicity that accompanies the release of TRI
information. Companies do not want to be known as leading polluters
in their communities.
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understood as a way to generate better practices. Finally, per-
formance-centered norms are a vital category of new policy
tools that create a shared expectation of comparable outcomes
while allowing the refinement of means and strategies. 221
H. LAW AS COMPETENCE AND ORCHESTRATION
The final feature of the governance model is orchestration.
Orchestration renders all other aspects of the governance
model meaningful, separating the model from flat processes of
devolution and deregulation. From the perspective of the mi-
crolens of decentralization, some reform agendas of the Renew
Deal may best be accomplished at the local level. A more accu-
rate view reveals, however, that under the governance model, a
broader network of regional, state, and national efforts must
support programs.222 While power is decentralized to allow lo-
cal knowledge to match solutions to their individual circum-
stances, decentralization must be coupled with regional and na-
tional commitments to coordinate local efforts and
communicate lessons in a comprehensive manner. 223
The greatest challenge of orchestration is to prevent the
isolation of problems by linking together geographically and
materially dispersed efforts. Rather than an exclusively local-
ized approach, which focuses only on specific problems in a con-
fined geographical area, at its best, the new governance model
addresses problems in their broader context. 224 The legal sys-
tem must create opportunities to consider policies regionally
and nationally.
In the Renew Deal vision, the central authority declares a
need and an intention to address an issue and expresses will-
ingness to provide resources. The role of government is to pro-
mote and standardize innovations that began locally and pri-
221. Coglianese et al., supra note 189, at 705 (summarizing a workshop
discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of performance-based regulations).
222. In the context of community development, see SIMON, supra note 151,
at 167-93. In the context of the new labor market, see Lobel, supra note 90, at
2157-61.
223. See A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4, at
287-88.
224. Nonorchestration is the greatest difficulty of many policy proposals in
recent years. For example, this has been a primary weakness of many local
development efforts that have been reenergized in the 1990s. See Audrey G.
McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place: The Geography of Economic Development,
36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 299-301 (1999).
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vately. 225 Scaling up, facilitating innovation, standardizing
good practices, and researching and replicating success stories
from local or private levels are central goals of government.
Policymakers must observe and encourage a variety of prac-
tices that emerge in the market, and then decide how best to
support and complement good practices. The federal govern-
ment's role,
is less one of direct action than one of providing financial support,
strategic direction, and leadership for other governmental actors....
[Tihe federal role... lies. . . less in championing particular institu-
tions and practices than in mobilizing resources, encouraging experi-
mentation, facilitating comparison and evaluation of alternative ap-
proaches, and diffusing the best practices.
226
Orchestration of the best practices found in different con-
texts has the potential to result in a "virtuous cycle of innova-
tion and improvement. '2
2 7
The normative authorities that proliferate within the man-
date of an orchestrated system require a delicate, ongoing bal-
ance. How can a legal system preserve the implication of hier-
archy without being jurispathic? 22s How does government
maintain its authority while promoting the governance capaci-
ties of other social actors? Governance scholars encourage the
exercise of a new kind of legal self-restraint. Instead of taking
over regulatory responsibility for the outcome of social proc-
esses, law restricts itself to the installation, correction, and re-
definition of democratic mechanisms. 229 It creates incentives
and procedures to cultivate internal reflection about behav-
ior.230 The legal process coordinates the multiple levels of gov-
ernment and nongovernment activities. Accordingly, recalling
the processprudential project (or the Legal Process school) of
225. Cf. Freeman, supra note 3, at 21 (proposing a model of governance in
which administrative agencies facilitate joint problem solving with private en-
tites rather than react to interest representation).
226. OSTERMAN ETAL., supra note 89, at 151.
227. Id. at 178.
228. Robert Cover developed the term "jurispathic" to signify the violence
of legal ordering upon other normative orders. Cover, supra note 181, at 40-
44.
229. Teubner, supra note 60, at 273-75.
230. REFLEXIVE LABOUR LAW, supra note 1, at 7 ("In distinguishing func-
tions (with respect to society), performance (with respect to other social sys-
tems), and reflexion (with respect to the system itself) a sophisticated labour
law approach tries to 'regulate' not only through 'performance' but also
through influencing centres of 'reflexion' within other social subsystems.").
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the 1950s, 231 the governance model treats the legal system as
the interaction of institutions and practices, rather than as a
set of rules.
With the integration of policy domains and fields of foun-
dational law-including constitutional law, administrative law,
and jurisprudence-the Renew Deal vision promotes institu-
tional analysis of the myriad of subsystems in the polity. The
anomaly of the American legal system, in which common law
courts were developed before the full constitution of an admin-
istrative state, has affected the path of legal theory by contrib-
uting to the dominance of jurisprudence. The governance model
expands the center of legal thought beyond jurisprudence to in-
clude legisprudence and processprudence among different so-
cial arenas and institutions. The model's broad focus encom-
passes government agencies, as well as a host of private groups
and organizations, operating together in a more holistic legal
regime. In its treatment of the law as a comprehensive system,
the model again recalls the postwar Legal Process school. 232
The governance model is, however, more sophisticated in the
range of institutions it considers viable and its drive to recon-
figure the interactions of these institutions.233 Both private and
public institutions should be open to transformation. "Until we
make the underlying institutional and imaginative structure of
a society explicit we are almost certain to mistake the regulari-
ties and routines that persist, so long as the structure is left
undisturbed, for general laws of social organization."234
231. For an introduction to the legal process movement, see HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (William N. Eskridge, Jr.& Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). See also infra text accompanying notes 489-
492.
232. For a description of the Legal Process school, see infra notes 489-492.
233. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public LawMovement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707,
737-61 (1991) (outlining the new public law movement); Edward L. Rubin,The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis ofInstitutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1424-33 (1996) (describing the method-
ology and substance of the new legal process).
234. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, POLITICS: THE CENTRAL TEXTS 6 (Zhi-
yvan Cui ed., 1997). For example, Roberto Unger argues that, despite the re-definition of property in twentieth century American legal thought as a bundle
of legal relations and conflicting rights, legal theory has failed to produce an
understanding that "market economies, like representative democracies andfree civil societies can take radically different institutional forms." UNGER, su-
pra note 4, at 203-04.
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Critical legal theorist Roberto Unger describes legal
thought as having suffered from "institutional fetishism," and
calls on a new generation of thinkers to rebel against this ten-
dency. "The institutional arrangements for production and ex-
change should be as open to experimental variation as all other
parts of social life." 235 The legal system must therefore promote
experiments with institutional design rather than curtail them.
In the governance model, centralized law does not occupy a
privileged role controlling all other subsystems. Instead, law
coexists with various subsystems, ever gauging the sustainabil-
ity of the different organizations. 236 The law still dominates,
however, through its capacity to coordinate among different so-
cial institutions (e.g., political, economic, legal, family, religion,
education). Governance policies serve to integrate isolated ef-
forts at the subsystem level, coordinating different scales of ac-
tion. Law's coordinating function is achieved through its "com-
petence competency," the competence to determine other actors'
competencies. The legal system confines itself to a certain set of
questions, namely, the capacities of different actors, arenas and
subsystems; the division of scope and responsibilities among
them; and their self-regulatory institutional processes. Yet, by
this very action, law asserts its primacy in developing proce-
dures and jurisdictional norms for the activities of other social
systems. The European Autopoiesis school, similarly to the ear-
lier American Legal Process school, points to this role of the
law in determining competencies of the different social subsys-
tems. It claims that "legal norms should produce a 'harmonious
fit' between institutional structures and social structures
rather than influence the social structures themselves.
'237
235. UNGER, supra note 4, at 203. Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel simi-
larly challenge legal institutional fetishism:
How bizarre the assumption that the one feature of our institutions
that remained fixed as they somehow slipped from unimprovable to
incorrigible is their inaccessibility to deliberate alteration! ... [T]he
legal-process idea of taking the institutions for granted becomes a
form of self-fulfilling prophecy .... [W]hy not suppose simply that the
institutions of government worked well in the immediate post-War
period because by design, or by good fortune, they fit well with their
environment? In time the environment changed, and the lack of fit
explains the poor performance of the institutions ....
A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4, at 283.
236. Cf. The Changing Shape of Government, supra note 106, at 1334 (re-
marks by Lester Salamon) (describing the wide variety of forms of public ac-
tion, many of which involve private entities).
237. Teubner, supra note 60, at 251.
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Similarly, in the American context, governance scholars offer
the concept of "reconstitutive law,"238 describing law's function
in providing rules about the procedure, organization, and con-
stitution of other social fields without directly prescribing indi-
vidual behavior. In this framework, law ensures that subsys-
tems are responsive to their constituents, defines jurisdictions,
coordinates activities, harmonizes subsystem activities with
national goals, while preserving broad subsystem independ-
ence-creating a strategic coupling between national goals and
local authority.239 Law discerns the relative capacities of differ-
ent institutions and supports self-sustaining balances in each
context. In this capacity, a governance approach creates a mid-
dle ground-a space of regulated autonomy-between substan-
tive regulation and nonregulation. 240 Law continues to play a
crucial role under the governance model, but that role differs
from the regulatory model's conception of law as top-down and
universal.
IV. THREE EMERGING DOMAINS OF GOVERNANCE
As we have seen, the Renew Deal shift from regulation to
governance is affecting a myriad of policy areas. This section
critically explores the recent application of governance princi-
ples in three areas where it is particularly prevalent. First, in
the area of employment law, new policies on occupational
safety and health, second-generation employment discrimina-
tion, and vocational training programs, provide important in-
sights into the ways the legal regime is confronting the new po-
litical economy and constructing innovative policies to produce
socially responsible market practices. Next, in environmental
law, the Renew Deal vision has had some of its earliest influ-
ences on policy and institutional design. Environmental schol-
ars have begun developing the concept of civic environmental-
ism, which confronts the failures of traditional regulatory
schemes and promotes participatory and decentralized ar-
rangements to better conserve the ecology, habitat, and natural
resources. The third area, Internet law, is an important terrain
of implementation of governance principles in a new infrastruc-
ture. Technological advances are conducive to new demands of
flexibility, increasingly facilitating reflexive regulation, en-
238. Stewart, supra note 7, at 108-09.
239. Id. at 88, 104-11.
240. Teubner, supra note 60, at 254.
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Table 2: From Reulation to G*overnance
Trdtoa Ne 0oerac
Reuatr Moe Moe
Nature of
Law
Centered
Substantive
Centralized
Command-and-
Control
Rigid and Fixed
Uniform rules
Generalized
Decentered and
Proliferated
Procedural
Reflexive
Decentralized
Coordination and
Orchestration
Flexible and
Adaptable
Diversity
Contextualized
Variances
Institutional Top-down Hierarchy Horizontal Network
Organization Formal Informal
State Multiple levels of
National level government (local +
Public transnational +
Central international)Multiple public and
Actors private participation
Decentralization and
Principle of
Subsidiarity
Modes of Formal avenues of Proliferation of
Action activism modes of activism
Static Dynamic
One-shot Iterative
Process Ossified, Entrenched Repeat 
learning
Experimental
Promotes innovation
Motivator for Liability (Fear) Reform
Private Problem-solving
Action Improvement
Discrete actions Holistic, systemic ap-
Form of Distinct cases proach
Engagement Separate fields of law Integration of policy
domains
I
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Role of Individuals are the ob- Individuals are norm-
Private ject of regulation--can generating
Actors comply or not Active citizenship
Information is Integrated approach
Use of selective for fear of All information
Knowledge liability should be considered
and over a long period of
Information time and shared
Regularized
continuous reflection
Reactive ProactiveFrame Defensive Ex ante
Ex post
Adjudicative Before and after the Ongoing
Approach fact judgment Benchmarking
Legal regime as Legal regime as part
Source of primary source of of a range of factors
Norms norms that are considered
together--economic,
ethical, customary
"Hard" "Soft"
Coercive Aspirational
PowerofLaw Rules Guidance
Mandatory Voluntary
Sanctioned Structured but
unsanctioned
Professionalized Multi-disciplinary
Role of Operates in legal engagement
Lawyer arena Operates in
diverse social arenas
Convergence of Partial convergence
End Goals policies of processes and
outcomes
Haves/have-nots Win-win framework
Conceptual struggle for a share of Law asks: how toFramework the static pie enlarge the pie
Law asks: how to
divide the pie
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abling information and power sharing, and lowering the barri-
ers of entry and engagement. They have also added a new layer
of settings to which legal thought must react. These three lead-
ing areas of governance provide insights to both the promise
and complexities of implementing an integrated governance
model in legal fields previously shaped by the New Deal regula-
tory paradigm.
A. THE NEW WORKPLACE
The new economy, marked by a growing demand for flexi-
bility, increased competitiveness, and rapid globalization, has
created new patterns of work and employment.
241 Today's
workplaces promise less stability; contingent employment rela-
tions are on the rise. Although any linear account is inevitably
oversimplified, the last few decades have seen a move away
from the "old" model of work-Fordist assembly-line production
and Taylorist scientific management-to a postindustrial mode
of production, which is flexible, lean, and service based, and in
which work is increasingly outsourced and part-time.
242
As employers are adopting more flexible arrangements,
workplace security has become scarcer,
243 New employment
patterns, described by industrial-organization scholars as the
"casualization of the labor market,"244 the "new psychological
employment contract,"245 and the "boundaryless career,"
246 re-
quire workers to accommodate change rapidly and manage
their own careers. Indeed, the new currency of the human-
capital era is employability rather than stability. Those who
are not well situated to this new world of employability are dis-
proportionately women, minorities, and immigrants.
247 More-
over, new employment patterns have put into question the re-
sponsibility of the state to regulate the workplace as well as its
241. See Lobel, supra note 87, at 144-53.
242. Id.
243. See Orly Lobel, The Slipperiness of Stability: Contracting for Flexible
and Triangular Employment Relationships in the New Economy, 10 
TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 109, 112-14 (2003).
244. SASSEN, supra note 174, at 34.
245. Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 519 (2001).
246. MICHAEL B. ARTHUR & DENISE M. ROUSSEAU, THE BOUNDARYLESS
CAREER: A NEW EMPLOYMENT PRINCIPAL FOR A NEW ORGANIZATIONAL 
ERA
(1996).
247. See generally Lobel, supra note 174, at 89-92.
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capacities to enforce top-down regulations. The heterogeneity of
the workforce and the workplace has made it more difficult for
a centralized government agency to promulgate rules that will
fit all firms. In today's reality, no single model of work relations
exists, and thus unitary conceptions of the workplace and uni-
tary employment policies are impossible. Although existing le-
gal and social institutions are based on the assumptions of a
former era, in which uniformity and stability were much more
widespread, the nature of the new labor market requires flexi-
ble and diverse institutions.248 A governance approach is fur-
ther needed to address a rapidly changing environment in
which flexibility and adaptability are key to remaining com-
petitive in the new global market. Technological innovations as
well as unpredictable strains of heightened competition require
constant change and adaptation.
New dimensions of the workplace are challenging the tra-
ditional ways policymakers and scholars have approached is-
sues of social justice in the area of work. The inadequacy of
substantive prohibitions in the new economy requires alterna-
tive methods of social activism and reform. As employment pat-
terns have radically changed in the new economy, misconduct
and inequity must be prevented using strategies outside the
traditional regulatory toolbox. New governance strategies have
been employed in a variety of policies, including vocational-
training reforms, occupational health and safety regulation,
and antidiscrimination strategies.
1. Vocational Training
Worker training and adult education have always been a
bridge between the state and the market, between welfare and
work, and between low-wage and higher paying jobs. Even
Adam Smith, dubbed father of the invisible hand and laissez-
faire markets, believed that vocational education should be
provided free to the working class to guarantee that they would
be able to join society as full, productive citizens. 249 In the past
two decades, however, training has become increasingly impor-
tant. Changing market requirements and employment patterns
place more value on skills and education than did the earlier
industrial workplace. At the same time, reductions in direct
248. Lobel, supra note 90, at 2157 (citing OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 89,
at 35-44).
249. AVIsHAi MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 157 (1996) (citing ADAM
SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776)).
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welfare provisions constrain the ability of workers to seek aid
outside of the market. These developments have sharpened the
divisions between skilled (rather than stable or secure), up-
wardly mobile jobs and low-skill "dead-end" jobs.250
Reform agendas for workforce development thus face a
trilemma. First, lifelong learning and training is becoming in-
creasingly important in the new, ever-changing economy. The
changing face of both the workplace and the workforce has
placed a high premium on constant reskilling, networking, and
employability. Second, because of higher mobility, dislocation,
and worker turnover, individual firms have less incentive to in-
vest in skill training, particularly of less-skilled workers. And
third, welfare reform and reductions in direct governmental aid
have created new constraints on the ability of workers to seek
aid outside of the market.251
Federal regulatory initiatives and publicly funded training
programs in the United States have long been criticized for lag-
ging behind the economic realities and falling short of the ef-
forts of other countries. 25 2 A recurring failure has been the lack
of coordination with the needs of the private job market. 253 Ex-
isting public institutions, such as local high schools and com-
munity colleges, have played a central role in training. How-
ever, these training sites did not achieve the much-needed
250. DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? 11-13 (1997); see
SASSEN, supra note 174, 138-42.
251. See Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Pov-
erty Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739, 1741 (2002); Joel F. Handler, US Wel-
fare Reform: The Big Experiment, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN A
NEW ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS 215 (Jonathan
Zeitlin & David M. Trubek eds., 2003).
252. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Community Economic Development
Movement, 2002 WiS. L. REV. 377.
253. W. NORTON GRUBB, LEARNING TO WORK: THE CASE FOR
REINTEGRATING JOB TRAINING AND EDUCATION 70-74 (1996); PAUL
OSTERMAN, EMPLOYMENT FUTURES: REORGANIZATION, DISLOCATION, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 90 (1988); Rashid Amjad, Employability in the Global Economy
and the Importance of Training: A Summary of the 1998-99 ILO World Em-
ployment Report, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 715, 730-35 (1999); Marie-
Louise Caravatti, The Role of Governments in the Development of Human Re-
sources Training for Employability: The U.S. Side, 22 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 37, 40
(1996); Lisa M. Lynch & Sandra E. Black, Beyond the Incidence of Employer-
Provided Training, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 64 (1998); see also Michael
Cragg, Performance Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from the Job
Training Partnership Act, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 147 (1997) (using the Job
Training Partnership Act to illustrate how the government approach to incen-
tives differs from that of the private sector).
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coordination between taught skills and actual job opportuni-
ties.254 One of the key difficulties in training is anticipating the
changing balance of supply and demand for different skills and
jobs in a local economy. 255 Uncoordinated efforts have been
largely inadequate to achieve the needed balance. Training also
requires integration with the ability and readiness of firms
themselves to make changes in their organizational structures.
To be most effective, training initiatives must therefore also as-
sume roles in human resource allocation and organizational
consulting.256
Recognizing the principle challenges of the new economy,
as well as the ongoing failures of the traditional approach to
training, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 replaced
previous federal legislation as the new legal regime for dis-
seminating funding from the United States Department of La-
bor to local job training programs. 257 A highly decentralized
system, the WIA aims to fully integrate federal grants into lo-
cal programs and eliminate the lack of coordination present in
the former system.258 Under the previous regime, different or-
ganizations and agencies within each state operated narrowly
focused education and training programs. In contrast, applying
the governance principle of policy integration, the WIA creates
local integrated marketplaces, where job seekers can choose
among a broad array of job placement services and educational
programs, as well as comprehensive personal and professional
counseling. It merges into the new system other publicly
funded services, such as special programs focusing on young
adults in secondary and postsecondary vocational education
programs. 259
254. OSTERMAN, supra note 253, at 90.
255. See ROSEMARY BATT & PAUL OSTERMAN, WORKPLACE TRAINING
POLICY: CASE STUDIES OF STATE AND LOCAL EXPERIMENTS 59-61 (Econ. Policy
Inst., Working Paper No. 106, 1993) (discussing the problems faced by the
Massachusetts Machine Action Project in its attempts to match supply and
demand in the Springfield local economy).
256. Id. at 58.
257. Pub. L. No. 105-220, 112 Stat. 939 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C. and 20 U.S.C.). WIA's predecessor was the Job Training
Partnership Act of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1322 (enacting no cur-
rently effective sections).
258. Nan Ellis, Individual Training Accounts Under the Workforce Invest-
ment Act of 1998: Is Choice a Good Thing?, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
235, 236 (2001).
259. For example, the WIA integrates the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and
Applied Technology Education Amendments of 1998. See Pub. L. 105-332, 112
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The WIA establishes a "one-stop" delivery system, which
provides job seekers with neighborhood career centers where
they can access core employment services.260 The centralized
location, where job seekers can obtain information about all as-
pects of the job market, is designed to make the job-seeking
process more efficient and to empower individuals to make
choices suited to their career needs and goals.261 This approach
enables citizens to actively participate in the implementation of
training policy. The law also encourages collaboration among
government, industry, and civil society. Each one-stop center is
comprised of public and private partner organizations that pro-
vide core services. 262 Required partners include adult education
providers, employment services, welfare-to-work centers, and
unemployment insurance services.263 Local agencies are
prohibited from directly providing training services, and are
instead required to seek out other (private or public) providers.
Training is provided through individual training accounts, in
effect establishing a voucher system through which a
participant chooses among eligible providers. 264 The one-stop
system provides participants with a list of eligible providers
and their performance information. 265 The WIA mandates uni-
versal access to the one-stop system,266 which includes informa-
tion on job vacancies, career options and counseling, employ-
ment trends, instructions on how to conduct a job search,
student financial aid, unemployment insurance assistance, as-
sistance in establishing eligibility for welfare-to-work case
management, and follow-up sessions. 267 As a result of the de-
centralized, collaborative approach required by. the Act, train-
ing services are directly linked to occupations that are in de-
mand in local areas or other areas to which the individual is
willing to relocate.268
Stat. 3076 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
260. 29 U.S.C. § 2864(c)-(d) (2000).
261. Ellis, supra note 258, at 236.
262. 29 U.S.C. § 2864(d)(3)(B).
263. Ellis, supra note 258, at 238.
264. 29 U.S.C. § 2864(d)(4)(F)(iii).
265. Id. § 2864(a)(2)(B)(i), (d)(4)(F)(iii).
266. Id. § 2864(c)(1) (describing accessibility requirements for statewide
one-stop delivery systems).
267. Id. § 2864(d)(2).
268. Id. § 2864(d)(2)(G)(iii).
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The one-stop centers are funded directly by federal block
grants. 269 The amount of funding each center receives annually
depends on its success, based on criteria articulated in the
WIA.270 Performance-based regulation encourages localities to
experiment and to dynamically compare and improve their
practices. The law specifies core performance indicators that fo-
cus on rates of entry into and earnings in unsubsidized
employment by participants. 271 Levels of performance affect the
federal funding of the local program in subsequent years.272 To
encourage orchestrated learning, the Act also requires that
states and local agencies establish standards for success for or-
ganizations that provide training services. 273 It further estab-
lishes national employment statistics to help monitor these
standards. 274 Finally, the new system aims to strengthen the
role of the private sector by establishing local, business-led
Workforce Investment Boards (WIBs) to act as boards of direc-
tors, overseeing the local systems.275 The WIBs receive infor-
mation about the performance of each program and are re-
quired to seek public input and conduct meetings open to the
public.276 Effectively, community-based partners constitute the
membership of the mandated regional WIBs.277 Such partner-
ship structure captures "the operative efficiencies of associa-
tional action, while being sufficiently tutored by local experi-
ence and allowing a speed and flexibility in government
response, to satisfy firm demands for such attention to their
269. Ellis, supra note 258, at 238.
270. Id.
271. 29 U.S.C. § 2871(b)(2)(A) (listing core performance indicators to be
used to evaluate state workforce investment activities).
272. Ellis, supra note 258, at 238.
273. States may adopt performance indicators in addition to those pre-
scribed by the WIA. 29 U.S.C. § 2871(b)(1)(A). Each provider must also submit
information relating to the costs of the program. Id. § 2871(d)(2)(C). The local
board may modify the performance criteria for programs of providers in the
local area by increasing the levels of performance above the minimum levels
established by the governor. Id. § 2871(c)(2).
274. Id. § 655.
275. Id. § 2821 (creating and describing the composition of state workforce
investment boards).
276. Id. § 2821(g).
277. Laura Dresser & Joel Rogers, Part of the Solution: Emerging Work-
force Intermediaries in the United States, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE
IN A NEW ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS, supra note 251,
at 266, 287.
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new competitive realties. 278 Through these new network part-
nerships, several efficiencies are reached, primarily relating to
scale and scope. Partnerships are able to adopt an industry-
wide approach that allows information sharing, standard set-
ting, and benchmarking both public and private efforts across
workplaces. 279 This allows industry participants to share the
cost of replenishing a pool of skilled labor and facilitates joint
investments. 28 0 By bringing together a growing number of em-
ployers, unions, public sector agencies, and community-based
partners, a governance approach enhances learning and prob-
lem-solving capacities. It further enables firms to pool their in-
vestments in human capital, leverage the accountability of pub-
lic institutions, and empower a wider range of players in the
labor market.28 1
Community-based initiatives have been successful in lev-
eraging public funds within the new governance workforce de-
velopment system. For example, Project QUEST (Quality Em-
ployment and Skills Training), an award-winning training
initiative in San Antonio, Texas, illustrates the multitiered ac-
tion of the governance model. Founded by a national network of
community organizations, the program is funded through a va-
riety of sources, including federal and state grants, and local
government funding. 28 2 Unlike conventional training programs,
Project QUEST is aimed at preparing workers for long-term,
skilled positions that would enable them to break out of pov-
erty.28 3 The ongoing link to community organizations and local
private businesses has contributed to its success. Project
QUEST managed to secure, in advance, job commitments from
the business community and state funds. 28 4 Integrating policy
domains, Project QUEST takes a comprehensive approach to
workforce development that includes support services such as
278. Id. at 288.
279. Id. at 285.
280. Id. at 286 ("[S]uccessful sectoral initiatives create a 'win-win' situation
for firms, workers, and new labor-market entrants from the community.").
281. Id.
282. Paul Osterman, Organizing the US Labor Market: National Problems,
Community Strategies, in GOVERNING WORK AND WELFARE IN A NEW
ECONOMY: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIMENTS, supra note 251, at 240,
257.
283. Osterman, supra note 282, at 255.
284. Id. at 254, 257.
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child-care subsidies, transportation, and referrals to health
care.
285
By involving a wide range of professionals, agencies, and
civil society organizations, Project QUEST has successfully
broadened the traditional tunnel vision of workforce develop-
ment issues by linking questions of job training programs to
school reform, living-wage campaigns, and local economic de-
velopment. 28 6 The principles of subsidiarity and learning are
realized through extensive meetings in which participants tell
stories of past unsatisfactory training programs and economic
dislocation. 28 7 The project has been recognized as successful in
addressing the skills mismatch that employers and employees
historically faced in the area, and that led employers to exten-
sively recruit from outside of the region to fill high-skill jobs. 288
Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Paul Oster-
man, who has carefully evaluated Project QUEST, describes
the project as "one of the most successful job training programs
in the nation."28 9
Although Project QUEST has resulted in substantial gains
for its trainees, the program's goals extend beyond its individ-
ual clients. From the perspective of orchestration, the aim of
the project is to impact the broader structures of the labor
market, alter hiring patterns, and improve the curricula of
community colleges for all attendees. 290 Through connections to
other community networks, training efforts have been linked to
broader political organizing.291 Initiatives like Project QUEST
have been replicated in other cities through diffusion of the
principles and successful practices exhibited by the new work-
force development framework. Each local area has further
modified the applied programs, adapting to local circumstances
and building upon shared information and experiences.
To conclude, the WIA represents a new framework for a
comprehensive "workforce investment" system based on inte-
gration of resources, individual choice of training, performance
measurements, and the encouragement of private-public part-
nerships. The Act promotes learning by requiring the articula-
285. Id. at 255.
286. Id. at 254, 258.
287. See id. at 255.
288. See id. at 256.
289. Id. at 259.
290. Id. at 256.
291. See id. at 257.
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tion of standards and information sharing; and customizes ser-
vices according to local and individual needs. Private sector la-
bor market intermediaries are encouraged to take a more active
and formal role in the public system of training.292 Finally, the
Act explicitly invites experimentation and provides the re-
sources to sustain successful experiments like Project
QUEST. 293 A governance approach to workforce development
enables government and activists to link supply-side efforts
(improving the skills of job seekers), demand-side initiatives
(altering the hiring patterns of firms), and structural-impact
initiatives, including the formation of new intermediary insti-
tutions, the revision of employment norms within a community,
and the alternation of long-entrenched practices of existing or-
ganizations. 294
2. Occupational Safety and Health
The decades following the New Deal brought subsequent
waves of regulatory programs, such as extensive public safety
and environmental regulation. 295 In 1970, Congress enacted the
Occupational Safety and Health Act.296 The statute established
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
within the Labor Department. OSHA was granted broad power
to regulate workplace safety across all industries. Because of
this far-reaching power, the Agency has been controversial
since its establishment, and strong opponents have called for
its dissolution. Indeed, OSHA has been treated by legal schol-
ars as a paradigmatic case study of bureaucratic regulatory
failure and has been accused of gross regulatory unreasonable-
ness.2 97 There have been drastic proposals to abolish OSHA al-
together based on claims that economic incentives, including
workers' compensation and hazard pay, generate the incentives
needed for worker protection.298 As Joel Handler has com-
292. Dresser & Rogers, supra note 277, at 287.
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., Osterman, supra note 282, at 264.
295. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190,
83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970)).
296. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-678 (2000)).
297. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERTA. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK:
THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982) (making repeated
references to OSHA in the authors' attempt to illustrate the problem of regula-
tory unreasonableness).
298. See, e.g., THOMAS 0. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT
41520041
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mented, "OSHA is usually cited as the prime example of the pa-
thologies of the legal-bureaucratic regime."299
The critique of OSHA practices epitomizes the dissatisfac-
tion with the regulatory model. In its early years, OSHA fo-
cused on the promulgation of rules that established universal
standards for issues such as exposure to toxins. The Agency en-
forced these rules by quasi-random inspections of work sites
and prosecution of violations. At the beginning of the 1980s,
major litigation called into question the validity of some of
OSHA's central top-down regulations. 300 The extensive litiga-
tion brought by industry groups reflected the controversy sur-
rounding OSHA's regulatory activity in the business commu-
nity. In the famous Benzene case, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down OSHA's standard for protecting workers from ex-
posure to benzene.3 01 The court held that OSHA, rather than
having the authority to prevent absolute risks, must first estab-
lish the existence of a "significant risk" before it promulgates
preventative standards. 302
In response to both the discontent with its original regula-
tory approach and to new challenges of regulating health and
safety in the new economy, OSHA has in recent years adopted
innovative approaches that are more akin to the Renew Deal
governance model.303 In its 2003 management plan, OSHA rec-
RISK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION (1993); William J. Maukestad & Charles Helm, Promoting
Workplace Safety and Health in the Post-Regulatory Era: A Primer on Non-
OSHA Legal Incentives that Influence Employer Decisions To Control Occupa-
tional Hazards, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 9 (1989).
299. Joel Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the Mod-
ern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REV. 999,
1025 (1988).
300. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981); Indus. Union
Dep't, v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
301. Indus. Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 662.
302. Id. Justice Marshall in his dissent stated:
[Wihen the question involves determination of the acceptable level of
risk, the ultimate decision must necessarily be based on considera-
tions of policy as well as empirically verifiable facts. Factual determi-
nations can at most define the risk in some statistical way; the judg-
ment whether that risk is tolerable cannot be based solely on a
resolution of the facts.
Id. at 706 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
303. Even in its first years, the legislature directed OSHA to adopt existing
private industry standards by reference. See Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 6(a), 84 Stat. 1593 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 655 (2000)) (suggesting that existing national consensus standards
would be presumptively favored). At OSHA's foundation, the Agency entered
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ognized that increased diversity, a shift from goods to services,
and a decrease in the percentage of workers employed in stable
full-time jobs have changed the American workforce signifi-
cantly over the past several decades. 30 4 The Agency acknowl-
edged that these changes require new strategies to address oc-
cupational safety and health. 305 For example, immigrant
workers often work in some of the most dangerous jobs, yet
many are unable to read English instructions. 30 6 The 2003 plan
states that "[tihese demographic and workplace trends compli-
cate the implementation of occupational safety and health pro-
grams and argue for enforcement, training, and delivery sys-
tems that are different from those that have been relied upon to
date."307 Similarly, OSHA now acknowledges that certain
workplace safety issues have been overlooked and neglected
due to the problematic divisions between policy fields. In 2003,
the Agency recognized that the most serious vocational risks
include workplace violence and motor vehicle accidents, two ar-
eas that have not been traditionally addressed by the
Agency. 308 To facilitate the governance principles of integration
of policy domains, the Agency aims to establish more collabora-
tive relations with other public and private institutions.
30 9
Another significant dimension of the Agency's new ap-
proach is the adoption of flexible, noncoercive (or "soft") prac-
tices. Reacting yet again to new workplace realties and previ-
ous failures in its regulatory strategies, OSHA has shifted its
into contractual relations with the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) for the provision of technical support for the development and applica-
tion of safety standards. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH LAW 56 (4th ed. 1998). ANSI develops these standards through col-
laboration with corporations or by forming committees from a pool of technical
and professional organizations and trade associations. Id. It oversees the proc-
esses of private standard-setting organizations and recommends the incorpo-
ration of their conclusions into OSHA standards. Id.
304. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
OSHA 2003-2008 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PLAN, at http://www.osha.gov/
StratPlanPublic/strategicmanagementplan-final.html (last visited Sept. 16,
2004).
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. Id.
308. See id. For example, OSHA's jurisdiction is vastly limited by the De-
partment of Transportation's responsibility for covering motor vehicle fatali-
ties.
309. The Agency explained: "Due to the diffuse nature of these problems as
well as jurisdictional issues, reducing these risks will require collaboration
with other federal, state and local organizations." Id.
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emphasis in recent years from extensive elaboration of stan-
dards and high rates of inspection to fewer inspections and
more programs of collaborative, semivoluntary compliance. At
the state and federal levels, agencies are experimenting with
innovative governance approaches to occupational health and
safety. For example, California's Occupational Health and
Safety Administration has adopted the California Cooperative
Compliance Program (CCCP), which authorizes unions and
employers to develop and implement safety requirements, dele-
gating governmental inspection and enforcement roles to joint
labor/management safety committees. 310 Through collective
bargaining, unions and employers develop and implement
workplace safety requirements in a collaborative, participatory
manner. As long as this program of audited self-regulation
proves to reduce accidents effectively, the Agency does not in-
tervene in the processes. This gives firms and industries incen-
tives to learn and improve dynamically and to share informa-
tion with others. Studying the implementation of cooperative
compliance programs in the construction industry in California,
sociologist Joseph Rees found that accident rates at CCCP pro-jects were significantly lower than those at companies operat-
ing under the traditional regulatory framework.311 The federal
OSHA has also experimented with similar programs, such as
the Voluntary Protection Program (VPP), allowing companies
with exemplary safety records to take over the role of OSHA in-
spectors themselves and to be exempt from regular inspec-
tions.312
As a public administrative agency, OSHA exemplifies the
move to governance approaches to law making, implementa-
310. JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE 134-74 (1988) (describ-ing in depth the organization and role of the labor/management safety com-
mittee).
311. Id. at 2-3.
312. Id. at 1. Some studies on the effect of internal compliance mechanisms
and OSHA violations have, by contrast, found the adoption of ethics codes pro-grams to be of little impact on corporate illegality. For example, one study in-dicates that there is a positive correlation between willful repeat violations
and internal compliance programs, leading the researchers to argue that the
adoption of such a mechanism is a purposeful way for management to hide itsinvolvement and reduce liability for safety violations. Marie McKendall et al.,Ethical Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality: Testing the Assump-
tions of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 367, 380(2002). But see infra Part VI.C for a discussion of the various factors that con-
tribute to successful collaboration in the context of occupational health and
safety.
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tion, and enforcement. OSHA's Strategic Management Plan for
2003-2008 described intentions to increase its use of coopera-
tive programs with the private sector, expanding outreach pro-
grams, industry education, and compliance assistance.
3 13
OSHA views the development of guidance and standards for oc-
cupational safety and working with employers and employees
as its primary responsibilities. 314 Among its vital activities are
consultation services to small businesses, the provision of com-
pliance assistance, outreach, education, and other cooperative
programs for employers and employees. 315 According to OSHA's
reports, injuries and illnesses have been cut nearly in half at
work sites engaged in cooperative relationships with the
Agency.3 16 OSHA also aims to foster relationships with other
civil society organizations to address critical safety and health
issues, expanding collaborative partnerships, voluntary pro-
grams and outreach, education, and compliance assistance.
3 17
3. Employment Discrimination
New employment antidiscrimination strategies are a third
example of the adoption of the governance model in the area of
work. Employment discrimination policies have largely been
based on the civil rights model of the 1950s and 1960s-a regu-
latory, adversarial regime. The main strategy was the direct
prohibition of certain practices, including illegal consideration
of gender and race in hiring and promotions, followed by top-
down implementation and enforcement. The regulatory model
was based on the assumption that employment discrimination
is intentional and relatively easy to comprehend and detect.
The regulatory solution was usually a lawsuit for damages or
an injunction against the particular discriminatory practices.
318
313. Trade Release, Occupational Safety & Health Administration, U.S.
Department of Labor, Agency Builds on Previous Successes, Sets New Goals
(May 12, 2003), http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show document?p_
table=NEWSRELEASES&pid+10214 (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2002, at Outcome Goal 3.1,
http://www.dol.govLsec/media/reports/annual2002/Goal3-l.htm (last visited
Oct. 28, 2004) ("The lost workday injury and illness incidence rate declined by
47 percent at sites engaged in voluntary, cooperative relationships with [the
Department of Labor].").
317. See id.
318. Although disparate impact suits have been recognized under Title VII
discrimination claims, traditional regulatory approaches have proven inade-
quate for long-term structural reform. See Sturm, supra note 195, at 469.
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While the regulatory model has been effective in eliminating
the most obvious and direct forms of discrimination, it has not
effectively dealt with more complex and subtle discriminatory
practices.
As the workplace has become more dynamic and multifac-
eted, discriminatory practices are frequently not the result of a
distinct and direct decision to discriminate but rather of com-
plex practices, including corporate culture, informal norms,
networking, training, mentoring, and evaluation.319 The com-
plex nature of this type of discrimination "resists definition and
resolution through across-the-board, relatively specific com-
mands and an after-the-fact enforcement mechanism."320 An
example is the recognition that a workplace can create a "hos-
tile or offensive work environment," even without any single
individual acting as perpetrator. 32 1 The boundaries between le-
gal and illegal conduct are blurred, although the consequences
of discrimination are no less harmful. Susan Sturm describes
the emergence of an alternative governance-based approach,
recently employed in many workplaces, that focuses on ongoing
problem-solving efforts, engaging both outside consultants and
workers themselves in reflexive efforts to eliminate workplace
discrimination.322 By involving workers as key participants in
antidiscrimination efforts, employers recognize their depend-
ency upon the internal insights of those closest to the problem
(i.e., subsidiarity) and their shared interest in eliminating dis-
crimination (i.e., win-win collaboration). These efforts also rec-
ognize the significance of explicit articulation and specification
of decision-making criteria and goals in order to allow compari-
son, learning, and continuous improvement. The voluntary
adoption of ethical codes of conduct in the workplace is a com-
mon practice in recent years that encourages employers to ar-
ticulate the corporation's values and practices. 323 Some compa-
nies have also shared lessons and data with other, similarly
situated firms. Another important way of learning is the accu-
mulation and preservation of data on hiring and promotions
319. Id.
320. See id.
321. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Rogers
v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
322. See Sturm, supra note 195, at 522-25.
323. Over 90% of Fortune 500 firms report the use of ethics codes of con-
duct. Andrew Brien, Regulating Virtue: Formulating, Engendering and En-forcing Corporate Ethical Codes, 15 Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J. 21, 21 (1996).
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over time. 32 4 Finally, voluntary provision of diversity training is
an increasingly common effort by employers.
325
In relation to regulatory approaches, governance strategies
may operate as a defense against liability or against the grant
of punitive damages in case of discrimination allegations by
employees. 326 In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, the U.S.
Supreme Court established a defense to punitive damages in
discrimination suits based on the demonstration by managerial
agents of good faith efforts to comply with Title VII.
3 2 7 In the
past several years, employers have sought to point to such good
faith efforts through the implementation of internal compliance
structures, including self-adopted equal employment policies,
codes, and diversity training programs.328 Similarly, in Bur-
lington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Supreme Court recog-
nized a defense to sexual harassment suits by the adoption of
internal antiharassment policies by firms. 329 These cases follow
the principles of flexibility and noncoerciveness, leaving some
practices unsanctioned to encourage experimentation in dis-
crimination prevention.
A governance approach to discrimination thus changes the
understanding of the nature and sources of discrimination.
Rather than seeing the worker as the victim and the employer
as the conscious, malicious villain, it understands that dis-
crimination is frequently the consequence of processes and
structures that can be transformed through learning and mu-
tual engagement.330 The recent adoption of governance strate-
gies has proven to have positive effects on the promotion of
equality and tolerance in many workplaces. 33 1 Moreover, some
of these initiatives have been effective not only in increasing
324. Sturm, supra note 195, at 469.
325. Richard S. Allen & Kendyl A. Montgomery, Applying an Organiza-
tional Development Approach to Creating Diversity, 30 ORG. DYNAMICS 149,
149 (2001) (reporting that 75% of Fortune 500 firms and 36% of other firms
have diversity training in the workplace).
326. Krawiec, supra note 15, at 504.
327. 527 U.S. 526, 542-43 (1999).
328. Krawiec, supra note 15, at 505.
329. 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
330. See Simon, supra note 21, at 75-77.
331. See Loriann Roberson et al., Designing Effective Diversity Training:
Influence of Group Composition and Trainee Experience, 22 J. ORG. BEHAV.
871, 871 (2001) (describing the increased popularity of diversity training in
corporate America during the 1990s).
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workplace equality but also in reducing employee turnover and
the costs of hiring and training.332
However, some scholars have criticized governance ap-
proaches to antidiscrimination for allowing employers to avoid
conventional legal liability. If antidiscrimination efforts are
merely cosmetic, a governance regime potentially forms a liabil-
ity shield.333 The law allows employers to opt out of the regula-
tory framework without adequate assurances of the effective-
ness of governance. For example, some studies have found that
simply adopting voluntary codes of conduct only alters behavior
in rare occasions, 334 yet courts consider their existence to favor
employers in litigation. A major problem with these new efforts
is that they have emerged mostly as voluntary initiatives or in
the shadow of a litigation threat, rather than as systematic
strategies supported, guided, and required by law. That is, the
principle of legal orchestration has not sufficiently guided these
initiatives. Because they lack a systematic backup, these new
approaches have created wide variance across firms and con-
troversy among employment law scholars as to the desirability
of this change.
Federal agencies have taken an initial, although partial,
step to orchestrate new governance antidiscrimination strate-
gies. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
recently initiated efforts to create stakeholder networks, in-
cluding advocacy groups, community organizations, and racial
and ethnic groups, to support the accumulation of knowledge
about new strategies to promote equality.335 Although the
EEOC's purpose is to enforce antidiscrimination laws, it his-
torically lacks power to promulgate rules or to sanction inde-
332. See generally Sturm, supra note 195, at 489-537 (providing examples
of businesses that have effectively addressed equality, turnover, and other
problems through internal workplace regimes).
333. See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substi-
tute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Educa-
tion and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 1 (2001) (questioning the effectiveness of employee training pro-
grams and decrying the Supreme Court's use of such programs as the basis for
an affirmative employer defense to discrimination claims); Krawiec, supra
note 15, at 505.
334. See, e.g., Mark S. Schwartz, The Nature of the Relationship Between
Corporate Codes of Ethics and Behaviour, 32 J. Bus. ETHICS 247, 253 (2001).
335. PRIORITY CHARGE HANDLING TASK FORCE, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LITIGATION TASK FORCE REPORT app. c (1998), http:/!
www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/task-reports/pch-lit.html (last modified Apr. 2, 1998).
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pendently.3 36 Instead, its main activities include issuing guide-
lines and conducting investigations, impact litigation, and me-
diation of individual violations. 337 It has more recently ex-
panded its activities to include assisting with compliance,
gathering systematic information, providing technical assis-
tance, and encouraging antidiscrimination public education and
outreach. 338 However, these initiatives have been limited. For
example, while the EEOC collects data on hiring and promotion
patterns from employers, the EEOC does not analyze the in-
formation systematically.3 3 9 The Commission continues to view
its primary role as monitoring, enforcing, and sanctioning fail-
ure or noncompliance. 340
B. Civic ENVIRONMENTALISM
Environmental law has been at the forefront of new gov-
ernance experiments. Challenges to the traditional regulatory
model have had some of their earliest influences in the field of
environmentalism. As Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler
describe, "the rise of environmental consciousness in the late
1960s coincided with the decline of an older dream-the image
of an independent and expert administrative agency creatively
regulating a complex social problem in the public interest."
341
Contemporary debates about domestic environmental regula-
tion in developed countries are characterized by calls for regu-
latory reinvention and the rejection of the command and con-
trol approach. 342 These calls are motivated by both external
and internal push/pull factors for legal reform. A growing cri-
tique of top-down adversarial approaches to environmental pro-
tection has spawned innovative laws and practices. The need
336. Sturm, supra note 195, at 550.
337. Id.
338. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT PLAN pt. II, http://www.eeoc.gov/about eeoc/plan/nep.html (last
modified Jan. 15, 1997).
339. Sturm, supra note 195, at 551.
340. Id.
341. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR
OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR
HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 1
(1981).
342. Kala K. Maluqueeny, Transnational Environmental Governance and
Large Scale Projects: Corporations, Economic Actors, and Financial Institu-
tions 10-11 (2004) (unpublished colloquium abstract, Harvard University Doc-
tor of Juridical Science Program) (on file with author).
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for governance has also been a response to the accumulation of
new scientific knowledge about the nature of the ecology.3 43 In-
creasingly, scholars advocate a new approach to environmental-
ism known as-civic environmentalism.3 44
1. Economy and Environment
The goals of stakeholders often conflict in the domain of
environmentalism. Nongovernmental organizations seek to
protect living and natural resources. Businesses, as well as la-
bor unions, generally want to minimize limitations on their
economic interests. Governments address public ends, includ-
ing distributional concerns among localities, the preservation of
the environment, and the promotion of sustainable economic
development. Despite significant divergence of interest, stake-
holders have begun questioning the desirability of adversarial
regulatory processes, seeking instead more collaborative ap-
proaches to environmental law. Particularly in the face of com-
plex environmental problems, controversies about the man-
agement of ecosystems have often amounted to impasses
among activists, corporations, and local and national govern-
ments. 345 These cases have resulted in an understanding that
all parties risk losing in an adversarial environment. In some
cases, stakeholders have begun to move away from win/lose
campaigns to engage in institutional governance arrangements
that can produce mutual gains to multiple interests.4 6 A gov-
ernance approach to environmental law allows parties to es-
343. DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 32-34 (1990).
344. DEWITT JOHN, Civic ENVIRONMENTALISM: ALTERNATIVES TO
REGULATION IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES 7-10 (1994); WILLIAM A. SHUTKIN,
THE LAND THAT COULD BE: ENVIRONMENTALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 128-41 (2000) (describing the emerging concept of
civic environmentalism as a participatory process with community and re-
gional planning, education, and sense of place); Debra S. Knopman et al., Civic
Environmentalism: Tackling Tough Land-Use Problems with Innovative Gov-
ernance, 41 ENVIRONMENT 24, 26-28 (1999). For a critique of civic environ-
mentalism, see Rena I. Steinzor, The Corruption of Civic Environmentalism,
30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,909, 10,916-21 (2000) (finding fault with civic environ-
mentalism's high costs and problematic implementation as compared to the
existing regulatory system).
345. See Brown, supra note 133, at 12.
346. See EDWARD P. WEBER, BRINGING SOCIETY BACK IN: GRASSROOTS
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SUSTAINABLE
COMMUNITIES (2003) (describing cases in which formerly conflicting parties
moved to more collaborative models, increasing the outcomes from the per-
spective of all different stakeholders); Brown, supra note 133, at 12-13.
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cape the traditional "economy versus environment" bind that
has so often characterized environmental regulatory conflicts.
Traditional environmental policy constitutes a staggering
number of disperse regulations, which, according to Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, "virtually swim before one's eyes." 347 Carol Rose
critically describes the difficulty of making sense of top-down
environmental law, stating that "[o]ur legislators churn out
great undigestible [sic] masses of statutes about the environ-
ment, which in turn are interpreted by mounds of regulations,
all densely packed with bizarre terms and opaque acronyms. 348
Yet, the nature of ecological resource management requires in-
tergovernmental coordination and continuous experimentation,
learning, and adjustment.349 The new governance approach of
civic environmentalism aims to be participatory, collaborative,
decentralized, and focused on problem solving. As such, policies
must be integrated to allow those closest to the problem to con-
template their effectiveness and reasonableness. Environ-
mental law scholars suggest that policy should engender a
practice of environmentally responsible reflexive manage-
ment.350 In the words of one scholar, "[a] new generation of en-
vironmental policy.., must be based on integrative and reflex-
ive laws rather than on the current system of command-and-
control regulation."3 51 Under such a regime, public authorities
347. United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 444 U.S. 1035, 1038 (1980) (mem.)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
348. Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management
Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (1991).
349. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward Ecologically Sustainable Democracy?,
in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 219.
350. See, e.g., Orts, supra note 43; see also Eric Bregman & Arthur Jacob-
son, Environmental Performance Review: Self-Regulation in Environmental
Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE
CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL SELF-ORGANIZATION 207, 210-12
(Gunther Teubner et al. eds., 1994) (advocating for a self-regulation approach
to environmental legal issues based on Gunther Teubner's model of reflexive
law).
351. Fiorino, supra note 31 (describing the reflexive law approach and its
role in environmental regulation); David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive
Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41 (1999)
(arguing for use of a reflexive approach to govern the behavior of corporate or-
ganizations); Dennis A. Rondinelli, A New Generation of Environmental Policy:
Government-Business Collaboration in Environmental Management, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,891, 10,902 (2001); see also Neil Gunningham & Darren
Sinclair, Integrative Regulation: A Principle-Based Approach to Environmental
Policy, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 853 (1999) (arguing that employing multiple
rather than single-policy instruments and including a broader range of regula-
tory actors will improve regulation).
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allow for cooperative implementation in which the government
relies upon agents or employees of the regulated entities to help
interpret, implement, and enforce applicable rules. 352 Govern-
ment restricts its role to assisting in and providing incentives
for self-implementation programs, promoting a system of "in-
teractive compliance." 353 Government further encourages pri-
vate participation by the dissemination of information to the
public. For example, environmental information disclosure ini-
tiatives such as the federal Toxics Release Inventory program
require firms to report their environmental-related activities to
the Environmental Protection Agency, which then releases the
data in a yearly report for use by industries, consumers, and
nongovernmental stakeholders. 3 54  Disclosure requirements
have proven particularly viable in the area of environmental
law where nonprofit organizations have taken an active role as
ecological consultants, land managers, and coordinators of en-
vironmental policy implementation. 355
At the federal level, one of the earliest environmental laws,
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),356 embodies
elements of the new governance model. Designed mostly as a
procedural regime, NEPA requires federal agencies to disclose
statements on environmental impact before taking action that
will affect the environment. 357 NEPA effectively requires fed-
eral agencies to adopt internal procedures to evaluate the envi-
ronmental consequences of their decisions and activities. The
statute applies, however, only to government agencies. 358 Envi-
ronmental law scholars have consequently described it as a "re-
flexive administrative law" regime. 359 More recent approaches
352. Michael, supra note 17, at 540-41.
353. See generally CORPORATE LAWBREAKING AND INTERACTIVE
COMPLIANCE, supra note 18 (offering several essays exploring cooperative ap-
proaches to interactive corporate compliance based upon the ideas presented
at an April 21, 1990 conference at New York University's Leonard Stern
School of Business).
354. See Fiorino, supra note 31, at 448.
355. See Lee P. Breckenridge, Nonprofit Environmental Organizations and
the Restructuring of Institutions for Ecosystem Management, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q.
692 (1999) (discussing the increasing reliance on nonprofit organizations in
the environmental field).
356. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83
Stat. 852 (1970).
357. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f(2000).
358. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 §§ 101-102, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4331-4332 (2000).
359. Orts, supra note 43, at 1273.
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to private sector environmental policies are similarly requiring
industries to be reflexive about their practices. The following
section illustrates a comprehensive effort for governance in the
context of habitat conservation.
2. Endangered Species and Habitat Conservation Planning
An instructive example of the shift from a regulatory to a
governance approach in the field of environmental law is the
development of habitat conservation planning under the En-
dangered Species Act (ESA).360 In the past, ecologists believed
that nature had an ideal state of equilibrium and that species
related to one another in a direct, linear way. 36 1 Over the past
several decades, modern ecology has come to view nature not as
static, harmonious, and balanced, but rather as a complex web
of connected species with no fixed point of equilibrium. 362 Rely-
ing on the former idea of a predictable equilibrium, regulatory
conservation regimes sought to limit direct threats to individ-
ual species by permanent top-down regulations. 363 Exemplify-
ing this regulatory approach, the ESA prohibits public and pri-
vate action that contributes to the extinction of endangered
species. Section 9 of the Act prohibits any person or organiza-
tion from taking fish or wildlife species listed as endangered by
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. 364 "Taking" is defined
broadly to include basically any harm to the essential behav-
ioral patterns of wildlife. 365 Until the early-1980s, the ESA es-
tablished a prohibitive regulatory regime, imposing a near-
absolute ban on land development in areas of wildlife conserva-
tion.36 6 This rigid regime was deemed insensible, not merely by
360. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). See
generally Symposium, The Endangered Species Act Turns 30, 34 ENV. L. 287
(2004) (examining the history and significance of the ESA on its thirtieth an-
niversary).
361. See, e.g., Wiersema, supra note 43, at 1.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C); Paul Boudreaux, Understanding "Take"
in the Endangered Species Act, 34 ARiz. ST. L.J. 733, 744-48 (2002) (discussing
whether § 9 requires intent or knowledge to take a protected species); see also
Federico Cheever & Michael Balster, The Take Prohibition in Section 9 of the
Endangered Species Act: Contradictions, Ugly Ducklings, and Conservation of
Species, 34 ENVTL. L. 363 (2004) (arguing that § 9 covers injuries to both indi-
vidual species members and the population of which there are a part).
365. See Cheever & Balster, supra note 364, at 365 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3
(2004))
366. Craig W. Thomas, Habitat Conservation Planning, in DEEPENING
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businesses, which were prohibited from developing conserva-
tionist areas, but also by activists and scientists, who recog-
nized the uncompromising nature of the process. 367 The ESA
regime is based on a formal process of listing species as endan-
gered. Its rigidity-an on-off listing-has led to strategic behav-
ior by all interested parties. Ecologists and policymakers ques-
tioned the absolute prohibition by the ESA, rather than the
development of more sensible and comprehensive plans to pre-
serve natural habitats. 368 Responding from below to these ri-
gidities, as well as to the new accumulation of scientific knowl-
edge about the ecology, private parties began to come together
to plan more flexible conservation projects. As a result of local
negotiation efforts between environmentalists and developers,
government was presented with consensus agreements that in-
cluded some taking of habitat in return for guarantees of suffi-
cient open space for long-term species survival.369
In 1982, Congress amended the ESA to authorize permits
that would allow such takings and encourage more multiparty
planning. 370 The new law encourages an alternative path of
governance by granting permits to nonfederal actors who sub-
mit satisfactory Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs).371 It now
allows the taking of endangered species for economic purposes
through this new planning process, if "incidental to, and not the
purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity."372
The new governance alternative has reframed the debate about
DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY
GOVERNANCE, supra note 349, at 144, 146. See generally STEVEN L. YAFFEE,
PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
(1982) (studying the effects of prohibitive policy through an examination of the
formation and implementation of the 1973 ESA).
367. See Thomas, supra note 366, at 146.
368. See id.
369. See id. at 146-47 (discussing a compromise reached in the late 1970s
between a landowner, a developer, and ecologists to preserve a butterfly habi-
tat near San Francisco while still allowing some development to occur).
370. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6,
96 Stat. 1411, 1422-1425.
371. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000); see also Albert C. Lin, Participants' Experi-
ences with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the
Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369, 376 (1996) (noting that a "permit may be is-
sued only after an HCP is submitted by the applicant and approved by the
[United States Fish and Wildlife Service]").
372. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
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species protection from "species versus jobs" to "species and
jobs."373
The habitat conservation planning process incorporates the
principles of collaboration, diversity, learning, and integration.
A submitted HCP must provide detailed information about the
likely results of proposed activities, the measures that will be
taken to monitor and mitigate adverse impacts, the funding
plan, and alternative actions that were considered.3 7 4 The de-
sign of the plan is left to the applicant's discretion, allowing
applicants to be creative and to tailor solutions to local prob-
lems.3 7 5 Although the final approval of the plan must be done
by the federal Agency, responsibility for subsequent supervi-
sion and coordination of the various interests in the plan can be
delegated to a private intermediary, such as a nonprofit land
conservation environmental organization. 376 Bradley Kark-
kainen explains:
Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) allow landowners to escape the
rigidities of a notoriously inflexible command-style rule, the "no take"
provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), by drawing up con-
servation-oriented land-use plans fitted to their own particularized
circumstances. The HCP planning process thus establishes a new lo-
cus for policy-making within a regulatory program heretofore defined
almost exclusively by centrally imposed, nationally uniform, categori-
cal rules.3
77
During the 1980s, the use of the optional HCPs was low.
Only during the 1990s, as a result of knowledge diffusion and
the issuance of new federal guidelines, did the number of HCPs
grow rapidly.373 By 2002, almost 400 HCPs had been ap-
proved.379
The habitat conservation planning process generates de-
pendency among actors. 38 0 Applicants need certainty to avoid
future lawsuits. 38 1 Therefore, advocates of habitat conservation
373. Thomas, supra note 366, at 147.
374. Id. at 147-49.
375. Id. at 148.
376. See Breckenridge, supra note 355, at 697-98 (noting the "extensive
interaction of federal, state, and local governments with the Nature Conser-
vancy in the development of habitat conservation plans under the Endangered
Species Act has exemplified the increasingly communicative and collaborative
relationship between government agencies and nonprofit organizations").
377. Karkkainen, supra note 349, at 208-09.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 161.
381. Id.
20041 429
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
planning have argued that the process increases the willing-
ness of stakeholders to share information and resources. 3 2 It
also requires applicants to consider a broader range of issues
beyond endangered species, including "physical infrastructure,
pollution, open space, development patterns, and transporta-
tion."38 3
One of the weaknesses of the ESA regulations is that they
do not require coordination among various applicants and be-
tween different habitat areas.3 8 4 A broad study of fifty-five
HCPs reveals that the participation process leading to the
plans varies widely, ranging from active and inclusive proc-
esses to narrow, closed-door planning. 38 5 Some applicants have
voluntarily chosen to coordinate their plans; in other cases local
governments and developers were unable to find common
ground for a single coordinated plan.38 6 These variations have
influenced the degree of deliberation and adaptability of the
plans.38 7 Unlike plans focusing on narrow issues and narrow
geographic areas, large-scale, multipartner HCPs have proven
more aligned with a collaborative and sustainable governance
vision. 38 8 Scholars therefore distinguish between two types of
HCPs-bilateral plans and multiparty adaptive management
plans.38 9 The first type, bilateral planning, allows some regula-
tory flexibility but does not involve broad participatory or col-
laborative engagement. 90 The focus of such plans is typically
382. Id.
383. Id. at 164.
384. See id. at 157 (noting that neither the ESA nor the Fish and Wildlife
Service regulations require coordinated action).
385. JEREMY ANDERSON & STEVEN YAFFEE, BALANCING PUBLIC TRUST AND
PRIVATE INTEREST: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN HABITAT CONSERVATION
PLANNING 0 (1998).
386. See Thomas, supra note 366, at 157-58 (comparing the Coachella Val-
ley broad planning to other less participatory cases, such as in the case of the
seventy HCPs of Travis County, Texas). See generally ANDERSON & YAFFEE,
supra note 385, at 9-11 (discussing varied approaches to HCP negotiations
involving primary parties and outside stakeholders).
387. Thomas, supra note 366, at 159 ("Adaptive management (with moni-
toring) can also enhance HCPs as schools of democracy by extending delibera-
tion beyond the planning phase in implementation."); see also ANDERSON &
YAFFEE, supra note 385, at 13-16.
388. See Thomas, supra note 366, at 166-67 ("We should focus on multi-
partner HCPs... so that they better approximate experiments in empowered
participatory governance.").
389. Karkkainen, supra note 349, at 210-12.
390. Id. at 210-11.
430 [89:342
THE RENEW DEAL
narrow in both scope and geographic scale. 391 By contrast, mul-
tiparty adaptive management plans, a more recent model for
HCPs, are larger in scale and scope and employ advanced
strategies of monitoring management and governance. 392 They
involve participation by multiple public and private parties, in-
cluding landowners, agencies, conservationists, scientists, and
interested citizens. 393 Not surprisingly, however, multipartner
plans are more time consuming and demand both expertise and
complexity. They therefore demonstrate how sustainable gov-
ernance demands ongoing support and orchestration by gov-
ernment.
In 2000, revised federal guidelines for habitat conservation
planning were issued, encouraging adaptive, iterative planning
akin to multiparty planning. 394 The revised guidelines encour-
age the adoption of an "adaptive management strategy" in
cases of information gaps. 395 Planners are advised to identify
uncertainty and unresolved questions. 396 The new guidelines
also promote the description of alternative implementation
strategies and proposed monitoring processes to evaluate im-
plementation. 397 These new guidelines are part of an effort to
make habitat conservation planning a sustainable governance
alternative to the regulatory option. The Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice has recently created an online system, the Environmental
Conservation Online System (ECOS), which summarizes habi-
tat conservation planning data.398 Innovations like ECOS rec-
ognize that centralized access to documents is needed to en-
hance sustainability, transparency, and accountability. 399 To
fully realize the governance potential of these new planning
processes, there is a need for more monitoring and coordina-
391. Id. at 211.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 211-12.
394. Thomas, supra note 366, at 155 (citing Notice of Availability of a Final
Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental
Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,241 (June 1, 2000) [hereinafter No-
tice of Availability]). Although these federal guidelines lack the authority of
formal regulation, they guide both the agency and applicants in the planning
and approval processes.
395. Notice of Availability, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35,252.
396. Thomas, supra note 366, at 153-56.
397. Id. at 155.
398. Id. at 167.
399. See id.
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tion, information pooling and sharing, increased funding, and
participation of diverse citizens. 400
C. E-GOVERNANCE AND CYBERDEMOCRACY
The move from a New Deal command-and-control model to
a Renew Deal governance model can be captured by journalist
Thomas Friedman's metaphor of a shift from walls to webs in
our new global world.401 No other environment is more reflec-
tive of the web structure than the World Wide Web. New tech-
nology holds the promise of facilitating new processes of gov-
ernance in various fields. At the same time, it changes the
landscape upon which law operates. Several levels of govern-
ance are exemplified through the environment of cyberspace.
First, at the individual citizen level, the Internet enables citi-
zens to become active users of information, proliferating the
process of cultural production. Second, at the subsystem level,
the Internet provides an experimental environment for self-
governance, establishing participatory nongovernmental stan-
dard-setting institutions. Third, at the metasystem level, the
Internet supports the shift from the regulatory to the govern-
ance model through the expansion of processes such as e-
regulation and innovative venues for political and legal activi-
ties.
1. Active Citizenship: From Consumers to Users
Emerging in its basic structure in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, predigital mass media was unidirectional.402 In this in-
formation environment, generally including the printed press,
radio, and television, consumers were conceptualized as passive
recipients of information. The technological environment of
mass media was characterized by bottlenecks and gatekeepers,
with a few licensed corporations controlling most of the provi-
sion of information.403 The role of law was to regulate the ac-
400. See id.
401. THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE:
UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION 39-58 (1999).
402. Balkin, supra note 39, at 10 (stating that mass media in general are
"asymmetrical and unidirectional"); Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Us-
ers: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Com-
mons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 563-64 (2000).
403. Balkin, supra note 39, at 10.
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tivities of media providers to ensure that they would better
serve their passive customers.
40 4
By contrast, the introduction of cyberspace allows people to
reach audiences outside traditional mass media channels.
Rather than the industrial model of protection of a pre-
packaged culture for consumption, the Internet has the poten-
tial to promote a model of peer-production and nonproprietary
collaboration.405 The digital revolution has loosened the tradi-
tional constraint of bandwidth, as well as constraints on repro-
duction and the use of information. 40 6 Because information, by
its very nature, is a nonexclusive good, digital technology en-
ables people to use materials produced by mass media in ways
that add, reproduce, and redistribute them. 40 7 The Internet
makes it possible for more individuals to participate in the
creation, design, and transformation of information environ-
ments. 40 8
In this new environment, Internet scholars advocate a
category of Internet "users," rejecting the dichotomous world
composed of a small number of professional producers and a
large number of passive consumers.40 9 Users are both consum-
ers and producers, who receive information and rework it for
further distribution. Users, in effect, active and empowered
citizens, are part of a dialogic conversation in a continuous
process of cultural democratic production.
410
Given the technological innovations of Internet infrastruc-
ture, the potential of a shift to a governance approach in the
field of information technology law is high. Governance princi-
ples of participation, collaboration, active citizenship, prolifer-
ated production, dynamic learning, and adaptability are all po-
tentially supported by the development of cybertechnology.
However, the struggle among the regulatory, market, and gov-
404. Benkler, supra note 402, at 562.
405. Id.; Balkin, supra note 39, at 22; see also Yochai Benkler, Coase's Pen-
guin, or Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 381-400
(2003); David R. Johnson et al., The Accountable Internet: Peer Production of
Internet Governance, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2004) (arguing that "peer produc-
tion of governance" is the most effective form of governance to increase online
social order); Katyal, supra note 160, at 1041-42.
406. See Balkin, supra note 39, at 20.
407. See id. at 10-12. Balkin refers to these two new strategies as "routing
around" and "glomming on." Id. at 10-11.
408. See Benkler, supra note 402, at 563.
409. See id. at 562.
410. Balkin, supra note 39, at 3-4.
THE RENEW DEAL 4332004]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ernance models persists. It is often in the interest of businesses
to limit the robust participation that the Internet enables.411
Commercial interests are struggling to enforce limited access
and distribution rights in this new environment. For example,
participatory production in a digital environment is curtailed
when courts ban users from utilizing media materials for politi-
cal commentary on the Web. A recent example is the case of the
Free Republic Web site, a forum for posting newspaper stories
with a comment. In Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, the Los
Angeles Times, together with the Washington Post, won their
argument that this practice was a violation of their copyrights.The decision reduced the ability of small nonprofit communities
to administer weblogs that build on traditional mass media re-
porting as a platform for commentary.412
Moreover, the competition over control and influence in cy-berspace is not limited to legal strategies. In addition to ques-
tions of intellectual property laws and media licensing, a gov-
ernance vision for cyberspace illuminates the significance of
spatial design, both in hardware and software, in guiding be-havior. On the one hand, technology is being applied to createdevices that limit control, access, use, and participation. On the
other hand, commentators see potential for designing thephysical infrastructure, logical infrastructure, and content lay-
ers in ways that are decentralized and prevent the concentra-
tion of the digital environment in the hands of few.413
Cyberspace also provides a vivid example of the interpen-
etration between public and private arenas and actors. Jack
Balkin asks, "Is the Internet a private space or a public
space?"414 Most digital communications networks are privatelyheld by large corporations.415 From the perspective of these
media owners, "the 'publicness' of digital communications net-
works is merely a side effect of the use of private property byprivate actors."416 From another perspective, cyberspace is pub-lic because it is a space for general interaction, exchange of in-
formation, and public participation.417 In essence, the very
value of the Internet is a function of its general public use.
411. Id. at 15.
412. 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
413. Benkler, supra note 402, at 568.
414. Balkin, supra note 39, at 23.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
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Rather than recognizing the public nature and significance of
the Internet as a space for participation and democratic en-
gagement, courts are accepting business interests in controlling
the Internet, namely, that the right to speak is a right to be
free from regulation. 418 Through such control, democratic gov-
ernance is curtailed, since consolidation risks reducing the
quality of public discourse and skews positions and information
in the drive to higher ratings.419 Cass Sunstein, in his book Re-
public.com, warns against the antidemocratic potential of cy-
berspace. 420 Sunstein worries that we are moving toward per-
fect filtering, which will allow individuals to see and read only
the "Daily Me," a narrow collection of voices with which they
already associate and agree. 421 This process will result in pre-
cisely the opposite of a democratic, deliberative new space. The
Internet will become an antipublic forum. It will become a seg-
mented, balkanized communications environment, leading to
radical group polarization.
A traditional regulatory response to these worries has been
policies such as the restriction of media concentration through
antitrust laws, imposition of a public interest obligation requir-
ing that programming cover public issues, and the regulation of
more access to diverse groups. 422 Balkin argues that, in addi-
tion to the traditional recognition of rights and rules, the new
system of democratic participation in the age of the Internet
must be based on technological designs that facilitate decen-
tralized control and popular participation. 423 Judicial creation
and protection of individual rights alone are not suited for the
new challenges of the Internet. Rather, the focus must shift to
technological designs and standards:
Laws affect how technology is designed, the degree of legal protection
that a certain technology will enjoy, and whether still other technolo-
gies that modify or route around existing technological forms of dis-
tribution and control will be limited or forbidden. But increasingly,
these sorts of decisions will be made by legislatures and administra-
tive agencies in consultation with private parties.
42 4
Balkin advocates "a robust and ever expanding public do-
main with generous fair use rights," so that intellectual prop-
418. Id. at 26-27.
419. Id. at 30.
420. CASs R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 65--69 (2001).
421. Id. at 44.
422. Balkin, supra note 39, at 30-31.
423. Id. at 51.
424. Id. at 63.
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erty laws will not inhibit the spread of culture and knowl-
edge.425 Scholars imagine the virtual space of the Internet as
the frontier of deliberative democracy.426
2. The Subsystem Level and Self-Governance: Internal
Internet Standard Setting
At the level of the Internet as a social subsystem, govern-
ance can be described as a predominantly self-regulating sys-
tem. There have even been famous declarations of the Internet
as a "government-free zone."427 The 1996 Declaration of the In-
dependence of Cyberspace urged "governments of the industrial
world ... you of the past ... [to] leave us alone."428 However,
the idea of a government-free zone is neither feasible nor desir-
able. The question is not whether to intervene, but rather how
and what regulatory approach to employ in this new space. 429
The Internet itself was created through governmental efforts,
primarily of the U.S. Department of Defense. Yet as the Inter-
net expanded and became pervasively commercial in the mid-
1990s, government transferred much of the standard-setting
responsibilities within the cybersystem to nongovernmental in-
stitutions.
Most Internet standards processes take place in nongov-
ernmental transnational settings.43o Rulemaking processes are
thus decentered from the formal state level and take place un-
der new conditions. The Internet Engineering Task Force(IETF) that sets the basic technical standards that define
Internet functions has been identified in legal scholarship as an
example of a deliberative and cooperative rulemaking environ-
ment.431 IETF, an unincorporated association with constantly
changing members, operates to set standards through negotia-
tions open to all.4 32 Michael Froomkin describes the IETF
425. Id. at 53.
426. Gunther Teubner, Lecture at Yale Law School, Coincidentia Opposito-
rum: Networks and the Law Beyond Contract and Organization (Oct. 8, 2003)(unpublished transcript on file with author).
427. See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyber-
space, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Feb. 8, 1996), at http://www.eff.org/
-barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
428. Id.
429. SUNSTEIN, supra note 420, at 128.
430. A. Michael Froomkin, HABERMAS@DISCOURSE.NET. Toward a
Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 752 (2003).
431. Id.
432. Id. at 755.
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model as a realization of the Habermasian vision of "a reener-
gized, activist, engaged citizenry working together to create
new small-scale communicative associative institutions that
over time either merge into larger ones or at least join
forces." 433 The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) is similarly an institution that was envi-
sioned in its conception to exemplify democratic governance.
However, ICANN's success in fulfilling a governance vision is
far more controversial. Indeed, it has been characterized by
some commentators as "an institution besieged" and "utterly
disastrous," and "accused of everything from bias, through self-
service, to out-and-out conspiracy."
434
ICANN was established in 1998 as a nonprofit corporation
charged with setting policy for Internet domain names and ad-
dresses. In effect, it was the result of the U.S. government's de-
cision to privatize its de facto control over those issues.
4 35
ICANN is a transnational and transgovernmental institution,
with constituents from multiple places and interests.
436 Al-
though based in California, it is not tied to any particular ju-
risdiction. It functions as a regulator, executive agency, and ad-
judicator, with the organizational structure of a corporate
entity.437 ICANN undertakes extensive regulatory functions,
standard setting, and the development of dispute resolution
mechanisms for conflicts between trademark holders and do-
main name holders. 438 ICANN has also created the Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), a private adjudication
mechanism for trademark and domain name disputes.
4 39
Some scholars view ICANN as a way to bypass administra-
tive law, namely the requirement for notice and comment in
rulemaking and judicial review, pursuant to the Administrative
Procedures Act.4 40 Yet, ICANN has adopted many administra-
433. Id. at 753.
434. Hunter, supra note 59, at 1153-54.
435. Id. at 1154-55; Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63
Fed. Reg. 31,741 (June 10, 1998).
436. Hunter, supra note 59, at 1152; see also Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN
and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 246 (2000).
437. See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Bylaws
(Apr. 19, 2004), at http:// www.icann.org/generalfbylaws.htm.
438. Hunter, supra note 59, at 1152.
439. See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Uniform
Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.
htm (last modified Aug. 26, 2001).
440. A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN To
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tive features, such as notice and comment and external review
processes. 441 The institution is relatively transparent, with its
every decision and practice published online.442 Its decision-
making processes are primarily consensus based.443 ICANN has
also adopted processes familiar in representative legislatures,
particularly in the appointment of its board of directors.
Shortly after its establishment as a private, nonprofit organiza-
tion, pressures mounted to conduct popular democratic elec-
tions for its board of directors, drawing on the constituency of
the Internet as a whole. 444 ICANN held elections for several
board seats, yet participation in the elections by the Internet
community proved surprisingly low. 445 Dan Hunter argues that
the vast criticism ICANN receives stems precisely from its na-
ture as a quasi-governmental, quasi-corporate, quasi-nonprofit
organization.446 Yet, the ICANN model provides an initial ex-
ample of the possibilities of participation in governance by non-
governmental standard-setting institutions in a globalizing
technological infrastructure.
3. E-Government, E-Rulemaking, and E-Activism
At the metasystem level, the new digital environment is
increasingly serving government and society in the develop-
ment of innovative legal and political processes. Regulatory
agencies are increasingly harnessing the power of digital tech-
nologies to meet the informational demands of rulemaking and
to expand public involvement in policymaking.447 Similarly,
nongovernmental organizations are using the Internet to ex-
pand their activities and agendas.
The E-Government Act of 2002448 is part of a series of ef-
forts to improve the federal government's online visibility,
transparency, and accessibility, and to create a federal govern-
Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J 17, 29 (2000).
441. Weinberg, supra note 436, at 228.
442. Hunter, supra note 59, at 1155.
443. Id. at 1153.
444. Id. at 1156.
445. Id. at 1178-79.
446. Id. at 1159.
447. JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, THE FUTURE OF ELECTRONIC RULEMAKING: ARESEARCH AGENDA (Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, WorkingPaper No. RPP-2002-04, 2002); Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking: Information
Technology and the Regulatory Process, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 353, 354 (2004).
448. Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116. Stat. 2899 (codified as amended primarily in
scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.A. and 5 U.S.C.A.).
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ment that is more "citizen-centered, results-oriented, and mar-
ket-based."449 The Act reflects the Renew Deal spirit of simul-
taneously improving effectiveness and legitimacy through gov-
ernance. It seeks to "enhance the management and promotion
of electronic Government services and processes," and at the
same time to enhance citizen participation in policymaking.
450
Federal agencies are required to use the Internet to centralize
information and increase the number of public records that are
accessible online. The Act establishes a new Office of Electronic
Government within the Office of Management and Budget. The
Act also requires all federal agencies to consider the impact of
e-government on persons without access to the Internet.
451
Both federal and state agencies are constructing Web sites
with rulemaking documents, which allow citizens to submit
electronic comments on proposed rules. 452 For example, the
EPA has adopted a system that makes available online full ac-
cess to all studies, comments, and records of the Agency's rule-
making processes.45 3 Such initiatives not only reduce the costs
of storage of information, but also allow agencies to better coor-
dinate their staff and interact with citizens. 454 Coordinating
these efforts, the Bush administration introduced a single point
of access to the federal government online-the FirstGov.gov
Web site. FirstGov.gov allows users to access the Web site of
any federal agency or government program. In 2003, it also
launched a search-and-comment Web portal that is particularly
designed for the electronic filing of public comments on pro-
449. Presidential Memorandum from George W. Bush, to the Heads of Ex-
ecutive Departments and Agencies (July 10, 2002), http:I! www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020710-6.html; see Jaime Klima, The E-
Government Act: Promoting E-Quality or Exaggerating the Digital Divide?,
2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9 (Apr. 15, 2003), at http://www.law.duke.
edujournals/dltr/articles/2003dltr0009.html.
450. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3601(3)(A) (2004).
451. E-Government Act, § 202, 116 Stat. 2899, 2911 (200).
452. Barbara H. Brandon & Robert D. Carlitz, Online Rulemaking and
Other Tools for Strengthening Our Civil Infrastructure, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
1421, 1422 (2002).
453. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RULES AND PROPOSED
REGULATIONS, available at http://www.epa.gov/rules.html#proposed (last up-
dated June 8, 2004).
454. Creating a similar online docket, the Department of Transportation
has reported saving over one million dollars per year in storage costs because
of its online system. Coglianese, supra note 447, at 376.
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posed rules, improving the administrative process of notice,
comment, and final rule.455
E-rulemaking recognizes that the development and imple-
mentation of rules is an interdisciplinary effort that requires
the cooperation of various stakeholders.456 The information in-
tensity and complexity required for rulemaking can be facili-
tated by the use of information technology. 457 Within govern-
ment, the embrace of the digital environment can increase
cooperation among different offices within a regulatory agency,
as well as among agencies. It can also help overcome problems
of poor data and regulatory incoherence by engaging broader
sectors of the market and civil society.458 The new portals for
notice and comment help make the public comment process
more interactive and deliberative.459 This improves government
decision making by allowing government to better reach their
policy goals, and increases public participation and democratic
legitimacy. Successfully harnessing new technologies to pro-
mote the Renew Deal vision allows government to reduce ad-
ministrative costs while increasing compliance. At the same
time, the democratic process is potentially improved. Moving
forward, a governance approach suggests that digital technol-
ogy can further be used to create deliberative forums. Govern-
ment agencies could create panels of citizens, like traditional
juries, that would advise about rulemaking.460
Similarly, private industry and nongovernmental organiza-
tions use the Internet to expand their public activities and
agendas and to more deliberately engage in governance. The
Internet has lowered the threshold for groups to act collec-
tively, triggering the emergence of new kinds of norm-
generating institutions.461 In the context of workers' rights for
455. Id. at 355; see FirstGov.gov: The U.S. Government's Official Web Por-
tal, at http://www.firstgov.gov (last visited Sept. 16, 2004).
456. Coglianese, supra note 447, at 373.
457. Id. at 356.
458. Cary Coglianese, Bounded Evaluation: Cognition, Incoherence, and
Regulatory Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1234 (2002).
459. Coglianese, supra note 447, at 373; see also Stephen M. Johnson, The
Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participation and Access
to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 278-
79 (1998).
460. CARY COGLIANESE, THE INTERNET AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
RULEMAKING 8 (Harvard Univ. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Working Paper No.
RWP03-022, 2003).
461. HOWARD RHEINGOLD, VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 2 (1993).
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example, workers are better able to communicate, to
strengthen local leadership, and to provide services such as
benefit portability by using the Internet. 462 The Internet re-
duces the cost of organizing and providing information, advice,
and services to members. Unions are gradually making fuller
use of the technological capacities to improve communication
and to recruit new members or to establish virtual worker
communities that challenge the traditional National Labor Re-
lations Act model. 463 IBM is an example of a company that re-
sisted traditional unionization under the New Deal framework.
Today, however, an employee Web site-Alliance@IBM-has
been established to provide information about IBM's employ-
ment policies and worker relations. 464 Another example of a vir-
tual union is that of the National Writers Union.465 Again, most
of its members operate without the possibility of traditional col-
lective bargaining. However, the virtual union provides job
postings, information, and advice to members, and has estab-
lished a lobbying arm that recently participated in a U.S. Su-
preme Court case on freelance worker copyrights. Similarly, in
other areas of social activism, "dot causes" are a growing form
of social organization that rely-partially or completely-on the
Internet to make their existence and activism possible.466
Employment, environment, and information technology
law have been leading domains in the shift from regulation to
governance. They provide us insights to the promises, as well
462. National Bureau of Economic Research Economist Richard Freeman
argues that although the impact of the Internet on union organizing is still to
be realized, the potential is "revolutionary." See W.J. Diamond & R. B. Free-
man, Will Unionism Prosper in Cyberspace? The Promise of the Internet for
Employee Organization, 40 BRIT. J. OF INDUS. REL. 569, 577-88 (2002) (detail-
ing the ways in which unions' use of the Internet will improve and expand la-
bor organizations).
463. Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Unions on the Net, THE NATION,
June 24, 2002, at 22.
464. Alliance@IBM: Communications Workers of America, at http:/www.
allianceibm.org (last updated Sept. 30, 2004).
465. National Writers Union, at http://www.nwu.org (last visited Sept. 16,
2004).
466. See John Clark & Nuno Themudo, The Age of Protest: Internet-Based
'Dot Causes' and the Anti-globalization' Movement, in GLOBALIZING CML
ENGAGEMENT 109, 109-11 (John D. Clark ed., 2003) (describing the emergence
of dot causes in recent years). The Internet-based OneWorld network is an ex-
ample of a dot caus'3 that is dedicated to free information access-it thus oper-
ates both at the subsystem and metasystem of transforming social organiza-
tion through governance. See OneWorld Network, at http://www.oneworld.net
(last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
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as the difficulties, of implementing new governance regimes.
Other fields, including health care, 46 7 education,468 policing, 469
housing,470 and prison management 471 have begun to experi-
ence similar developments.
V. GOVERNANCE AS THEORETICAL HYBRIDIZATION
A. THE THIRD WAY PROMISE
The governance model fosters a mixed ecology. A central
strength of the Renew Deal is that it explicitly and ingeniously
embraces theoretical hybridization, drawing together elements
from rival schools of thought. In its spirit and style, the Renew
Deal is integrative, accommodating, and optimistic. It advo-
cates the proliferation of methods and structures and the
pragmatic acceptance of each. By offering a big tent, it can re-
spond to demands for flexible accommodation in the new econ-
omy and varied local conditions, as well as to the ongoing need
for public action. Hybridization enables contemporary legal
thought to live with paradox. For example, the obsessive main-
tenance of traditional boundaries-including those of public
and private, profit and nonprofit, formal and informal, theory
and practice, secular and religious, left and right-is no longer
a major concern with the shift to the Renew Deal paradigm. 472
On the contrary, the governance model aims to move beyond
these pervasive dichotomies in search of sustainable structures.
Its objective is not to police boundaries, but rather to seek out
and open structures that will facilitate wider imaginative hori-
zons. Furthermore, the model is comfortable making links
among the local, regional, national, and global levels, as multi-
ple overlapping authorities. As will be argued in the succeeding
section, the model accepts a rich definition of democracy, com-
467. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek & Maya Das, Achieving Equality: Health-
care Governance in Transition, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 395 (2003).
468. See, e.g., Liebman & Sabel, supra note 19, at 184.
469. See, e.g., Archon Fung, Accountable Autonomy: Toward Empowered
Deliberation in Chicago Schools and Policing, 29 POL. & Soc'v 73, 75 (2001);
Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815 (1999).
470. Sabel & Simon, supra note 16, at 1047-53.
471. Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial
Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 807 (1990).
472. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 22; Lobel, supra note 38; Minow, supra
note 78.
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bining direct, representative, associative, participatory, and de-
liberative aspects.
The governance model should thus be understood as an at-
tempt to envision a third way between state-based, top-down
regulation and a single-minded reliance on market-based
norms; between centralized command-and-control regulation
and individual free contract. It aims to transcend the concep-
tual dichotomies of regulation and deregulation; of legal direc-
tive and spontaneous market behavior.4 73 Inventing flexible,
responsive administrative practices may be the only alternative
to big, blunt bureaucracies on the one hand, and private mar-
ket mechanisms on the other.474
A key promise of the Renew Deal is its explicit suggestion
that economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy can, under
certain conditions, point in the same direction. Governance
principles can increase both efficacy and accountability,
thereby restoring the legitimacy of the legal regime. Govern-
ance is efficient because it encompasses multiple arenas and
mechanisms by which to learn, adapt, and improve. It is de-
mocratic because it encourages the participation of more citi-
zens and attention to more interests in legal processes. More-
over, the Renew Deal vision reconciles the ongoing tension
between the fear of big government and the need for a public
response to social challenges. 475 Coordinated decentralization
addresses the expectation of Americans that government policy
will reflect their moral values and sense of fairness, but "effi-
ciently, leaving the greatest possible amount of control in the
hands of those closest to the problems. '4
76
473. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 3-18; Edward L. Rubin, Law
and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WIs. L. REV. 521, 563-65.
474. Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Crea-
tor of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2026
(1997). A similar third way reasoning is expressed in the reflexive law litera-
ture: "[Rieflexive law represents a legal form especially suited to combine
three advantages: (i) nonintrusive, postregulatory regulation, (ii) a renewed
formal structure preserving the integrity of the legal medium, and (iii) the
normatively desirable combination of freedom and regulation." Andrew Arato,
Reflexive Law, Civil Society and Negative Rights, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 785, 786
(1986).
475. See, e.g., OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 89, at 152; A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4, at 271-73 (1998).
476. OSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 89, at 152.
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B. REGULATORY AND MARKET FAILURES ABOUND
As a third way vision, the governance paradigm comes at a
moment when there are rich understandings in the legal world
about the failure of both government regulation and market
nonregulation.4 7 7 The pathologies and chronic problems of both
the public and private sectors are well studied.
Regulatory failures have been at the center of legal study
for several decades. Regulation has been described as having
become "the Stalingrad of domestic political warfare. 4 78 Regu-
latory deficiencies are understood to include rigidity, monetary
waste, a tendency to uniformity, and the suppression of innova-
tion.47 9 Peter Schuck describes the symptoms of regulatory pa-
thology as "stifled competition, gross inefficiency, hostility to
public participation in agency processes, frustration of innova-
tion, administrative chaos and delay, secrecy, absence of long-
range planning, and indifference to competing social objec-
tives."48 0 At the conception stage, regulation is often based on
poor information and policy analyses that oversimplify the is-
sue.48 1 At the implementation and enforcement stages, interest
group resistance and bureaucratic limits can defeat the goals of
the regulatory efforts.48 2 Government agencies often lack the
resources to monitor implementation, let alone adequately de-
termine cause and effect. They are also susceptible to rent seek-
ing and capture, where powerful interest groups control and
477. The idea of nonregulation is itself highly problematic because of the
many ways initial private law entitlements and system background rules (e.g.,
property rights, contracts, family, and work) construct interactions within the
market. See, e.g., Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1520-22.
478. SCHUCK, supra note 53, at 117.
479. See generally Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mis-
matches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549
(1979) (detailing the framework for the anlaysis of economic regulation); Paul
Stephen Dempsey, Market Failure and Regulatory Failure as Catalysts for Po-
litical Change: The Choice Between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Com-
petition, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1989) (assessing the costs and benefits of
regulation and dregulation while tracing the history of regulation); Christen
Carlson White, Regulation of Leaky Underground Fuel Tanks: An Anatomy of
Regulatory Failure, 14 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 105 (1996) (analyzing the
San Francisco Regional Water Control Board and its regulatory mission and
enforcement).
480. SCHUCK, supra note 53, at 119.
481. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEMNG
THE REGULATORY STATE 84-91 (1990).
482. Id.
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disproportionately affect regulatory decisions. 483 Examples of
misbehavior of government agencies have not been hard to
trace, ranging from failures of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion to nuclear power control.484 In the absence of an encom-
passing governance approach, regulation further risks regres-
sive taxation when the costs of regulation are passed on to
consumers.
48 5
Conversely, market failures include distributional inequi-
ties, unincorporated externalities, collective action failures and
free rider problems, information asymmetries, cognitive biases,
and scale inefficiencies. 48 6 Certain markets, for example those
with scarce resources, natural monopolies, or commons (and
"anticommons"), are particularly vulnerable to failure.48 7 Mar-
kets also frequently lack adequate spaces for the public ex-
change of ideas.48 8
Some evaluations of regulatory and market failures rely on
factual distinctions between the capacities of market and public
action. In such cases, the choice of public or private action is
empirical and instrumental. Given a certain shared goal, such
as the reduction of industrial pollution, the question is which
institutional arrangement will best achieve the desired results.
Other concerns are based on normative evaluations of the dif-
ferences between various spheres-political, economic, and
civic life. In such contexts, there may be an intrinsic value to
privatizing, or publicizing, a social function, regardless of which
483. See, e.g., William W. Bratton and Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory
Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L.
REV. 1861, 1885-92 1941-42 (1995) (addressing capture and rent seeking in
the context of corporate governance).
484. SCHUCK, supra note 53, at 119.
485. Id. at 122.
486. See, e.g., ACQUIRING SKILLS: MARKET FAILURES, THEIR SYMPTOMS
AND POLICY RESPONSES (Alison A. Booth & Dennis J. Snower eds., 1996);
Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failures and the Evolution of State
Regulation of Managed Care, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 172-83 (2002).
487. See, e.g., ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING
REGULATION 202-23, 257-83 (1999) (detailing concerns related to the control
of monopolies, the balance between regulation and the fostering of competi-
tion, and franchising); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998)
(developing a theory of "anticommons" property to explain economic failure in
the context of the Soviet shift from socialism to a market economy).
488. See generally MINOW, supra note 22 (arguing that emerging relation-
ships between government and private entities calls for new approaches and a
renewed commitment to public values).
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forum is better situated instrumentally to achieve certain
goals.
C. RECONSTRUCTION
The accumulation of insights about regulatory and market
failure reveals the importance of moving beyond existing pat-
terns of lawmaking. In both its experimental construction of
new institutions and in its theoretical linkages, the Renew Deal
is a reconciliatory and reconstructive project, synthesizing the
fundamental lessons of opposing intellectual camps. Just as the
governance model is generated through the interaction between
internal and external forces for change in the legal field, the
model brings together competing theoretical and practical les-
sons. In this synthesis, the Renew Deal vision again recalls the
Legal Process school of the 1950s, which was reactive in differ-
ent ways to the emergence of the New Deal paradigm. 4s9 Ed-
ward Rubin has described the 1950s legal process scholarship,
as "[t]he last unified approach to legal scholarship. 490 Gary
Peller similarly describes the Legal Process school as "the last
great attempt at a grand synthesis of law in all its institutional
manifestations.4 91 Legal process emerged as a school of
thought at a moment when there was a critical need to explain
the new realities of the growing regulatory administrative state
and to find sources of legitimacy for a new centralized legal
framework. But soon after its birth, ideological polarization de-
veloped within legal academia. 492 Two newer schools, critical
legal studies from the Left and law and economics from the
Right, proved especially discordant, which left little room for
unifying moves in the last several decades. 493 However, the new
governance school emerges at a period in which opposing
schools of thought have challenged not only the assumptions
and imperfections of its rivals but also its own premises. In
both practice and theory, the Renew Deal paradigm enables the
489. See generally Erwin N. Griswold, Preface to HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS viii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994) (noting the effect of the New Deal on the Legal Process
school).
490. Rubin, supra note 233, at 1393.
491. Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
561, 568 (1988).
492. Some scholars argue that the break actually coincided with the emer-
gence of the Legal Process school. See William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Introduction to THE LEGAL PROCESS, supra note 489, at c-cxxv.
493. Rubin, supra note 233, at 1393-94.
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resurgence of broad structural thinking, combining critiques of
conventional legal strategies, as well as the limits of critical in-
sights.494 In legal practice, breakdowns can be traced through
changes in the professional approaches to "cause" lawyering.
Legal practice has moved from a focus on the administrative
state in the Progressive Era, to court-oriented civil rights liti-
gation in the 1960s and 1970s, to the critical, rebellious, local,
personal, and "outside-of-the-law" positions of "cause" lawyers
in the 1980s and 1990s. 495 In legal academia, both law and eco-
nomics and critical legal studies have been challenging their
own basic assumptions in recent years.496 In general, economic
494. For critiques of the critical positioning of progressive practitioners and
thinkers in the 1980s and 1990s, see Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest,
and the New Social Movements, 26 LAW & SockY REV. 697 (1992); William H.
Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law
Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099
(1994). In former years, the internalized occupation with law was viewed to be
paradoxically strengthening-the more law was deconstructed, the stronger it
became. Although it was with reference to political/philosophical strands out-
side of the law, the discourse was narrowed to that of internal legal thought.
The internal critique within the legal world has taken a toll on the ability to
define camps, left or right. A revolution to move to a new paradigm is under-
way. In spirit and sometimes in body, thinkers are leaving the jurisprudential
center and looking elsewhere for fuel and energy.
495. Trubek, supra note 146, at 272.
496. A behavioral approach to law has been challenging many of the tradi-
tional assumptions of law and economics. See NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN
G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM
(1997); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); see also Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social
Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553
(1998). Gary Minda, describing second generation law and economics scholar-
ship explains that "[t]he shift from abstract theory to concrete institutional
analysis has been nurtured by a new understanding of economic theory-an
understanding that views 'theory' merely as a tool for investigating what may
'work' as a solution to some problem .... [T]he second generation views eco-
nomics as an applied science." GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL
MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 87-88 (1995).
Elsewhere, Minda describes that:
The current generation of [law and economics] scholarship tends to be
more modest in its own claims about the role of economics in law and
less accepting of the conservative orientation of property rights analy-
sis of the Chicago School founders. Only a small number of methodo-
logical issues appear to be settled; including claims that microeco-
nomic theory is a basis for analyzing law, that demand curves are
downward sloping, and that cost-benefit analysis and the economic
definition of cost (opportunity cost) are essential for intelligent poli-
cymaking. Second generation [law and economics] scholars have re-
treated from the orthodoxy of "efficient" answers for nearly every le-
gal question; instead, the second generation thinkers admit that
"most law and economics questions are still open and likely to remain
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theory has become more critical, while critical theorists have
become more constructive. If law and economics analysis has
been conventionally aligned with conservative projects, and
critical scholarship with progressive projects, we have reached
a critical moment within legal thought when it is possible to
question these assumptions from both ends, allowing opponents
to reconcile their pervasive conflicts. Second-generation law
and economics scholars have recognized that government inter-
ventions can enhance both liberty and welfare. 497 The economic
understanding of market failures, including problems of collec-
tive action and information asymmetries, has expanded. More
than that, the very concept of linear maximization of individual
welfare has been challenged. New institutional economics has
challenged conventional assumptions about economic actors as
isolated individuals engaged in didactic exchanges. 498 Rather,
the new understanding of individuals is that of social beings
whose actions and knowledge are at least partly constructed by
their institutional settings. Drawing on psychological analysis,
behavioral law and economics has introduced the understand-
ing that individual preferences are endogenous, a function of
experience and existing collective norms.499 As a result, recent
law and economics scholarship recognizes that freedom is not
identical to unlimited choice and that government intervention
is inevitable in a functioning market.
From the perspective of critical legal scholarship, second-
generation crits, including feminist, critical race, and gay legal
theorists, have challenged the blank rejection by earlier critical
scholars of the legal system as an engine for social change.500
These scholars have pointed to the significance of legal rights,
pragmatic programs, and immediate remedies within the exist-
ing legal system for disadvantaged minorities. 501 This newer
so for a long time." Second-generation law and economics scholarship
is also more eclectic theoretically and much more sophisticated than
the work of the [law and economics] founding fathers.
Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J.
599, 607 (1989). From the perspective of critical scholars, second generation
",crits" include critical race theorists, feminist legal theorists, and gay legal
studies scholars. See Handler, supra note 494, at 706-10; Gary Minda, One
Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From Langdell and Holmes to Pos-
ner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REV. 353, 367-70 (1994).
497. SUNSTEIN, supra note 481, at 38-45.
498. Rubin, supra note 233, at 1413.
499. SUNSTEIN, supra note 481, at 40-44.
500. Rubin, supra note 233, at 1407-08.
501. Id. at 1407-08 n.49. On the critical race theorists critique of critical
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scholarship has been more inclined to translate critique into
prescriptive analysis, rather than settling for abstract condem-
nations.5 02 Next-generation critical scholars have broadened
their inquiry to include the exploration of the multiple roles of
law in achieving social change and the relationship between
government branches in realizing these changes.
The integration of rationales, theories, and systems repre-
sents a maturation of legal thought. Rather than oppositional,
the Renew Deal aims for an appreciative positive stance, pull-
ing together disparate ingredients and synthesizing elements
from opposing schools of thought.503 Through new governance
approaches, contemporary thinkers can bring together in their
research unlikely pairs, such as privatization and democratic
theory. 504 The theory itself is thus reflexive, in the sense that it
calls for integration in legal practice and correspondingly ex-
emplifies hybridization in the academic field. Indeed, the theo-
retical basis for the Renew Deal vision mirrors its practical ap-
plication in its inclusive spirit.
VI. CENTRAL NORMATIVE CHALLENGES
The strengths of the governance model are many and its
future promising, as shown by the increasing adoption of gov-
legal scholarship, Rubin cites, among other scholars, Kimberle Crenshaw,
Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidis-
crimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1356 (1988), Richard Delgado, The
Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 304, 307 (1987), and Patricia J. Williams,
Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 405 (1987). Rubin cites the following feminist theorists:
Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished
Draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1058 (1992) and Martha R. Mahoney, Legal
Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1991).
502. Rubin, supra note 233, at 1408-09; see also Handler, supra note 494
(urging progressive scholars to combine critique with constructive reform pro-
jects); cf. Lobel, supra note 38 (describing the recent trend in legal scholarship
on social change towards advocating extra-legal activism).
503. Richard Stewart describes Cass Sunstein's writing as putting together
"a bit of Hayek, nuggets of public choice theory, a substantial dose of welfare
economics, considerable amounts of Mill and republican political theory, some
New Deal leavening, and a trace of critical legal theory studies spice." Richard
B. Stewart, Regulatory Jurisprudence: Canons Redux?, 79 CAL. L. REV. 807,
810 (1991). Stewart describes this m6lange as "truest to our condition." Id.
504. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Rethinking Traditional Alignments: Privatization
and Participatory Citizenship, in PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, GLOBALIZATION
AND MARKETS (Clare Dalton ed., forthcoming 2005).
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ernance approaches in a wide spectrum of legal fields. As is of-
ten the case in a paradigm transformation, supporters of the
nascent vision invest great efforts to demonstrate its potential
and strengths, often by imagining the best possible scenarios
for the adoption of the new framework. However, ideal theories
are never risk free. Particularly in the rich setting of govern-
ance, with its affluence in meanings, there is also a need to
warn against certain blind spots and difficulties.
Two mirror-image risks exist in the transition to the Re-
new Deal governance paradigm. First, when advancing a new
model of law, there is some tendency to insist too much on its
newness. The old is easily dismissed as conventional, its ap-
proaches antiquated. This tendency often results in aligning old
approaches to law with our critical understandings of power,
legality, action, and change. Thus, for example, some expres-
sions within the Renew Deal literature overstate the allocation
of power within the regulatory framework, while aligning gov-
ernance with transformative social activism (decentering). In
such cases, power is framed as a characteristic of the regula-
tory model, while empowerment is the promise of governance.
Similarly, formal regulation is considered present only in cer-
tain settings, activities, and spheres of action; other issues and
arenas are depicted as outside traditional legal mechanisms.
These underlying tendencies run the risk of instigating a con-
temporary bias that universally aligns the regulatory model
with conservative commitments, and the governance model
with transformative politics.
Mirroring the first, a second risk involves the construction
of problematic equivalences (recentering). New governance ap-
proaches often assume one-dimensional measurements in
evaluating complex developments. For example, scholars may
imply flat equations between advancement in business admini-
stration models and new public management models; between
scientific learning and democratic learning; between small-
scale knowledge and large-scale initiatives; and between ac-
countability and responsiveness.
Although the Renew Deal vision is at an early stage in its
elaboration by legal scholars and in its adoption in practice, it
is important to recognize that the case studies we have ex-
plored can help us better evaluate the potential of the govern-
ance model, as well as its limitations.
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A. ADDITION VS. SUBSTITUTION: THE REGULATORY MODEL AS
COMPATIBLE WITH THE GOVERNANCE MODEL
What is the relationship between the regulatory model and
the newer governance model? Does governance supplement or
replace regulation? To be cautious, implementation of the new
model should resist overly sharp breaks between traditional
approaches and new ones. A statutory mandate may be a first
step in the constitution of a governance model. The long-
studied gap between law-on-the-books and law-in-action has
recently been explored not simply as a weakness of the regula-
tory system, but rather as a strength. Daniel Farber describes
the concept of slippage, the disparity between regulatory man-
dates and actual enforcement. Negative slippage results from
weak enforcement by regulators and noncompliance by private
actors. 50 5 Positive slippage occurs when regulators assist regu-
lated parties in designing alternatives to compliance on a nego-
tiated, case-by-case basis.5 0 6 Such instances resonate with pro-
posals for partial industry regulation advocated by John
Braithwaite and Ian Ayres. 50 7 Farber argues that with positive
slippage, top-down standards may often be the "opening gam-
bits in a prolonged bargaining process" between agencies and
regulated parties.50 8 The dynamics of implementation demon-
strate a process that is much more flexible than initially as-
sumed. Therefore, the initial regulation should be understood
as "the government's opening demand in negotiations, and the
final bargain is likely to be more favorable to the other side."
50 9
New governance practices of regulatory agencies, such as
the increased issuance of informal guidance, are typically car-
ried out in the shadow of a formal and standardized body of
administrative law. Activities conducted in the shadow of the
law possess background efficiencies when the law allows for
variations in implementation. For example, Jason Johnston
stresses that, in environmental regulation, regional and local
variations in implementation of uniform federal law are pre-
cisely what Congress intended and planned for in its incentives
505. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and
Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 299
(1999).
506. Id. at 305-11.
507. See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 191.
508. Farber, supra note 505, at 317.
509. Id. at 316.
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analyses. 51° Similarly, referring to collaborative governance
approaches as "contractarian regulation," David Dana observes:
In the absence of the threat of the application of the default regime of
command-and-control regulation, regulated entities would lack any
economic incentives to negotiate alternative regulatory arrange-
ments .... [I]n fact, we do not observe any contractarian regulatory
activity where there are no applicable background command-and-
control regulations in place or plausibly threatened to be in place.
Thus, although it is true that contractarian regulation is a reform al-
ternative to command-and-control regulation, it is also true that
command-and-control regulation is a precondition for contractarian
regulation.511
Regulatory approaches not only have ex post effects but
also ex ante effects. They promote self-regulation and create in-
centives for parties to reach efficient allocations on their own.
Often, actors that recognize the possibility of regulation, which
would order them to alter their behavior, have an incentive to
voluntarily reach a cooperative agreement with their competi-
tors, as we have witnessed in the case of endangered species
and HCPs. Similarly, in the contexts of employment discrimi-
nation and occupational safety and health, the possibility of
traditional regulatory liability continues to motivate industries
to improve their practices through self-governance. Several of
the governance-based initiatives explored earlier condition con-
tinuation of the programs on proof of effectiveness. In such
cases, regulatory agencies announce that as long as the pro-
gram effectively reaches its policy goals, the agency will con-
tinue to allow increased involvement of nongovernmental par-
ticipants and allow flexibility in program interpretation and
implementation. The retention of supervisory authority and the
background threat of direct regulation and enforcement
strengthen accountability in the shift to governance. Moreover,
some initiatives, such as the California-OSHA audited self-
regulation program, facilitate the shift to governance through
the appointment of government officers to act as problem-
solving consultants to the process rather than as enforcement
agents. 512 The continued presence of an official government
510. Jason Scott Johnston, The Law and Economics of Environmental Con-
tracts, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO
REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 291 (Eric W.
Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001).
511. Dana, supra note 13, at 47.
512. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 651 (2000).
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representative in a collaborative setting encourages parties to
participate in efforts to sustain responsible practices.
This interaction between flexible compliance and tradi-
tional mechanisms is a significant aspect of the Renew Deal.
Discussing the merits of both soft and hard law, David Trubek
and Louise Trubek suggest that "[t]he institutional debate
should be about the relative capacities of different modes to
handle specific governance tasks."5 13 Similarly, Richard Stew-
art suggests focusing on the comparative advantage between
"prescriptive" and "reconstitutive" strategies.5 14 To be most ef-
fective, the governance model must continue to explore such
"inter-modal synergy and hybrid.., governance modes," 5 15 in-
cluding the coexistence, complementarities, and mutual rein-
forcement of traditional regulation and new governance ap-
proaches.
B. SCARCE RESOURCES: EXPERTISE, EXPERIENCE, AND SOCIAL
ENERGY
A second challenge posed by the shift to a governance
model is striking a balance between the value of direct partici-
pation and the need for a high-quality representative democ-
racy. This tension echoes the fragile balance between prolifera-
tion of authority and legal orchestration, but the perspective is
different. Under the new model, the valuation of direct en-
gagement and experience risks becoming too populist. The Re-
new Deal should not abandon a Madisonian notion of democ-
racy, based on checks and balances among branches of
government backed by expert agencies. I have argued that the
best versions of the governance model are those that accept
tension, and do not uniformly choose one way over another.
Here too the model should incorporate tension as part of an on-
going challenge.
There is some tendency in Renew Deal scholarship to repli-
cate weaknesses of particular versions of the American prag-
matist tradition. Such tendencies include an aversion to strong
expressions of shared public values and to normative claims of
morality. Stanley Cavell has vividly expressed this tendency as
513. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 2, at 2.
514. Stewart, supra note 7, at 93; see also supra notes 71, 238 and accom-
panying text.
515. Trubek & Trubek, supra note 2, at 2 (referring in particular to combi-
nations between "hard" and "soft" modes of law in the context of European Un-
ion governance).
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"a temptation to meta-snobbery, snobbery over not being a snob(like pride in transcending pride), an apparent effort to exempt
oneself from the condition of morality (the divided human con-
dition) by surpassing it."516
The pragmatist impulse is to embrace the ordinary, lay ex-
perience. Ralph Waldo Emerson stated, "I embrace the com-
mon, I explore and sit at the feet of the familiar, the low." 5 17
John Dewey's "democratic faith in common people" involved
scorn for high theory and the praise for practice and small pro-jects.5 18 Building on these ideas, some thinkers claim the
precedence of direct experience over expertise, contending that
the latter "sacrifices the insight of common sense to intensity of
experience. It breeds an inability to accept new views from the
very depth of its preoccupation with its own conclusions." 519
At the same time, however, governance embraces the es-
sential significance of transparency and information disclosure.
In the complex, highly technical environment of the twenty-
first century, abundance in information demands an equivalent
abundance in resources and knowledge to apprehend it. The
governance model must assure that disclosure requirements,
such as those we have discussed in the environmental field, will
achieve its intended goals. Given the increased significance and
complexity of information, the simultaneous and ongoing dis-
persion of decision making creates certain risks. The produc-
tion, distribution, and processing of information has become the
key source of wealth in the information age. 520 However, infor-
mation is not worth much if there are insufficient means to use
it, sort it, make sense of it, apply it, and upgrade it. Indeed, too
much information can be debilitating and counterproductive. In
the context of federal agencies, Jerry Mashaw and David
Harfst have documented how judicial insistence on exhaustive
information for the federal auto safety program has impaired
the ability of agencies to make important advancements in
safety. 52 1 In the context of individual consumers, psychologists
516. STANLEY CAVELL, CONDITIONS HANDSOME AND UNHANDSOME: THE
CONSTITUTION OF EMERSONIAN PERFECTIONISM, at xx-xxi (1988).
517. ALBERSTEIN, supra note 30, at 10 (citing RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Na-
ture, in SELECTED ESSAYS 36 (Larzer Ziffed., 1982)).
518. Id. at 12.
519. GLEN 0. ROBINSON ET AL., THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 25 (1993)(citing Harold J. Laski, The Limitations of the Expert, HARPER'S MAG., Dec.
1950, at 101).
520. Balkin, supra note 39, at 3.
521. JERRY L. MASHAW AND DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
[89:342
THE RENEW DEAL
have documented the ways in which information ubiquity can
curtail people's ability to make informed choices. 522 Asymmetry
of resources among private groups and differences in the or-
ganization of knowledge communities further exacerbate these
problems. 523 Moreover, the digital age has made a new kind of
scarcity pertinent. Spam e-mailing is a paradigmatic example,
illuminating how the costs of information processing, distribu-
tion, and filtering shift from the distributor to the receiver.
524
The ready availability of ubiquitous information as well as new
ways to transmit it has brought new concern about the scarcity
of audience attention-popularly termed "the eyeball di-
lemma."525 In information-based initiatives, such as those we
have discussed in the context of environmental policies and e-
regulation, variations in the capacity of stakeholders to utilize
newly available data effectively are critical to their ability to
contribute to governance processes in a meaningful way.
The Renew Deal vision must resist the illusion of informa-
tion and transparency-that the information age, through its
own mechanisms, can solve all problems. The illusion is two-
fold. First, it elides the tension between the desire of a society
to radically disperse decision making and the insistence on re-
taining the ability of decision makers to make meaningful
choices. Second, there is some tendency to assume that com-
prehensive and widespread information on an issue will even-
tually lead people to converge normatively on the same posi-
tions.
In this context, the current dominance of economic exper-
tise presents a particular risk. Pairing proliferated participa-
tion with the pervasiveness of economic jargon risks coloniza-
tion of governance by economic models. Colonization is
particularly dangerous in contexts of organizational reliance on
SAFETY 95-103 (1990).
522. See On Amir and Dan Ariely, The Pain of Deciding: Indecision, Flexi-
bility, and Consumer Choice Online (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (finding that under circumstances of ubiquitous information, con-
sumers are more likely to fall into indecision).
523. See, e.g., John Kennan & Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Private In-
formation, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 48-50 (1993). For more information on
knowledge communities, see MARTIN CARNOY, SUSTAINING THE NEW
ECONOMY: WORK, FAMILY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 152-89(2000).
524. Balkin, supra note 39, at 7.
525. Id.
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technical formulae for value-driven policy choices.526 The risk is
enhanced because of the pervasive idea in modern thought that
value judgments are subjective, while statements of fact are
capable of being objectively true and warranted.5 27 The govern-
ance model must resist the allocation of decision-making proc-
esses at the level of financial knowledge, rather than through
substantive policy debates, even if both potentially occur under
participatory, collaborative, and inclusive conditions.5 28 Due to
this fear and despite the growing enthusiasm about new gov-
ernance networks, it is not surprising that some perceive such
multilateral participatory networks as a technocratic conspir-
acy intended to depoliticize issues in ways that will inevitably
benefit the rich and powerful at the expense of the poor and
weak. 529 One of the central goals of the new model must there-
fore be to explore how information ubiquity and technical jar-
gon impairs the ability to truly participate in a polity. 530
526. See generally HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE
DICHOTOMY (2002) (examining the history of the fact/value dichotomy and ap-
plying that to the field of economics). The regulatory model seeks to sort out
fact from value. For example, take Amartya Sen's capabilities approach to wel-
fare economics and his concept of human flourishing, and the realization that
questions of economics and questions of ethics cannot be neatly separated. See,
e.g., AMARTYA K. SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985). Economics is
most often reluctant to delve into a discussion of what human flourishing
might mean. Such questions are deemed 'subjective,' and therefore not part of
the scientific inquiry. It is thus that the notion of fact has been contrasted in
modern thought both to values judgments and to analytic truth, "preventing
us from seeing how evaluation and description are interwoven and interde-
pendent." PUTNAM, supra, at 3. Rational choice assumes completeness; science
presupposes values, epistemic values, such as coherence and simplicity. Id.
527. Id.; cf. Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 931 (2000) (critiquing the narrow scope of values applied in
standard cost-benefit analysis).
528. Within public administration, this risk can be seen when decision-
making powers are shifted from an agency such as OSHA or the Environ-
mental Protection Agency to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
OMB's lack of substantive expertise provided a frequent cause for criticism.
MCGARITY, supra note 32, at 281. In the corporate world, similar tendencies
have been proven to inhibit innovation. DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE RECKONING
500 (1986); Farber, supra note 9, at 1286-87 (1993).
529. Slaughter, supra note 111, at 347-48.
530. The governance model must also grapple with the problem of incom-
mensurability of different contexts. In some governance literature, big and
small problems are treated as one. On the possibility of moving from one scale
to another, see JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN
CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM 229-70 (1990); Carol J. Greenhouse, Figur-
ing the Future: Issues of Time, Power, and Agency in Ethnographic Problems of
Scale, in JUSTICE AND POWER IN SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES 108 (Bryant G. Garth &
Austin Sarat eds., 1998).
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Several of the case studies that we have explored signify a
continuous need to provide knowledge and training for new en-
trants. For example, in the context of workforce development
and vocational training, local community-based organizations
have recognized the importance of capacity building of their
members engaged in collaborative private/public partnerships.
Local programs under the new Workforce Investment Act train-
ing regime provide nongovernmental partners opportunities to
attend workshops and training sessions on political organizing,
public speaking, and active membership in network community
associations. 531 Recognizing the difficulties in opening up the
public arena to private nonprofessional participants, other gov-
ernance initiatives similarly require citizens and participating
partner organizations to undergo training in such areas as
budgeting and finance, organizational behavior, strategic plan-
ning, and legal issues. 532 Only through adequate ongoing train-
ing and government support can a shift to governance success-
fully combine both participatory decision making and
professionalism. 533 By and large, political and legal theorists
have contrasted theories of democratic representation with
those of direct participation. 534 At its best, the governance
model should aim to combine expertise and experience-
involving representatives in many avenues while recognizing
the importance of direct engagement.
531. Osterman, supra note 282, at 252.
532. For example, in the context of school reform, restructuring in Chicago
has involved a decentralization of authority from district-wide administration
to Local School Councils (LSCs) that are composed of elected parents, commu-
nity residents, and teachers, as well as the principals. JOEL HANDLER, DOWN
FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT
199-203 (1996). Chicago's LSCs improved parent and community involvement
and focused greater attention on local needs. Id. Parents and community par-
ticipants have been required to undergo training in areas such as school budg-
eting and finance. DEEPENING DEOMOCRACY, supra note 20, at 29.
533. See, e.g., HANDLER, supra note 532, at 206-09, 234-35.
534. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 77 (1980); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 223, 268 (1986) ("[T]he alternative is to abandon representa-
tive democracy in favor of either the anarchy of direct participation or the tyr-
anny of judicial despotism."); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe,
100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2469-70 (1991) ("Obviously, democracy cannot exist in a
modern polity as in 'the Greek Polis' or 'the New England town.' Representa-
tive democracy replaces direct participation. Nonetheless, democracy can be
measured by the closeness, responsiveness, representativeness, and account-
ability of the governors to the governed.").
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C. ACCOUNTING FOR POWER IN A NONHIERARCHICAL
COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENT
We have seen that a basic premise of the governance model
is that participatory, collaborative, and flexible approaches can
generate win-win situations. The theme of win-win is reminis-
cent of the postwar Legal Process school. In the Hart and Sacks
legal process materials, the theme of multiple winners is de-
scribed as "the fallacy of the static pie":
The proposition that the supply of the good things of life is not fixed
but expansible holds true even of tangible satisfactions, which the ex-
ponents of the dog-eat-dog view of human existence are likely to have
chiefly in mind. It is still more conspicuously true of the intangible
satisfactions of life, which are intensely desired also, and all the more
intensely as the more urgent of tangible needs are met.5 35
In order to be effective, the governance model must not ac-
cept a naive account of the win-win theme. Situations in which
multiple interests are mutually enforcing are context specific.
Unlike first-generation legal processors, most governance
scholarship constructs a more sophisticated depiction of limited
resources in society. In fact, as we have seen, some of the schol-
arship's leading substantive areas involve the most difficult
contexts of scarce resources, such as low-wage work, welfare,
and distributive social policy. The governance school must
therefore develop a richer basis for approaching collaboration
in situations of pervasive competition, power imbalances, and
limited resources.
It would be irresponsible to discuss the shift from a state-
centered regulatory model to a new governance model based on
collaboration and the empowerment of diverse actors without
asking who will win and who will-at least some of the time-
lose. The significance of bureaucratic structures in the Webe-
rian ideal includes the predictability of a rule-bound admini-
stration.5 36 What will replace the formalities of rules in flexible,
collaborative, and relatively informal structures?
We must recognize the possibility that instead of resulting
in a virtuous circle, a shift to governance approaches may pro-
duce a vicious cycle under certain circumstances-tilting more
and more entitlements in favor of those already in power. A
central challenge for the governance model is therefore to un-
derstand how collaborative environments can be nurtured to
535. HART & SACKS, supra note 231, at 102-03.
536. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY 1394-95 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
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produce equitable results, especially in settings where vast
power imbalances exist. This challenge is particularly resonant
today, as a "deficit-induced imperative to limit government
spending" has become part of our fin de sicle legacy. 53 7 Com-
mitment to regulation and its enforcement has eroded. 538 Dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s, government began to withdraw from
its role as an active player in the market, at the same time al-
locating fewer resources for traditional enforcement. 539 Disturb-
ingly, some contemporary reform projects "appear merely to be
attempts to reduce benefits under the guise of governance and
experimentation."5 40 Reform agendas for the new economy
must not confuse the adoption of the new governance model
with a declining commitment to public values and needs.
54 1
The transcendence of left/right political alignments within
the legal world has been described in the previous sections as
an important asset of the governance model. Legal scholars
long identified with progressive social reform are recognizing
that governance need not be a clear-cut left or right ideological
project.5 42 This realization enables scholars to engage in a prac-
537. DONAHUE, supra note 109, at 3.
538. See id.; R. Kent Weaver, Ending Welfare As We Know It, in THE
SOCIAL DIVIDE: POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FUTURE OF ACTIVIST
GOVERNMENT 382-86, 392-99 (Margaret Weir ed., 1998).
539. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 538, at 382-99.
540. Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers
and Welfare "Reform", 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 741, 745 (1993).
541. See generally Lobel, supra note 90, at 2045-46 (discussing the dy-
namic between rules and morality).
542. See, e.g., John C. Dernbach, Toward a National Sustainable Develop-
ment Strategy, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 101-02 (2003). According to Dern-
bach:
Sustainable development falls outside the left/right political spectrum
in which most people traditionally think about environmental politics.
Among other things, though, sustainable development.., premised
on the importance of private efforts and the removal of subsidies-two
points that are consistently emphasized by the right (but not exclu-
sively by the right). But it is also premised on an ambitious and broad
set of environmental goals and a desire to eradicate large-scale pov-
erty-two points that are consistently emphasized by the left (but not
only by the left). Because sustainable development is neither left nor
right, liberal nor conservative, and because it is not primarily envi-
ronmentalist or primarily business-oriented, it does not fit into the
traditional left/right spectrum. Moreover, the emphasis of sustainable
development on thinking and acting for the long-term is hard to fit
into political election cycles.
Id. (citations omitted); cf. Handler, supra note 494, at 722 (describing the
problems of the new populism as "neither left nor right" (quoting CARL BOGGS,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL POWER: EMERGING FORMS OF RADICALISM
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tice of remembering and forgetting, strategically engaging in
"magical realism" or "real utopias"-envisioning the ideal in
nonideal circumstances.543 While embracing this ambiguity and
uncertainty is a strength of the governance paradigm, it is,
however, not free of risks. Governance proponents need to
make sure that converging to a seemingly unaffiliated dis-
course does not overlook important questions.
The most promising analyses in the governance school are
those writings that directly consider the question of power.
Shifts from one paradigm to another are always about shifts in
power allocation. Governance processes not only provide a
framework for decision making and action, but also alternate
the power relations among the participants. Thus, governance
scholars have pointed to the need for a growing convergence of
interests to "reach a synergetic effect or a 'win-win' situa-
tion."544 The ability of groups to successfully interact under
situations of asymmetrical power is at the center of much de-
bate. While some consider informality-derived from involve-
ment of the relatively unstructured and weak nongovernmental
organizations-as an empowering feature, others view this self-
claimed weakness as strategic powerlessness that only consti-
tutes other means of maintaining existing social hierarchies. 545
Some scholars view cooperative relationships as necessarily
compromising the ability to exert pressure. 546 Others allege
that cooperation can only occur in the rare circumstances in
which the powerful believe empowerment to be a good thing, in
IN THE WEST (1986))).
543. On magical realism, see Lucie White, Global Forces, Life Projects, and
the Place of Care: Conversations with Women in Project Head Start, in
GLOBALIZING INSTITUTIONS: CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION AND INNOVATION
145, 148 (Jane Jenson & Boaventura de Sousa Santos eds., 2000). On "real
utopias," see Erik Olin Wright, The Real Utopias Project: Overview, at http://
www.ssc.wisc.edu/-wright (last visited Sept. 27, 2004).
544. Kooiman, supra note 14, at 251.
545. See Lobel, supra note 38, at 28-40.
546. A radical expression of this view is given by Richard Cloward and
Frances Fox Piven, who argue that the power of underprivileged groups lies
precisely in their power to (illegally) disrupt. See generally FRANCES Fox
PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY
SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL (1979); FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A.
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (2d
ed. 1993). In their view, formal organizing and engagement with other groups,
in negotiation or legal reform activities, is inherently co-optive because it cur-
tails this potential and capacity of disruption, drawing the movement to or-
derly strategies. Id.
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other words, where the powerless have a tangible resource of
value. 547
Generally, when the interests of various actors are more
likely to converge, governance is more likely to be effective.
Writing about the emerging EU regime, Oliver Gerstenberg
and Charles F. Sabel state broadly that the starting point for
their proposed experimentalist model is the implication of radi-
cal indeterminacy, and, in particular, "that, in a complex world,
'strong' actors cannot rule out the possibility that they will
come to depend on solutions discovered by 'weak' ones."54
8
Other governance scholars have been careful not to make
overarching generalizations. In his book Down From Bureauc-
racy: The Ambiguities of Privatization and Empowerment, Joel
547. This debate is deeply present in discussions about the adequate
framework for labor relations and collective bargaining. See generally Lobel,
supra note 87 (discussing the competitive/cooperative duality that empowers
employees in the workplace); Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial Sys-
tem: An Argument Against Judicial Revision of Section 8(a)(2) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1667-68 (1983). These questions
also arise in discussions of Alternative Dispute Resolution. See HANDLER, su-
pra note 532 (providing an excellent account of the promising contexts in
which dependent or powerless groups can cooperate in a meaningful way with
powerful private or public groups and organizations); Valerie A. Sanchez, Back
to the Future of ADR: Negotiating Justice and Human Needs, 18 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 743-51 (2003); see also infra notes 550-555 and accom-
panying text. For an exchange about the possibilities of empowerment through
cooperation in the contexts that Joel Handler explores, see Joel F. Handler,
Living with Ambuiguity, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 223 (1998) and Julie A.
White & John Gilliom, Up from the Streets: Handler and the Ambuiguities of
Empowerment and Dependency, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 203 (1998). The lit-
erature on regulatory negotiation also provides insights into the dynamics of
the cooperative-adversarial debate. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, American
Administrative Law Under Siege: Is Germany a Model?, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1279, 1283 (1994) (noting that negotiated rulemaking can be successful in par-
ticular contexts of environmental issues); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus
Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J.
1206 (1994) (demonstrating that not all stakeholders are represented in the
model of regulatory negotiation, and discussing instances in which the model
can nonetheless help clarify the values at stake and assist disparate groups in
reaching meaningful consensus within an identified range of choices); see also
Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Nego-
tiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997) (providing broad critical views of
regulatory negotiation); William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millen-
nium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46
DUKE L.J. 1351 (1997) (same).
548. Oliver Gerstenberg & Charles F. Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyar-
chy: An Institutional Ideal for Europe?, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE'S
INTEGRATED MARKET 289, 292-93 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse
eds., 2002).
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Handler looks explicitly at the consequences of decentraliza-
tion, deregulation, and privatization to citizen empowerment. 549
Handler rightly understands power struggles as including "not
only the definition of values but also the arenas and procedures
of conflict."550 Rather than equating the move to the local with
empowerment, he sees the relationship between the "localized"
and "empowered" as contingent and unstable. Handler de-
scribes empowerment as a dynamic, reflexive developmental
process that is dependent on context. 55 1 He indicates that shifts
for subordinate groups in terms of where and how regulation
takes place "might only mean 're-regulation under another
master."' 552 Handler further warns that the process of empow-
erment through governance depends on constant renewal, be-
cause such shifts are always unstable, tentative, and easy to
undermine and co-opt by bureaucratizing the local institution
(whether private, public, or hybrid).55 3 Successful renewal en-
tails taking seriously the concept of process, in which the shar-
ing of power, while not a zero-sum contest, invariably involves
an alteration of power. 554 Always lurking in the background is
the possibility that cooperative relations will become adversar-
ial if one party believes it will be made better off from the
change.555
In many of the contexts we have explored, stronger parties
are able to see the benefits of a shift to the governance model.
These benefits include increased knowledge and information,
the stability that is reached through agreement, and, at times,
the existence of bona fide shared interests. For example, in the
area of health and safety governance initiatives, OSHA has
been able, in certain environments, to successfully promote col-
laboration within the firm between workers and employers be-
cause of a convergence of a number of positive factors. First, all
parties broadly perceive the prevention of accidents as a posi-
tive and moral goal. Second, firms often need to maintain a
549. HANDLER, supra note 532.
550. Id. at 4.
551. Id. at 115-16.
552. Id. at 5.
553. Id. at 168.
554. Id. at 216-18. Two categories are distinguished under Handler's
framework: empowerment by invitation, in which the powerful provide the re-
sources for empowerment; and empowerment through conflict, in which the
powerless obtain the resources on their own from the larger community. Id. at
133-219.
555. Id. at 220.
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good public image, and promoting a safe work environment can
contribute to their public relations efforts. As a result, employ-
ers are likely to actively engage in the improvement of safety
conditions within their firms. Third, since regulatory violations
are often ambiguous, the cooperative mode has proven at times
to be more effective in preventing accidents and achieving
workplace safety.556
Sociologist Joe Rees, who carefully studied the implemen-
tation of a governance approach to occupational health and
safety in the construction sector in California, found that in
successful cases both management and labor faced strong in-
centives to cooperate. 557 Management viewed the traditional
inspection system as inadequate and burdensome and sought to
voluntarily improve safety due to the high costs of workers'
compensation. 558 The labor union was motivated to increase its
cooperation with management in order to prevent union de-
cline. 559 There was also a general agreement between manage-
ment and workers as to what constituted safety problems.
56 0
Moreover, the professional safety engineers within the firms
were relatively independent actors. 56 1 Their independence con-
tributed an additional balanced voice in labor-management
multiparty discussions about safety improvements. 562 Finally,
the appointment of a flexible but engaged compliance officer by
the state OSHA ensured continuing governmental facilitation
of the program. 563 Building on these sociological observations,
Jody Freeman suggests that the success of collaborative gov-
ernance as a regime of shared public/private authority depends
on "a fragile conjunction of ingredients." 564 Handler believes
that even in situations of extreme differences in power, a gov-
556. Id.; see also Freeman, supra note 3, at 49-55.
557. REES, supra note 310. Similarly, in the context of coal mine safety,
John Braithwaite has argued that cooperative policy measures better serve
the interests of workers. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE:
ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY 64 (1985); see also Sidney A. Shapiro &
Randy S. Rabinowitz, Punishment Versus Cooperation in Regulatory Enforce-
ment: A Case Study of OSHA, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 713, 716-24 (1997) (describ-
ing the utility of cooperative approaches to OSHA enforcement).
558. See REES, supra note 557, at 72.
559. Id. at 28-29.
560. Id. at 155.
561. Id. at 101-03.
562. See at 119-25.
563. Id. at 194-96.
564. Freeman, supra note 512, at 652.
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ernance approach can be sustained when expert administrators
or private parties come to rely on the weaker party's knowledge
and cooperation. 65 In such cases, mutually beneficial ex-
changes can occur.5 66 Handler suggests that transforming rela-
tionships from regulatory hierarchy to cooperative governance
requires the creation of "morally decent trust."56 7 In such rela-
tions, parties can be open about their motives and interests
without undermining the relationship.5 68 Yet, again, such a col-
laborative trust environment depends on the formation of re-
ciprocal and concrete incentives.569
In all of the domains we have documented, it is critical to
distinguish between gaining real power over real decisions and
real resources versus having merely advisory and knowledge-
dissemination capacities. In the private market, a lucid exam-
ple of the latter has been the adoption of various managerial
techniques under the title of "employee participation plans."570
565. JOEL F. HANDLER, LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 13-38
(1990).
566. See id. at 28-31 (describing the context of social service administra-
tion and suggesting that both administrators and clients may benefit from co-
operative relationships based on negotiation and mutual problem solving).
567. Id. at 136.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 127-29. An early example for participatory empowerment
through the invitation of government is Project Head Start. Established in the
1960s, Head Start was a unique experiment for its time, and has been claimed
by some commentators to be a program that embodies many of the features of
the contemporary governance vision. See, e.g., White, supra note 543, at 148.
Lucie White describes two central features that characterized the novelty of
Head Start. First, it established an open space for gathering as citizens. See
id. at 148-49. Second, it distributed lawmaking powers to the people most af-
fected by the program, the low-income parents of the children for whom the
program was designed. See id. at 160-61. Intended initially to help the chil-
dren, the program became a sanctuary for the low-income mothers who were
given the opportunity to become involved in its governance. Id. at 149. White
views these features as creating a new constitutional order of plural democ-
racy, rather than simply constituting direct redistribution of resources. Id. at
148. White, like Handler, is nonetheless cautious in making broad generaliza-
tions as to the feasibility of replicating these features in any context. See id. at
149-50 (describing the particular political and social context surrounding
Head Start's inception); see also supra notes 551-552 and accompanying text.
A significant aspect of the project, not explicitly mentioned by White, is that it
involved a morally accepted cause-the care of children-for which it is rela-
tively easy to mobilize support. Moreover, project Head Start was a compara-
tively small program, which raised less resistance than a large expensive pro-
gram might have. White, supra note 543, at 153.
570. See Lobel, supra note 87, at 150-53 (noting the rise of employee par-
ticipation plans and listing the different programs that might fall under this
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Many of the recently adopted schemes in the private sector,
such as "self-managed teams," have been depicted as empower-
ing forms of employee voice which can replace traditional ad-
versarial unionism, yet they are often used by management
merely as mechanisms for monitoring, controlling, and exerting
additional pressures on workers. 571 In the context of school re-
form initiatives, psychologists Dan Lewis and Kathryn Naka-
gawa similarly distinguish between an enablement paradigm,
in which there is only a technical participation for the ends of
the program, and an empowerment paradigm, in which partici-
pation takes on a political end-control over the program.
5 72
Unless there is complete identity between parties, there
are always conflicts of interests between the constituents of an
economic enterprise.5 7 3 Social relationships are both adversar-
ial and cooperative. In sociology, this reality has been termed
"antagonistic cooperation," which is defined as "[a] relationship
between or among persons in which they join their efforts to
produce something of value to the participants, while at the
same time being in conflict over other things, most particularly
the division among themselves of the product of their joint ef-
forts."574
These tensions may be enhanced or mitigated through pol-
icy and design, drawing on the concrete incentives for main-
taining a governance environment in different legal fields.
57 5
The governance model must therefore assume the difficult task
of developing a relational concept of power that is more com-
plex than the simple traditional top-down understandings that
form the analytical basis for the regulatory model. It must ac-
knowledge both the potential and the perils of systems of mul-
tiple authorities and interlocking power hierarchies constituted
under its principles.
category).
571. Id. at 169-72.
572. DAN A. LEWIS & KATHRYN NAKAGAWA, RACE AND EDUCATIONAL
REFORM IN THE AMERICAN METROPOLIS: A STUDY OF SCHOOL
DECENTRALIZATION passim (1995).
573. Lobel, supra note 87, at 188.
574. Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE
L.J. 1855, 2031 (1985).
575. Lobel, supra note 87, at 188.
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CONCLUSION:
GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY-
BETWEEN EFFICIENCY, LEGITIMACY, AND FAIRNESS
The legal system is at a critical juncture between the New
Deal regulatory system, deregulatory devolutions, and the Re-
new Deal governance paradigm. As the foregoing analysis of
renewal projects suggests, three overarching projects are inter-
twined in the Renew Deal vision: economic efficiency, political
legitimacy, and social democracy.
A. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
The governance model promotes more efficient organiza-
tion of public life, efficient use of public dollars, and effective
delivery of governmental services. It aims, methodologically, to
match means to ends more closely, and to enhance the impact
of law and policy. The efficiency project emphasizes the instru-
mental nature of the governance model's innovative features.
New governance mechanisms, including incentives for different
stakeholders to internalize externalities, to measure perform-
ance, to coordinate, and to share information, all serve to create
and maintain a better-functioning system. Both market and
government practices can improve through the generation of
more competition, choice, and involvement. By involving pri-
vate industry and drawing on local knowledge, for example, in
disseminating public funds for vocational training or promoting
citizens' electronic participation in rule promulgation by admin-
istrative agencies, governance can reduce administrative costs
and increase the cost-effectiveness of policymaking. At the
same time, we have seen that promoting self-governance, in-
dustry networks, and social capital within the private sector
can help organizations operate more effectively.
B. POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
The governance paradigm strives to restore the legitimacy
of the democratic process and the legal system. By actively in-
volving the private sector and supporting multilevel participa-
tion, the governance model addresses the increased dissatisfac-
tion with political life and decline of social engagement under
the regulatory regime. To achieve these goals, it stimulates in-
creased participation, deliberation, responsiveness, subsidiar-
ity, diversity, transparency, public scrutiny, and accountability.
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The political project emphasizes that policy stakes must be con-
crete, clear, transparent, and accessible. It asserts the value of
ongoing mechanisms and procedural safeguards to control
regulatory power and to ensure the legitimacy of collective de-
cisions about public life. By increasing the number of voices
that influence policy, as in the recent experiments of habitat
conservation and Internet standard setting, the aim is to build
an environment of structured deliberation together with differ-
entiated competences among social institutions.
C. SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
The third project concerns the question of how to better
achieve and promote the substantive ends that we value as a
public. This project includes both the protection of basic rights
and liberty and institutional responsiveness to human needs.
By promoting goals such as structural equality in the work-
place, the protection of animals and natural resources for fu-
ture generations, or community economic development, the
governance model strives for greater fairness of outcomes and
realities, equitable distribution, and the fair allocation of re-
sources, both material and symbolic.
While theoretical hybridization is a strength of the govern-
ance model, choices and balances must be made as the three
projects intertwine. Part VI described the risk of economic ap-
proaches colonizing the public discourse about values. A similar
risk is posed by privileging efficiency and legitimacy over sub-
stantive social democracy. The methodological and procedural
goals of governance operate within the context of substantive
normative arrangements. When tension arises, how do we
strike a balance between the ideal of participation as a goal in
itself and the ends it sets out to achieve? Is the Renew Deal era
missing substance?
One of the characteristics of the New Deal regulatory revo-
lution was the affirmation of the permissibility and legitimacy
of governmental redistribution. 576 The New Deal model was
committed to the idea of government as the agent of substan-
tive social reform. Through the creation of large programs such
as Social Security and Medicare, the federal government sig-
naled its role in social provision and distributional reform. The
governance model, innovative and promising for political and
576. Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitutional Virtues and Vices of the New
Deal, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219, 220 (1998).
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legal renewal, must not subvert older, long-fought-for substan-
tive arrangements. There is a tendency to equate shifts from
top-down regulation with deregulation, privatization, and devo-
lution. The new governance paradigm resists this dichotomized
world and requires ongoing roles for government and law. Cur-
rent reform proposals must resist the balkanization of social
policies in ways that reduce governmental roles in social re-
form-for example, through extensive welfare waivers to the
states. 577
To maintain the balance between the three overarching
projects of governance, ideas of good and value must still be
available and present in public discourse. Some Renew Deal
scholars have argued for a "new form of deliberation," which
employs the pragmatist tradition of "reciprocal determination
of means and ends."5 78 A strong collapse between means and
ends is a perilous step. The idea that core substantive ar-
rangements are left open becomes, under certain conditions, in-
sufficiently value-oriented. We do not want a paradigm in
which "conceptions of justice are ... infinitely plural,"579 sug-
gesting a lack of ability to have a normative objective stand-
point. As we continue to develop the new legal paradigm, Re-
new Deal scholars must consider how certain versions of the
governance model affect our ability to make normative and pre-
scriptive judgments and to advance public ends. The challenge
to unjust or unequal social realities derives from the rejection
of certain realities and the advancement of alternative ones.
The ability to engage in governance depends on the ability to
hold ideas about what is right and what is wrong. Within the
governance paradigm, reformers will continue to need inde-
pendent variables to judge the success of innovative ap-
proaches. A process or methodological framework alone will not
suffice. For procedural legitimacy to be meaningful, there must
be a commitment to public values, such as political equality,
which is endangered when power and wealth are deeply imbal-
577. Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty
Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739 (2002).
578. See A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, supra note 4, at
284.
579. See MacDonald, supra note 47, at 77. Legal pluralism emphasizes the
existence of plural legal orders that lend themselves to reconciliation, modifi-
cation or aggregation in a monist, hierarchical way. See id. This is an example
of a structure that is too loose and that does not sufficiently lend itself to or-
chestration and evaluation.
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anced. 580 Substantive criteria of the common good are required
to fully realize the potential of governance.
The multiplicity of projects that underlie the new vision
signifies the importance of a dialectic among normative theo-
ries.581 Democratic legitimacy embodies the entire range of val-
ues of effective governance, processes, and outcomes.
58 2 This
diversity is not a new feature unique to the emerging Renew
Deal era. Yet, the new paradigm must seek to fulfill its promise
of better grappling with diversity as it affects the quality of
public life. Indeed, underlying the paradigm shift from a regu-
latory to a governance model is a fundamental understanding
of the wealth of normative theory and practice. Most of us value
the core of each of the three normative projects of governance.
As William Eskridge asserts,
[Different normative theories] together more accurately capture our
political society than any one separately. We value individual auton-
omy (liberalism), but we also understand our interdependence (legal
process) and crave a society that stands for values we can be proud of
(normativism). As a result, we usually favor limited government, but
endorse state regulation to address social and economic problems and
to foster national values.
583
Addressing the problems of lawmaking, implementation,
and enforcement, advances in legal theory are increasingly
pointing to the possibility of renewal through governance. Re-
cent policy reform initiatives also provide glimmers of the prac-
tical potential of the governance model. Taken together, con-
temporary legal thought and practice is beginning to shed light
on the mismatch between dominant regulatory theories and so-
ciopolitical realities. Governance at its best signifies the com-
patibility of different theories of democracy-liberal, constitu-
tional, direct, representative, associative, participatory, and
deliberative. As it struggles to harmonize theory and practice,
580. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 159.
581. To provide an example of a dialectic among normative theories, the
value of individual justice in concrete cases often coexists and potentially con-
flicts with overall justice.
582. For a discussion of different strands in democratic theory, see gener-
ally AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
1552-53 (1996).
583. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
109 (1994). Frank Michelman, in a similar attempt to link competing ideals
that we commonly value, offers a genealogy of democratic concepts that seem
attractive to many. Frank I. Michelman, What (If Anything) Is Progressive-
Liberal Democratic Constitutionalism?, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 181, 184-96
(1999). Michelman moves from liberalism to constitutionalism to democracy to
progressivism. Id.
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the governance model is better positioned to fulfill the promises
of a twenty-first century Renew Deal.
